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Abstract 
 
South African insurance companies have made substantial in-roads into the low-income 
segments of the insurance market. The strength of microinsurance—insurance products 
designed specifically for low-income individuals—has been fueled almost exclusively by 
the sale of funeral insurance products, an unsurprising trend considering the immense 
cultural value that many South Africans place on funerals. Insurance companies have 
managed to achieve scale by tapping into community-based infrastructures, which serve 
as low-cost distribution channels for these products. The incursion of “insurance 
culture” into this space has thus resulted in a market ecosystem in which formal and 
informal institutions are in fluid states of tension and cooperation. Building on 
institutional theory and adopting ethnography as its primary methodological approach, 
this thesis examines the institutional dynamics underpinning South African 
microinsurance markets. Based on fieldwork I conducted from June 2015-April 2016 
(based primarily in Cape Town and the neighboring township of Khayelitsha), my thesis 
will highlight the ways in which formal and informal institutions interact to produce 
regulatory outcomes that enable and/or constrain individual actors. While these 
institutional structures shape individual decision-making with regard to risk management, 
I also consider the ways in which individuals exercise agency to navigate shifting 
institutional landscapes and effect change in underlying structures. Thus, this thesis 
contributes to the debates on microinsurance, as well as on financial inclusion more 
broadly, reframing them within this complex interplay between institutions and actors.   
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A Note on Currency 
 
 
 
 
During June 2015-April 2016, the period of research, the South African rand fluctuated: 
On average it was equal to £0.05 GBP and US$0.07. 
 
That is, R10=0.5 pence or US$0.70; R100=£5 or US$7.00
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1—Introduction 
 
Before dawn broke on the morning of 5 February 2016, Goodwill Nxusani and 
his wife were already awake in their small, corrugated iron shack in Khayelitsha, a large 
township on the outskirts of Cape Town. They had a long journey ahead of them. Along 
with their three children and a handful of relatives, they quickly loaded into two mini-bus 
taxis full of pots, pans, and other cooking equipment. A hearse carrying the body of 
Goodwill’s father-in-law soon joined this convoy of taxis, and together, set off shortly 
after 4:00 AM.  
Their destination was Queenstown in the Eastern Cape, approximately 1,000 km 
away by car. With road accident fatalities on the rise in the last 3 years (a 19% increase 
from 2013-2016 according to the Road Traffic Management Corporation1), this journey 
was not without risk. Thankfully, after a rigorous, nearly 12-hour journey, they arrived 
safely at their destination. But there was little time for rest, particularly for the women. 
The next day, there was to be a feast for the approximately 300-400 people who were 
attending the funeral ceremony, and the food needed to be prepared. While Goodwill 
held court with his relatives, his wife got straight to work with the other women in the 
family. They would work throughout the night. 
On Saturday, 6 February, the family gathered in the late morning hours to pay 
their final respects with a traditional Xhosa funeral befitting a patriarch. Hymns were 
sung; livestock in the form of cows and sheep were slaughtered to mark the occasion; the 
guests were served food. The post-funeral feast was a restrained yet warm affair, a sort of 
staid family reunion. The pots, pans, and cookware were cleaned and the mini-buses 
were loaded back up. After they said their farewells, Goodwill and his family began the 
long return journey back to Khayelitsha. 
                                               
1 http://www.rtmc.co.za/  
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Depending on who one asks, this occasion might seem like an unusual setting for 
a study on microinsurance. But for those who have had any experience with South 
Africa’s massive funeral services market, it would make intuitive sense for a Xhosa 
funeral to be the starting point for such an empirical investigation. In fact, it was this 
strange conjuncture between the off-grid intimacy of an indigenous life-cycle event like a 
funeral on the one hand and the calculating efficiency of insurance companies on the 
other that first provoked my curiosity. How were these disparate realms connected? 
What were the underlying mechanisms that brought them together? 
This world of funeral rituals and actuarial logics brings together a diverse range 
of actors that make for the unlikeliest of bedfellows. Building on the momentum 
generated by the “microfinance revolution” (Robinson, 2001) in the past few decades, 
microinsurance has generated interest from development scholars and practitioners, 
multinational insurance corporations, community-based entrepreneurs, mutual-aid 
solidarity groups, and policymakers—all with their own agendas, and thus, their own 
ideas about how microinsurance might fit within these respective agendas.  
Innovative frameworks have emerged to try to reconcile these competing 
interests—Bottom-of-the-Pyramid (BoP) business models, financial inclusion agendas, 
market-led development frameworks, to name a few—but gaps and disjunctures remain. 
Unsurprisingly, as empirical research has demonstrated over the years, the objectives of 
the market do not always align neatly with those of development, poverty reduction, 
indigenous self-help institutions, and in the case of microfinance, individual 
empowerment (see Rahman, 1999; Rankin, 2001; Elyachar, 2005; Harvey, 2007; Karnani, 
2007; Roy, 2010; Edwards, 2011; and Roodman, 2012). 
This inherent tension is the starting point for my analysis. Adopting ethnography 
as my primary methodological approach, I examine the institutional dynamics that 
underpin South Africa’s emergent microinsurance market. In so doing, I distinguish 
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between formal institutions as embodied by insurance companies and state regulatory 
regimes, and informal institutions as embodied by community-based businesses like 
funeral parlors and mutual-aid schemes, popularly known as burial societies. The 
interactions between these formal and informal institutions produce regulatory outcomes 
that enable and/or constrain both providers and microinsurance clients. As I will argue 
throughout this thesis, these dynamics don’t strip actors of their agency (by pre-
determining their behavior), but rather produce new and shifting institutional landscapes, 
which actors must then learn to navigate. I will thus consider the question of agency in 
relation to my analysis of formal and informal institutional dynamics. Ultimately, what 
this thesis seeks to understand is what this interplay between institutions and actors 
means for the risk and welfare outcomes associated with microinsurance. 
Setting the Scene: The South African Microinsurance Landscape 
 
Over the past decade, microinsurance—formal insurance products designed 
specifically for low-income people—has taken off in South Africa. According to the 
Microinsurance Network2, South Africa alone accounts for more than half of the 62 
million lives covered by microinsurance policies on the African continent. In 2014, it is 
estimated that microinsurance premiums written in South Africa amounted to nearly 
$609 million USD. Moreover, indicators suggest that the market is in the midst of a rapid 
expansionary phase; the MicroInsurance Centre estimates that from 2008-2014, the 
microinsurance coverage ratio increased from just 17% to nearly 64%, a gain of 
approximately 26 million additional lives covered every year.3 Unsurprisingly, these 
trends have drawn much attention from the insurance industry, which has been quick to 
embrace microinsurance as a potential vehicle into untapped growth markets.  
                                               
2 Source: http://worldmapofmicroinsurance.org/  
3 Source: http://www.microinsurancecentre.org/ 
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The rapid growth of this market is fueled almost exclusively by the sale of funeral 
insurance policies, perhaps unsurprising given the immense cultural value assigned to 
funerals. Despite their low incomes, poor South Africans have strong cultural and social 
motivations to hold dignified (and expensive funerals) for their deceased relatives (Bähre, 
2007b). Historically, they have had to turn to informal sources of finance to meet their 
financial needs, including those related to the high costs of these funerals. Examples of 
these are the aforementioned burial societies, which are community-based pooling 
schemes designed to help defray funeral costs, as well as informal funeral parlor 
businesses. 
The key innovation that has enabled South African insurance companies to 
achieve mass scale of their microinsurance operations was partnering with these 
indigenous burial societies and funeral parlors, rather than incurring the heavy costs of 
setting up their own retail and distribution networks. These deeply embedded 
community-based structures simultaneously serve as distribution channels and as client 
aggregators that help form naturally occurring risk-pools, which are then underwritten on 
a group basis (see Fischer and Qureshi, 2006). Building on these initial in-roads, 
insurance companies have also been able to establish retail storefronts in low-income 
areas like townships. In these brick-and-mortar operations, insurance companies often 
employ agents from within the community who have the fluency to speak to the 
languages and cultures of the targeted clientele. The incursion of “insurance culture” 
(Cohen and Sebstad, 2006: p.42) into this low-income, predominantly informal sphere 
has thus resulted in an ecosystem in which formal and informal institutions are in fluid 
states of tension and cooperation, a relationship that is of core interest to this thesis. 
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The rapid growth of the 
microinsurance market has coincided with a 
number of factors that have fueled a rising 
mortality rate in South Africa, particularly in 
the mid-1990s-mid-2000s (Statistics South 
Africa, 2017). A key driver for this was the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, which peaked in 
2006 (see Figure 1). After what many 
criticized as the government’s lackadaisical response to the epidemic, a national rollout of 
antiretroviral drugs in 2005 seems to have been effective in lowering the number of 
AIDS related deaths per annum. Regardless, South Africa’s HIV/AIDS infection and 
mortality rates remain among the highest in the world.  
South Africa is also plagued by notorioulsy high levels of crime. In 2015/2016, 
nearly 34 murders were recorded per 100,000 people, or an average of 51.2 murders per 
day.4 Mortality rates attributed to road accidents have also been persistently high over the 
past two decades. From 2000-2016, road fatalities have gone up from 19.60 to 25.17 
deaths per 100,000 people.5 These road fatalities also tend to spike during heavy travel 
periods like the holidays or, tragically, when relatives are traveling to and from major 
events like funerals.  
Taken together, what becomes clear is that the social and financial functions of 
burial societies and funeral parlors are performed under increasing pressure. Rising 
mortality rates have translated into more frequent payouts for local burial societies and 
fewer surviving members to replenish their funds. Moreover, research has shown that 
these informal financial mechanisms are particularly vulnerable to external shocks and 
                                               
4 Source: https://www.saps.gov.za/services/final-crime-stats-release-02september2016.pdf 
5 Source: https://www.arrivealive.co.za/United-Nations-Decade-of-Action-for-Road-Safety-2011-2020 
Figure 1- Births and Deaths for the period 2002-2016. 
Taken from Statistics South Africa, Statistical Release 
P0302 
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covariate risks, which would include epidemics like HIV/AIDS or persistently high rates 
of violence (De Weerdt, 2005; Morduch, 2006). So while these institutions have 
demonstrated remarkable adaptability and resilience over time, the confluence of these 
more recent factors have compelled them to partner with insurance companies to remain 
financially viable. Thus, formal and informal structures involved in the provision of 
microinsurance exist in a co-dependency; burial societies and funeral parlors increasingly 
need to be underwritten to remain solvent, and insurance companies need informal 
infrastructures to gain access to a client base with an increasing demand for insurance 
products that can cope with rising death rates. This putatively symbiotic, mutually-
beneficial partnership between insurance companies and burial societies/funeral parlors 
is the empirical focal point for this study.  
Locating the Thesis: Informality, Financial Inclusion, and Microinsurance  
 
Development practitioners and scholars have framed microinsurance as a 
market-based instrument that can supplement or take the place of state-based social 
protection systems that have failed to provide adequate coverage for informal sector 
workers (Siegel et al., 2001; Arun and Steiner, 2008). In many developing countries, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, state-based social security systems were designed to be 
linked to formal sector employment on the assumption that the formal sector would 
expand as countries developed/industrialized. But contrary to the expectations of many, 
an era of industrial development, market liberalization, and globalization did not lead to a 
wide-scale decline in the size of the informal economy/sector. In fact, the evidence 
suggests quite the opposite has happened; the informal economy is expanding and 
continues to be a critical source for employment, income/wages, and service provision 
(Meagher, 2003; Schneider et al., 2011; ILO, 2011; Meagher and Lindell, 2013).  
This recognition has provoked a shift in the way the informal sector is 
conceptualized and approached within development policy circles. No longer viewed as 
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some unincorporated, underdeveloped, and/or unproductive economic sector, the 
informal economy is increasingly seen as a source of economic dynamism and 
entrepreneurial potentialities (see Castells and Portes, 1989; De Soto, 2000; Maloney, 
2004; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007; Jütting & de Laiglesia, 2009). More attention has 
been paid to finding arrangements that work in the informal sector in order to re-
purpose them toward new, more productive ends (Kelsall, 2008). Various agendas and 
frameworks have emerged under different headings like “inclusive markets,” “markets 
for the poor,” (M4P) and “bottom-billion capitalism,” all of which emphasize the need 
to incorporate informal infrastructures into formal market systems that promise to yield 
more inclusive forms of growth (De Haan and Thorat, 2013; De Mello and Dutz, 2014; 
ADB, 2014). 
BoP ventures and articulations, for instance, stress how the poor are “co-creators 
of value” and that they operate in a context filled with “usable” networks, structures, and 
institutions that can be leveraged to generate both profit and social welfare 
simultaneously. (Prahalad, 2006; UNDP, 2008; London and Hart, 2010; and Rivera-
Santos and Rufin, 2010). These perspectives are deeply rooted within frameworks that 
conceptualize microinsurance as both a development tool and a potentially profitable 
business opportunity. The viability of microinsurance in South Africa rests on the ability 
of insurance companies to tap into and re-purpose community-based, indigenous, 
“informal” infrastructures—e.g. burial societies, funeral parlors, churches, “stokvels” 
(mutual savings groups), and cooperatives—to distribute products more efficiently and 
affordably. 
But what are the implications of this re-purposing for informal institutional 
landscapes? What are the terms by which informal institutions are incorporated into or 
linked with formal markets and systems? And how do power inequalities shape the 
negotiation of these terms? These are some of the key questions that animate the more 
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critical perspectives on inclusionary agendas and discourses. Informal structures and 
workers may be included, but they may be “adversely incorporated” into formal systems 
on disadvantageous terms (Hickey and du Toit, 2007; Meagher and Lindell, 2013). 
Moreover, informal institutions are not merely reshaped and repurposed, but they also 
impact the social field in dynamic ways (Jütting et al., 2007; Casson et al., 2010). Power 
inequalities shape the interactions between formal and informal systems and are thus key 
factors in the distribution of benefits. 
These questions and critiques figure prominently in the debates surrounding 
microfinance and financial inclusion. The proliferation of microcredit and microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) worldwide has fuelled what Roy (2010: p.32) has called “neoliberal 
populism” or the notion that the poor can lift themselves out of poverty through access 
to a more “democratized” capital in the form of microcredit. In this framing, removing 
the barriers to the formal financial system is an integral component of poverty reduction 
(Beck et al., 2009; Cull et al., 2014; World Bank, 2014). But as critics have argued, this 
view that poverty is symptomatic of financial exclusion misses the ways in which the 
financial system itself can be the source of negative outcomes for the poor. 
Simultaneously, the focus is shifted away from the structural drivers of poverty while the 
burdens of escaping it are placed squarely on the shoulders of the poor (Rahman, 1999; 
Rankin, 2001; Roy, 2010; and Mader, 2014). 
These perspectives are useful anchors to locate and inform this study of 
microinsurance markets in South Africa. Microinsurance enthusiasts argue that this 
market-based instrument can extend coverage to those who have slipped through the 
cracks of the social safety net, particularly the poor who work in the informal economy. 
This view brings the state into a new sort of relationship with the market, one in which 
the former essentially outsources its traditional obligations to the latter. Thus, as 
anthropologist Erik Bähre has observed, commercial insurance “blurs distinctions 
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between the realm of the market and that of redistribution” (Bähre, 2011: p.374). At the 
same time, questions have been raised about the extent to which this outsourcing would 
essentially transform rights-holders into risk-bearers (Maurer, 1999). From this view, 
market and management technologies produce, rather than respond to risk, while the 
poor are re-constituted as market/insurance subjectivities. What does this mean for 
microinsurance clients and their ability to manage risk? And what does this mean for the 
informal risk management structures that have long been the last line of defense for low-
income households? 
Theoretical Framework and Research Questions 
 
The debates that frame the issue of financial inclusion and market-based 
approaches to development are seemingly at an impasse between the valorizing rhetoric 
of individual self-empowerment on the one hand and critical perspectives concerned 
more with the “dark side of inclusion” (Meagher, 2015: p.839) and/or adverse 
incorporation on the other. To move this debate forward, I have adopted an institutional 
framework to focus more attention on the institutional processes and dynamics that 
produce outcomes, rather than on the outcomes themselves. Through this institutionalist 
lens, the duality that is often used to describe South Africa’s economy can also be used to 
describe the divide between formal institutions, which are more prevalent in the 
developed sectors of the economy, and informal institutions, which hold more sway in 
the underdeveloped, “indigenous” segments of South African society. 
Throughout the thesis, I rely on institutional theory, which broadly defines 
institutions as the rules of the game of a society/organization, or more precisely, “the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: p.3). Building 
on this foundation, I further distinguish between formal and informal institutions. I 
identify formal institutions by utilizing the definition advanced by De Soysa and Jütting 
(2007: p.31) as “rules encapsulated in formal structures such as constitutions…formal 
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legal and property rights systems,” which are “enforced by official entities.” I rely on 
Helmke and Levitsky’s (2006: p.5) definition of informal institutions as “socially shared 
rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of 
officially sanctioned channels.” These might include “norms and customs regulating 
socio-economic life,” which “determine each individual’s position to others” (Casson et 
al., 2010: p.137). Unlike formal institutions, informal institutions are not enforced by the 
state, not generally codified, and yet, widely accepted as legitimate (De Soysa and Jütting, 
2007). 
Moreover, I build upon an analytical framework developed by De Soysa and 
Jütting, which conceptualizes the interaction between formal and informal institutions 
(see Appendix A). In their framework, formal and informal institutions are given equal 
analytical weight; their interactions produce institutional outcomes, which in turn lead to 
either positive or negative development outcomes. Crucially, their framework also 
accounts for the impact of external factors like “meta-institutions” (e.g. culture and 
identity) and “context” (e.g. history and geography), as well as the agency of political 
actors (e.g. industry lobbyists who push for a change in insurance law). 
In adapting this framework to my own study, I make a couple key adjustments to 
more accurately capture what I observed in the field (see Appendix B). First, I give a 
much more central role to agency, particularly as it relates to so-called gatekeepers who 
straddle the line between formal and informal institutional spheres. While agency is 
conceptualized as an external influence in De Soysa and Jütting’s framework, I found 
that it was the work of individual agents (i.e. insurance sales agents, funeral parlor 
operators, burial society administrators, etc.) that played a determining role in whether 
formal and informal institutions cohered or conflicted. They are thus embedded within, 
rather than external to, processes of institutional interaction.  
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Second, while my framework looks specifically at formal and informal 
institutions, it also considers the broader institutional environment in which institutions 
and actors operate. Among other things, this has allowed me to better understand how 
clients experience microinsurance. They do not simply interface with an insurance 
company, for example, they must learn to navigate a whole set of institutionalized 
systems in the formal sector that might include contracts, premium/claims 
administration regimes, and legal forms of recourse. These experiences stand in stark 
contrast to their more intuitive dealings in the informal institutional environment, which 
is typically regulated by social norms, traditions, and relational structures. These informal 
regulatory regimes are not only more familiar and intelligible to locals, the mechanisms 
for recourse are also more accessible. 
In understanding risk and welfare outcomes as by-products of a complex 
interaction between agents and formal/informal institutions, the thesis challenges the 
idea (central to the self-empowerment perspective) that simply improving access to 
formal financial products is enough to result in positive outcomes. As I will demonstrate, 
access is a necessary, yet insufficient condition to assure that microinsurance clients can 
realize the full benefits of financial inclusion. The thesis also challenges the somewhat 
deterministic view that formal entities like insurance companies and state regulators can 
simply re-shape and re-purpose informal infrastructures to serve the needs of capitalist 
enterprise. These perspectives tend to miss the crucial regulatory roles that social, 
informal institutions continue to play and the ways in which they can shape formal 
institutions as well. 
An important subtext of this theoretical framework, then, is that accounting for 
power dynamics is key to understanding processes of institutional change and the 
effectiveness of institutional outcomes. It is true that formal actors like regulators and 
insurance agents deploy a range of techniques to shape the microinsurance market; this 
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entails both discursive and managerial forms of power that appropriate informal 
institutions to serve the interests of the corporate bottom line. But as this thesis will 
demonstrate, the informal space is not a flat vacuum devoid of institutions and actors 
with agency, but is rather filled with complex power hierarchies and social networks. 
Moreover, informal operators subvert, circumvent, and negotiate with formal actors and 
thus contribute to the shaping of the institutional space. I thus approach microinsurance 
markets as a “terrain of contestation” (Elyachar, 2005: p.189), in which institutional and 
development outcomes are analyzed within the frame of political economy. 
The core research questions that structure this thesis are centered on this 
complex interplay between institutional structures (both formal and informal) and the 
agency of actors; I argue that they must be examined within the same analytical frame. As 
such, the research questions of the project are as follows: 
 
1. How do the interactions between formal and informal institutions affect the 
regulation of microinsurance markets? 
2. How do microinsurance providers (both formal and informal) navigate and affect 
the prevailing institutional structures? 
3. How do these institutional dynamics affect welfare outcomes for microinsurance 
clients?   
Guided by the research questions, the objectives of the thesis are threefold. First, 
the thesis will examine the interactions between formal and informal institutions, linking 
institutional outcomes to the regulatory effects they ultimately produce. By regulation, I 
am referring to both formal regulations, which are encapsulated in state laws and 
standard insurance practice, and to informal regulatory structures like social norms, 
customs, and socially shared rules, which govern burial societies and funeral parlors. 
Second, the thesis will examine the relationship between agency and processes of 
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institutional change/development. While the actions/strategies of individual actors are 
constrained by and respond to the prevailing institutional structure, they can also enable 
and/or distort outcomes, which can then induce institutional change. In other words, 
analysis must be attuned to the ways in which the direction of change flows both ways 
between agents and institutions. Third, the thesis provides an explicit focus on 
microinsurance clients and their perspectives/experiences as they navigate the 
institutional terrain to access microinsurance. Like providers, they must adapt to the 
emergent set of incentives and constraints inscribed in institutional structures. How does 
this affect their ability to manage risk? 
Chapter Structure 
  
 The chapters of the thesis are structured around these three main objectives, 
which are to examine: 1) The interaction between formal and informal institutions that 
underpin South Africa’s microinsurance market; 2) The agency of microinsurance 
providers; and 3) Welfare outcomes for microinsurance clients. But first, in the following 
chapter, I lay the theoretical foundation of the research project by reviewing the relevant 
literature under three broad themes. First, I outline the mainstream macro/micro-
economic case for microinsurance, as well as more critical anthropological perspectives 
on risk/insurance. Second, I review the wider debates around inclusive markets and 
financial inclusion within which various approaches to microinsurance take their shape. 
Does inclusion into formal financial (and microinsurance) markets lead inexorably to 
favorable welfare outcomes for the poor, or does inclusion entail new risks that can be 
disempowering? And third, since financial inclusion (via access to formal 
microinsurance) entails a process by which formal entities like insurance companies 
penetrate and restructure informal infrastructures, I turn to the vast institutionalist 
literature (i.e. New Institutional Economics, critical institutionalism) to shed light on how 
institutional dynamics/interactions are understood and conceptualized. Across these 
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three themes, the literature review outlines a framework built at the interstices of formal 
and informal institutional spheres, where the political economy of risk, microinsurance 
markets, and financial inclusion is most clearly revealed. The framework trains the 
empirical focus of the study on the underlying interactions between formal/informal 
institutions and the different actors engaged within the microinsurance value chain. How 
do these various interactions shape the distributional benefits of inclusion into formal 
insurance markets? 
 The ethnographic approach I took to my field site in South Africa 
(predominantly based in Cape Town and the township of Khayelitsha) is informed by 
the convergence of these various literatures. In Chapter 3, I discuss the qualitative as well 
as quantitative methods I adopted to address the core empirical questions of this study. 
Because the nature of these questions required that I conduct research in both formal 
and informal spheres, I had to design different data collection strategies accordingly. 
Moreover, an in-depth study on microinsurance meant that I had to find ways to procure 
potentially sensitive information on the intimate financial practices of the poor. This 
required that I take more long-term, relational approaches to many of my interview 
subjects. I discuss my rationale for each of the strategies I chose to employ, and I reflect 
upon the unique methodological challenges of conducting research in South Africa, 
particularly as it relates to overcoming racial, cultural, and linguistic barriers. 
 The empirical chapters explore the institutional dynamics of microinsurance 
markets and the ways in which different actors navigate the prevailing formal and 
informal institutional arrangements. But before analyzing the interactions between 
formal and informal institutions, it was important to first examine them separately as 
they are rooted in their own unique histories. Analyzing them separately allowed me to 
trace their respective evolutionary pathways over time, which helped to contextualize the 
logics by which these institutions operate.  
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 In Chapter 4, I focus on what I call informal institutions of risk management. 
Broadly, these refer to the set of social norms, conventions, rules, and traditions 
embodied by organizations like burial societies. In the informal space, institutional 
structures that cultivate norms of solidarity, cooperation, and reciprocity have long 
played key regulatory roles in the collective management of risks (related to death and 
funerals). In the context of Cape Town/Khayelitsha, these institutions have been shaped 
by the socio-political history surrounding Xhosa migration from the Eastern Cape to the 
Western Cape. Moreover, the Xhosa people’s deeply held cultural beliefs regarding death 
and their obligations to their ancestors are directly tied to the economics of the funeral 
industry, as well as to the way economic institutions (i.e. burial societies) have been 
designed to address them. Having set the cultural and historical frame, the chapter 
proceeds to analyze the regulatory/governance functions of modern burial societies. 
Varying in form and function, burial societies embody and enact the institutions that 
regulate social relations, financial flows, and risk management with relations to funerals. 
 Chapter 5 turns its attention to the formal institutions underpinning 
microinsurance markets. I situate the analysis within the context of the state and 
industry’s on-going efforts in the past decade to formalize the funeral insurance and 
services market. Though these efforts have largely been stymied, the state does seem to 
recognize the need to develop separate legislation tailored to microinsurance markets. 
Chief among the difficulties in crafting and passing such legislation, however, has been 
balancing the competing, often contradictory agendas of corporate interests, financial 
inclusion, consumer protection, and so-called “black economic empowerment” (BEE). 
The complexities of this balancing act and the various motivations that drive the 
formalization agenda are captured in the Microinsurance Regulatory Framework and the 
Financial Sector Charter, touchstone policy documents that I analyze along with other 
relevant documents within this policy domain. After having traced the political and 
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policy context of the current formalization agenda, the chapter turns to the underlying 
mechanics that drive it forward. The analysis focuses not only on the concrete market 
technologies and practices (e.g. market research, surveys, training, etc.) that are deployed 
to shape microinsurance markets, but also on the discursive frameworks cultivated to 
calibrate a social field that frames risk in ways that microinsurance products are 
particularly well suited to address. I challenge the normative assumptions behind a 
financial inclusion discourse that stresses “improved access,” by demonstrating how 
these managerial and discursive techniques produce/construct, rather than access, 
microinsurance markets and client subjectivities.  
 In many ways, Chapter 6 serves as the center of gravity for the thesis. After 
having examined formal and informal institutions separately, I bring them together in 
this chapter to analyze the nature of their interaction and the regulatory outcomes this 
interaction ultimately produces. I find that in the microinsurance space, formal and 
informal institutions co-exist in alternating states of complementarity and competition. 
In addition to highlighting the conditions that determine whether institutions 
complement and/or compete with one another, the analysis also demonstrates that 
institutional change flows in both directions. In other words, not only do burial societies 
and funeral parlors change as a result of their partnerships with insurance companies, but 
formal insurance practices and regulations must also adapt to better align with informal 
institutional structures. This insight pushes back against deterministic perspectives on 
formalization by re-framing institutional dynamics as a dynamic ebb-and-flow process 
that engages in constant negotiation and adaptation between formal and informal 
institutions.      
Starting with Chapter 7, I switch gears to focus on how agency factors into the 
institutional analysis; Chapter 7 looks at this from the perspective of microinsurance 
providers. More specifically, I center the analysis on intermediaries and mediators who 
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reside at the intersections between formal and informal institutional spheres, namely, 
insurance agents, mobile network operators, funeral parlor operators, and burial society 
administrators. The chapter highlights the critical role mediators play in building 
coherence between heterogeneous (formal and informal) systems and frameworks, work 
that holds microinsurance value chains together. By comparing different 
mediators/intermediaries along this value chain, the analysis demonstrates how processes 
of mediation are embedded within existing social relations and power hierarchies. I argue 
that to understand welfare and institutional outcomes, these power dynamics have to be 
taken into account because mediators ultimately affect how values are “translated” 
(Mosse and Lewis, 2006) between institutional spheres. Moreover, as the interactions 
between formal and informal institutions recalibrate the set of constraints and 
opportunities, certain actors are better positioned than others to benefit. Thus, the 
incursion of microinsurance systems into the low-income market can result in the 
reinforcement of existing power inequalities, which complicates the optimistic rhetoric 
often peddled by mainstream financial inclusion narratives. Instead, understanding how 
mediators fit along not only the microinsurance value chain, but also within the social 
structures of their communities, helps to reveal how the benefits (and risks) of financial 
inclusion are distributed.   
Finally, Chapter 8 examines agency from the perspective of microinsurance 
clients as they navigate the institutional landscape. In contrast to the other chapters of 
the thesis, this chapter employs a more narrative style and structure to capture the felt 
experiences of clients as they deal with the death of a loved one, confront the various 
challenges and obligations in putting together a funeral, and adapt to the financial 
aftermath. I present and compare the portraits of two individuals, a Zulu woman name 
Jabulile Lwazi and my local facilitator, Goodwill Nxusani. Both had recently lost family 
members, and through a combination of interviews and participant observation, I was 
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able to sketch how they respectively engaged with the different institutions involved with 
risk management/microinsurance, as well as what kind of outcomes were produced in 
each case. While their cases were comparable in a variety of ways, the most salient factor 
that divided Jabulile from Goodwill was income: Jabulile was comfortably earning a 
middle-class salary while Goodwill and his family were very poor. And although you 
would not expect their respective engagements with microinsurance to yield equivalent 
outcomes, the striking contrast in their two cases had more to do with their broader 
exposures to different institutional spheres than to the disparities in their income. While 
Jabulile’s income bracket corresponded with her natural familiarity with formal 
institutions (e.g. insurance companies, small claims courts, etc.) Goodwill’s worldview 
was shaped almost entirely by his lifelong experiences navigating informal institutional 
settings. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 8, contextualizing a clients’ experience of 
microinsurance within these frames is essential to assessing the substantive benefits of 
access or inclusion into the formal financial system. 
Funerals like that of Goodwill’s father-in-law constitute the bedrock upon which 
the South African microinsurance industry stands. In South Africa, the demand for 
“modern,” “formal,” “efficient,” and “reliable” microinsurance products is inextricably 
bound to deeply held cultural beliefs about death, ancestors, family, and the afterlife. 
Taking my cue from economic substantivist perspectives, I highlight how microinsurance 
markets are embedded within South Africa’s unique socio-cultural context. Far from 
building microinsurance markets from scratch, insurance companies must negotiate with 
existing informal structures that are imbued with a cultural logic all their own. 
Conversely, informal operators are not passive consumers, but are rather active agents 
who negotiate, circumvent, and contest the terms of their partnerships with insurance 
companies. Thus, this thesis aims to widen the empirical and theoretical frame to more 
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fully capture how the complex interplay between actors and formal/informal institutions 
shape efforts to build microinsurance markets and drive processes of financial inclusion.   
 20 
2—Literature Review 
 
Development theory has explored the possibilities and pitfalls of microinsurance 
as a market-based instrument that can help reduce the economic vulnerabilities of low-
income individuals and households. Current perspectives on microinsurance have been 
shaped by the wider shifts in microfinance thinking over the past 30 years. The 
aspirational view of microfinance—famously propagated by Muhammad Yunus and 
other founding figures—as a sort of silver bullet to the problem of poverty, has given 
way to more sober perspectives as empirical evidence has steadily caught up to the initial 
hype. 
 David Roodman argues, for instance, that instead of expecting microfinance to 
lift people out of poverty, more attention should be paid to microfinance’s role in 
stabilizing livelihoods: “The great strength and hope of microfinance lies in building self-
sufficient institutions that can give billions of poor people an increment of control over 
their lives” (Roodman, 2012: p.270). Thus, more likely to be at the normative center of 
microfinance is the “microsurvivor” (Fernandez, 2005) rather than the 
“microentrepreneur”—a term that “romanticizes their plight and implies too much hope 
for their escape” (Roodman, 2012: p.28). This more modest approach has widened the 
microfinance arena beyond its initial focus on credit to encompass other financial 
products like savings and insurance that can play a stabilizing, if not a more overtly 
catalyzing, role in the lives of the poor. This has given rise to the hope that 
microinsurance might be the next microfinance product to scale at the global level. A 
closer look, however, suggests that, again, the hype may be outpacing the available 
evidence. 
 For all the theoretical (and aspirational) benefits it can offer low-income clients, 
microinsurance is still subject to market governance. At what point do social objectives 
hit a ceiling set by the profit motive? Even if microinsurance can get supply-side features 
 21 
right, why do many products fail to generate demand? And how does formal insurance 
fit in with the array of informal risk management strategies poor people have historically 
relied upon? In many ways, these questions are not new. Market approaches to 
development typically have to confront the tensions between the demands of profit and 
the aspirations of social welfare. What, then, are the new opportunities, values, 
dislocations, and tensions generated by the penetration of microinsurance markets into 
this largely informal, high-risk space? How do they impact the risk outcomes for the 
poor? 
 This review aims to bring together disparate, yet related literatures that help 
frame the core debates raised by the prospects of microinsurance as a market-based 
development tool for the poor. The chapter is organized thematically and will review 
these literatures under three broad headings: 1) Theories of risk and poverty; 2) Inclusive 
markets and financial inclusion; and 3) Institutional theory. Under the first theme, I 
begin by outlining the mainstream macro and micro-economic cases for microinsurance. 
Empirical evidence has shown that the poor exist in a heightened state of risk; since 
financial calamity can result from even the most banal of incidents, researchers have 
argued that risk is linked to the persistence of poverty. Moreover, the poor, especially 
those that draw their income from the informal sector, are also the least equipped to 
protect themselves or to deal with the consequences that result from their exposure to 
risk. Social policy perspectives thus approach microinsurance as a potential means to 
extend protection to those who may have fallen through the cracks of the social safety 
net. 
 Risk is conceptualized within this framework as being detached and objective, 
that is, an external hazard that can be alleviated through proper risk management 
techniques and well-designed tools/interventions, i.e. microinsurance. But from a critical 
anthropological angle, this conceptualization of risk obscures the ways in which risks are 
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socially and culturally constructed. This work re-frames microinsurance within a political 
economy of risk that, crucially, takes into account power dynamics, which shape how 
risks are defined and distributed, as well as how insurance clients are ultimately engaged.  
 Next, the chapter broadens the scope by reviewing the relevant debates around 
“inclusive markets” and financial inclusion. Mainstream market-based perspectives are 
primarily concerned with improving access to the formal financial system for the 
excluded poor. Stemming from this emergent research agenda, which positions the 
market as a key force in the alleviation of poverty, C.K Prahalad’s “bottom-of-the-
pyramid” concept advances the notion that the profit-maximizing ethos of the private 
sector can be harnessed to meet the social aims of poverty alleviation. Much of this 
“business as development actor” rationale is embedded within efforts to build out 
microinsurance markets. But of course, this idyllic scenario garners its share of critique, 
as this literature review will make clear. Critical scholarship, in particular, has pointed out 
the ways in which markets themselves can be a source of disempowerment and risk. As 
scholars from this school of thought argue, more attention needs to be paid to the terms 
by which the poor are being included into markets and the financial system. 
 Finally, since this market is characterized by formal insurance companies 
partnering with informal, community-based structures to sustain microinsurance value 
chains, I review the relevant literature on institutional theory to illuminate the processes 
of institutional interaction that underpin the South African microinsurance market. In 
particular, scholarship stemming from New Institutional Economics (NIE) has identified 
the regulatory role that institutions play in producing and perpetuating certain outcomes; 
“getting institutions right” is thus a core mantra that shapes a research agenda interested 
in finding the right mix and/or design principles that would reliably lead to desirable 
objectives. Critical institutionalism, on the other hand, challenges the premise of these 
design-based perspectives. In contrast to a conceptualization of institutional dynamics as 
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being directed from the top-down, scholarship from this more critical research stream 
focuses on how processes of institutional development are embedded within situated 
social contexts. According to this view, change is an ad-hoc, culturally informed process 
that is far messier than design-based perspectives might suggest.   
 These conceptual debates are germane to an analysis of microinsurance markets 
in that formal and informal institutions interact in dynamic ways to shape regulatory 
outcomes. The frictions produced by holding these competing conceptual frameworks 
against each other help illuminate a productive path upon which my empirical analysis 
will proceed.  
Economic and Anthropological Perspectives on Risk and Microinsurance 
 
The Macro/Micro Economic Case for Microinsurance 
 
 The poor are more vulnerable than are the rest of the population to a spectrum 
of covariate and idiosyncratic risks—illness, natural and manmade disasters, property 
loss, etc.—and due to their low levels of income and general exclusion from formal 
socio-financial institutions, are less able to prevent and mitigate these risks (Holzmann & 
Jørgenson, 2001; Churchill, 2006). The higher probabilities of risk coupled with the 
poor’s limited ability—or perhaps unwillingness—to pay market-rate insurance 
premiums, have traditionally made insurance markets the exclusive domain of the well-
to-do. But in recent years, on the strength of the so-called “microfinance revolution” 
(Robinson, 2001), innovations to all facets of insurance operations—design, distribution, 
and even underlying actuarial principles—have enabled microinsurance operations to 
gain a foothold in markets throughout the developing world. Microinsurance products 
have emerged in several domains including health (Drechsler and Jütting, 2005; Castel, 
2009; Aggarwal, 2010; Acharya et al., 2013), agriculture (i.e. crop/rainfall insurance 
[Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Giné et al., 2008; Cai 
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et al., 2009; Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012]), credit-life (Wipf et al., 2011) and life/funeral 
(Ranade and Ahuja, 1999; Ericson and Doyle, 2006; Chan, 2009; Golomski, 2015). 
 Defining microinsurance is not as straightforward as it might seem at first glance. 
For regulatory purposes, policymakers tend to define microinsurance according to 
specific product features, which vary by country.6 Others use the term loosely to refer to 
general risk-prevention techniques. The broadly accepted definition of microinsurance is 
the one advanced by Craig Churchill who defines it as “the protection of low-income 
people against specific perils in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to 
the likelihood and cost of the risk involved” (Churchill, 2006: p.12). While the latter part 
of this definition is indistinguishable from that of regular insurance, the specific emphasis 
on low-income people differentiates microinsurance categorically. That it operates on the 
principle of risk-pooling (between other insurance clients) further distinguishes 
microinsurance from other risk-mitigation techniques. 
Researchers have charted the mechanisms through which risk is linked to poverty 
persistence and have discovered that the risk-management strategies undertaken by the 
poor play a key role (Dercon et al., 2009). Historically, the excluded poor have turned to 
informal coping strategies and financial mechanisms to provide themselves with some 
protection, including rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs), accumulating 
savings and credit associations (ASCAs), burial societies, stokvels, cooperatives, etc. 
(Rutherford, 2000; Collins et al., 2009). A number of studies have demonstrated that 
these informal risk management strategies, although important, are generally imperfect 
and insufficient (Townsend, 1995; Morduch, 1999; Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Dercon, 
2005). They have also been shown to have both short-term and long-term trade-offs that 
contribute to the persistence of poverty. For example, ex-ante strategies (before the 
                                               
6 See The South African Microinsurance Regulatory Framework (Republic of South Africa, 2011) released by the National Treasury, 
Republic of South Africa. 
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occurrence of a risk event) include measures like making conservative production or 
employment decisions that offer low returns on investment in the long-run (Rosenzweig 
& Wolpin, 1993; Morduch, 1995; Dercon, 2005). In the aftermath of a shock, ex-post 
responses include the depletion of productive assets to smooth consumption (Lim  & 
Townsend, 1994; Davies, 1996), harmful labor supply adjustments such as the use of 
child labor (Jacoby & Skoufias, 1997; Beegle et al., 2003), and taking on debt that can 
quickly become unmanageable (Udry; 1994; Goldstein et al., 2005). Similarly, at the 
community-level, studies on informal risk sharing have demonstrated that such 
mechanisms are imperfect and particularly poor at addressing covariate risks that affect 
all individuals in an area at the same time (De Weerdt, 2005; Goldstein et al., 2005; 
Morduch, 2006). 
 Given the fragility and limited scope of informal risk management systems, 
formal insurance has the advantage of applying actuarial standards to help supplement, 
or in some cases, replace these systems (Dercon, 2005). Theoretically, microinsurance 
brings value to low-income households in three main ways: Smoothing consumption, 
promoting welfare-enhancing behavior, and encouraging productive forms of risk-taking 
(Churchill, 2006; Dercon et al., 2009). Surprisingly, the empirical evidence of the impact 
of microinsurance along these three dimensions is limited, due in some measure to 
methodological challenges (Dercon et al., 2009). Research on health insurance schemes 
has found positive results with regard to welfare-enhancing behavior (Dong et al., 1999; 
Wagstaff and Pradhan, 2005; Dror et al., 2006) and some income protection for inpatient 
costs, but not for out-of-pocket expenditures (Wagstaff, 2007; Chankova et al., 2008). In 
terms of the impact of microinsurance on production decisions, the research has yielded 
somewhat mixed results; while crop insurance has been shown to encourage risk-taking 
into more productive ventures (O’Donoghue et al., 2007; Cai et al., 2009), other studies 
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have demonstrated no impact on risk-taking behavior (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; 
Giné and Yang, 2009). 
Since microinsurance does not operate in a vacuum, but is rather part of a larger 
“social risk management toolbox” (Siegel et al., 2001), it must strike a balance with other 
financial mechanisms such as informal insurance, private savings, and social insurance 
schemes. How to strike this balance is an empirical question without clear answers. A 
limited number of studies have shown that parallel systems can crowd each other out. 
For example, public programs such as public insurance, comprehensive health insurance, 
and food aid transfers have been found to have crowding-out effects on private 
insurance, precautionary savings, and informal risk sharing arrangements, respectively 
(Attanasio and Ríos-Rull, 2000; Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999; Chou et al., 2003; Dercon 
and Krishnan, 2003). Conversely, Jowett (2003) presents evidence that informal financial 
networks may crowd out voluntary health insurance schemes in Vietnam.  
Despite these studies, it is important to note that the trade-offs of 
microinsurance uptake have not been clearly established in the literature. Economist 
Jonathan Morduch laments that because assessments of microinsurance’s welfare 
impacts can only be made in relation to already existing risk management mechanisms 
and strategies, researchers do not have precise estimates of the value-added gains from 
replacing/supplementing these measures with market-based insurance (Morduch, 2006). 
Nevertheless, since the coverage gap in risk management systems is primarily conceived 
in this framework as a product of state failure, market-based approaches to extending 
and/or replacing traditional social protection have been embraced and advanced by 
policymakers and development theorists who are at least ideologically, if not empirically, 
committed to the market as a viable vehicle for risk mitigation.  
Insurance as a Source of Risk: Anthropological Perspectives on Risk 
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 While the traditional neoclassical research agenda has sought to answer narrowly 
constructed questions related to the impact of microinsurance on welfare and on the 
wider risk management ecosystem, scholarship emerging from a more critical school of 
thought have interrogated the ways in which markets for risk and insurance are mutually 
constitutive of situated socio-cultural institutions. In his seminal book, Risk Society: 
Towards a New Modernity, Ulrich Beck provides the following insight on the nature of risk:  
Risks are a bottomless barrel of demands, unsatisfiable, infinite…Demands, and thus markets, 
of a completely new type can be created by varying the definition of risk, especially demand for 
the avoidance of risk—open to interpretation, causally designable and infinitely reproducible 
(Beck, 1992: p.23).  
 
Drawing on the notion that markets are produced through the interaction of a 
variety of “calculative agencies” (Callon and Muniesa, 2005: p.1230), De Goede (2004) 
has argued that actuarial logic (an instrument of calculation) does not just react to but 
creates particular definitions of risk and insecurity. For this reason, Ewald (1991: p.200) 
has called insurance “eminently creative” in the way that it creates value out of previously 
dreaded events. Building on her ethnographic work on price formation, Jane Guyer 
evokes Karl Polanyi’s concept of “fictitious commodity” to describe the process of 
commoditizing risk: “The original object—risk—is already out there to be disembedded 
from a shared social matrix, transformed into a definition, and linked to an insurance 
strategy, in order to be revalued for sale on the market” (Guyer, 2009: p.215). These 
insights help to unveil the central paradox of insurance: “While pretending to eradicate 
uncertainty…finance identifies and invents more and more possible uncertainties to be 
hedged” (De Goede, 2004: p.213)—Beck’s “bottomless barrel.” 
Building on these constructionist views of insurance markets, De Goede argues 
that the commercialization of risk should not be understood as a reaction to objectively 
existing danger, but as a “profitable cultural process” (De Goede, 2004: p.205). 
Corporate calculative agencies must interact with norms and cultures engrained within 
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community structures and institutions. In other words, as “rationalist” as insurance may 
present itself to be, it is still subject to socio-cultural understandings of life and value 
(Kar, 2013). Zelizer (1978) observed, for example, that life insurance markets in the 
United States first emerged as a response to changes in the nuclear family system 
(prompted by urbanization), which created an uncertain economic situation for a bulk of 
middle class households that could no longer rely on informal, community-based support 
in times of crisis. Similarly, in her study of life insurance markets in China, where talk of 
death is a cultural taboo, Chan (2012) found that agents mobilized their deep knowledge 
of the cultural practices and beliefs of their clients to frame insurance in unique, context 
specific ways that were locally sensible.  
Anthropologists have also demonstrated how insurance, as a social and political 
technology (Ewald, 1991), re-constitutes the social landscape. For instance, Golomski 
(2015) demonstrates how the legal definition of the nuclear family, which underpins life 
insurance policies in Swaziland and is key to claiming insurance payouts, worked to 
reconfigure traditional kinship structures of care. By tying up the value of human life 
with market notions of value, insurance transformed these affective relations through 
“consumptive practices and revaluations of cultural ideals” (ibid.: p.82). As these 
ethnographies make clear, insurance does not operate in abstracted vacuums, but 
simultaneously shapes and is shaped by existing social and cultural norms (Kar, 2013; 
Golomski, 2015). 
Moreover, the gradual process of financialization exerts a governmental force 
that transforms rights-holders into risk-bearers (Maurer, 1999). This shift is crucial in 
understanding how insurance, while protecting against some defined risk, can also 
introduce other forms of risk by reconstituting the poor as market subjectivities and 
newly minted risk-bearers. In the case of index insurance, for example, property 
ownership is nullified as a prerequisite for the purchase of insurance in exchange for 
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individual policyholders accepting some degree of basis risk, leading scholars to question 
if farmers are, in fact, better off not purchasing index insurance at all (Binswanger-
Mkhize, 2012; L. Johnson, 2013). In the life insurance market, Erik Bähre’s ethnography, 
which focused on brokers who mediate between communities and employers by 
mobilizing personal networks to sell policies, found that the costs insurance companies 
were attempting to cut were translated into financial risk for the brokers in the form of 
reduced/cancelled commissions (Bähre, 2012). Moreover, community-based 
intermediary institutions—in Bähre’s case study, a church—were also exposed: “Many of 
the risks that were part of this new financial endeavour were not covered by the ‘market’ 
(the insurance company). Instead, they were passed back to…the intermediary 
organization, which was ill-placed to withstand them” (ibid.: p.159).  
In contrast to neoclassical renderings of microinsurance, then, Leigh Johnson 
argues that insurance cannot simply be understood as a development intervention, but as 
“techniques attempting to articulate a particular chain of social and economic relations 
premised on the creation of financial consumers.” (L. Johnson, 2013: p.2676). In the 
process, the poor are “dis-articulated” (Bair and Werner, 2011: p.993) from what cultural 
anthropologist Mary Douglas referred to as the “old protections.” As she observed, “the 
markets suck us (willingly) out of our cozy, dull, local niches and turn us into 
unencumbered actors, mobile in a world system, but setting us free they leave us 
exposed. We feel vulnerable” (Douglas, 1994: p.15). 
Markets of Inclusion or Exploitation? Financial Inclusion for Microinsurance 
Clients  
 
The Drivers of Financial Exclusion and the Economic Case for Inclusion 
 
The economic case for microinsurance reflects and operates within a much 
broader neoliberal development framework that gives primacy to the market as the key 
driver of poverty reduction. Within this paradigm, researchers have highlighted the 
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crucial role of well-functioning financial markets/systems in economic development. 
Financial sector depth, which is a measure that captures the size of a nation’s financial 
sector relative to its economy, has been found to be associated with lower levels of 
income inequality in the medium-to-long term (Li et al., 1998; Clarke et al., 2006; Jahan 
and McDonald, 2011), boosted real incomes for those in the lowest income brackets 
(Beck et al., 2007), and higher economic growth (Levine, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2008), all factors that have been strongly linked to measured reductions in 
poverty (Ravallion, 2001; Adams, 2002; Beck et al., 2007; DFID, 2008). This has given 
rise to the argument that financial sector development is fundamentally pro-poor (Rajan 
and Zingales, 2003; Honohan, 2004).  
According to this formulation, then, the exclusion of the poor from formal 
financial systems and services is a key contributor to persistent levels of poverty. The 
World Bank estimates that around 40% of the world’s adult population—an estimated 2 
billion people—do not have access to the most basic formal financial services (World 
Bank, 2014). For adults in the lowest income quintile, Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 
(2012) estimate that 77% are excluded. The dynamics of what drives and sustains 
financial exclusion are complex and difficult to capture in the data. Beck et al. (2009) 
distinguish between those who are voluntarily excluded (i.e. lack of demand) and those 
who are involuntarily excluded. For the latter group, they identify four main drivers of 
exclusion: 1) Households/firms that are considered un-bankable due to their low 
incomes or their high levels of risk; 2) Discriminatory policies; 3) Deficiencies in the 
contractual and informational frameworks (e.g. lacking the proper ID documents); and 4) 
Price and product features.  
Sarma and Pais (2011) situate financial exclusion within broader processes of 
social exclusion. Studies suggest that exclusion from the financial system tends to occur 
to groups of people who are considered at the margins of society including low-income 
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groups, ethnic minorities, immigrants, the elderly, and the unemployed (Kempson and 
Whyley, 1998; Goodwin et al., 1999; Connolly and Hajaj, 2001; Barr, 2004). Countries 
with lower levels of income inequality tend to also have higher levels of financial 
inclusion, suggesting a strong correlation (Kempson, and Whyley, 1998; Buckland and 
Guenther, 2005). Other factors that seem to impact measures of financial 
inclusion/exclusion include, but are not limited to geographical proximity (both physical 
and electronic) (Leyshon and Thrift, 1995), levels of adult literacy, infrastructure 
development, and rates of urbanization and connectivity (Sarma and Pais, 2011).  
 Propelled primarily by this growing body of empirical scholarship that has linked 
the depth and efficiency of financial systems with economic growth, financial inclusion 
has, in recent years, steadily moved to the center of the global development agenda. The 
world’s leading development organizations including UNDP, OECD, the World Bank, 
and others have all launched major reports and/or initiatives devoted to the 
advancement of financial inclusion. For example, the World Bank’s 2008 report, Finance 
for All? Policies and Pitfalls in Expanding Access makes the broad case for financial inclusion 
in succinct terms: 
Financial market imperfections that limit access to finance are key in most development theories. 
Lack of access to finance is often the critical mechanism behind both persistent income inequality 
and slow economic growth. Hence, financial sector reforms that promote broader access to 
financial services should be at the core of the development agenda (World Bank, 2008: p.17). 
 
As was already discussed in the context of microinsurance, one of the major 
drawbacks of having limited access to formal financial products is that the excluded poor 
often have no choice but to turn to informal mechanisms to manage their assets and risk. 
Though these informal mechanisms are a valuable last resort, they are often unreliable 
and expensive. Formal financial markets and institutions, on the other hand, exist to 
overcome information asymmetries, lower transaction costs, efficiently channel savings 
and investment into their most productive uses (Honohan, 2008; Beck et al., 2009), and 
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in the case of formal microinsurance, provide rationalized, well-regulated risk-pooling 
services (Dercon, 2005). Exclusion from the financial system, therefore, exacts a heavy 
opportunity cost (Cull et al., 2014).  
Studies have associated more inclusive financial systems with lower levels of 
socio-economic inequality, stronger economic growth, and a more dynamic economy 
overall (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Honohan, 2004; Beck et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2009; 
Cull et al., 2014). Although these macro findings point to a positive relationship between 
financial inclusion and the economic welfare of the poor, the precise mechanisms and 
linkages that animate the relationship between the two are still subject to some debate. 
Researchers have noted, for instance, that the financial needs of small firms/enterprises 
are different from those of households. Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have 
demonstrated that while access to finance has clear benefits for firms, such as the 
elimination of credit constraints that lead to growth (Crépon et al., 2011; Banerjee et al., 
2015), the evidence is more mixed at the household level (Banerjee et.al, 2015; Karlan 
and Zinman, 2009; Brune et al., 2011; Angelucci et al., 2013; Dupas and Robinson, 
2013). For individuals and households, then, it may be the indirect benefits of financial 
inclusion on firms (i.e. more efficient production and labor, higher wages, etc.), rather 
than the direct provision of financial services that have a stronger impact on poverty 
reduction (Beck et al., 2007). 
Market Failure or State Failure? Diverging Perspectives and Approaches to Expanding Inclusion 
 
 While the positive effects (direct and indirect) of improved access to formal 
financial services have been well established in the empirical literature, there are 
competing views of whether financial exclusion is primarily a product of state or market 
failure. These diverging views have different policy implications, particularly as it relates 
to the role of the state and subsidies. In terms of risk, for instance, social policy 
perspectives frame the persistent and high levels of economic vulnerability of the poor as 
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fundamentally a product of state failure. From this perspective, microinsurance—a 
product of the private sector bound to market/business principles—is conceived of as 
an instrument to extend vital social protections to poor and vulnerable citizens. This 
social protection approach is animated by the coverage gap that exists in many 
developing countries, particularly in Africa. The challenge of comprehensive coverage is 
exacerbated by the fact that most state-based systems are designed in the traditional 
Bismarckian mold of linking social protection to formal sector employment. The ILO 
estimates, however, that half to three-quarters of all non-agricultural employment in 
developing countries is found in the informal economy (ILO, 2014), making it difficult 
for countries to extend protection to those in the informal sector (Canagarajah and 
Sethuraman, 2001).  
Following this, microinsurance has been framed as a market-based intervention 
that can supplement and even replace inadequate state-based social protection systems 
(Jacquier et al., 2006; Arun and Steiner, 2008). In the context of limited state capacity, 
Jacquier et al. (2006) argue that microinsurance schemes have certain comparative 
advantages over state-based schemes with respect to their cost-effectiveness and their 
ability to reach excluded groups, such as workers in the informal economy. This 
perspective maintains that microinsurance should thus be linked to national social 
protection strategies, essentially harnessing the market to serve as a patch for the state’s 
social safety net (Siegel et al., 2001; Jacquier et al., 2006). 
In contrast, the view that financial exclusion is primarily a result of market failure 
shapes efforts to “fix” market institutions in order to become more inclusive. Several 
frameworks, most notably the “Making Markets Work Better for the Poor” (M4P) 
approach, have emerged to identify and address systemic constraints that limit the 
capacities and opportunities for the poor to engage markets as consumers, producers, 
and/or wage earners (DFID, 2005; Elliot et al. 2008). A primary focus of the M4P 
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framework, which is rooted in the work of New Institutional Economics (NIE), is on 
lowering transaction costs; interventions are focused on how the right mix of institutions 
can lower the barriers of entry for the poor. In this framework, then, it is the state that 
works to address market failures by “getting institutions right” (Rodrik, 2004) as an 
integral component of market inclusion. 
 Out of these divergent perspectives, two general schools of thought have 
emerged regarding the state’s role in developing more inclusive financial services 
markets: modernism and activism (Honohan and Beck, 2007). Modernist approaches 
focus on establishing an enabling environment for inclusive financial markets. In the 
microinsurance sector, this entails adjustments to formal insurance regulations like 
minimum capital requirements, licensing regimes, and prudential standards that aim to 
reshape the structure and operation of the market to better align with the realities of the 
low-income space (Trommershäuser et al., 2006). Activist perspectives, on the other 
hand, advocate for more targeted interventions that aim to prioritize and assist specific 
groups that have been excluded (i.e. low-income households, informal businesses, etc.). 
Typically, this includes the judicious use of subsidies and ring-fencing legislation that 
enables access for those groups who are hardest to reach. M4P inspired approaches look 
to bring together the overall strategic focus of the modernist perspective with the flexible 
operational focus of the activist approach (DFID-SDC, 2008).  
From Equity to Efficiency: Shifts in Microfinance Thinking 
 
 In the microfinance literature, this modernist-activist debate is reflective of a 
deeper conceptual and philosophical divide between rights-based and market efficiency-
based discourses. Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank are some of the more 
prominent voices advocating for a rights-based approach, which conceptualizes financial 
services— particularly microcredit—as a human right (Microcredit Summit, 1997; Yunus, 
1998). This assigns a more central, direct role to the state, donors, and civil society 
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organizations in ensuring that the hardest to reach clients (i.e. low-income, rural 
households, etc.) are extended access to financial services. The use of subsidies to ensure 
this outcome is thus encouraged or at least tolerated within this discursive framing. 
Indeed, studies have shown that the vast majority of microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
continue to rely on subsidies to remain operationally sustainable (Morduch, 1999; CGAP, 
2005; UNCDF, 2005); subsidies have even been shown to make MFIs more efficient 
(Hudon and Traca, 2011). 
 However, decades of microfinance research have challenged these approaches, 
provoking a rethink regarding the most effective role for the state. In particular, research 
on microcredit makes clear that the poor do not always use formal loans for productive 
enterprise, but also use them to finance consumption—food, education, healthcare, and 
even luxury goods, for example—(Todd, 1996; Rahman, 1999; Collins et al., 2009; 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2012; James, 2014)—and to build non-financial assets like house 
improvements or car repairs (Todd, 1996; Rahman, 1999; Copestake, 2002). Evidence 
has also shown that credit is often used in “loan recycling” (Rahman, 1999) whereby new 
micro-loans are drawn to pay-off existing debt obligations.  
As Cull et al. point out, the reason for this may be due to the fact that the 
financial needs and objectives of the poor who make their living in the informal 
economy often blur the distinction between firm and household: “In economic terms, 
they are consuming households and self-employed firms at the same time; thus 
consumption and production decisions are intertwined” (Cull et al., 2014: p.1). Informed 
by these insights, there has been pushback against direct subsidies on the grounds that 
they underwrite unproductive/inefficient financial behaviors and practices (CGAP, 
2006), as well as fears that excessive subsidies may lead to a dependency that undercuts 
sustainability over the long term (Morduch, 1999; Morduch, 2005; CGAP, 2006).  
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In the wider microfinance sphere (which includes microinsurance), these debates 
have contributed to a shift away from an equity focused approach, which relies on public 
subsidy to maximize direct access to financial services, to a broader “financial systems 
approach” more concerned with implementing inclusive financial sector policies that aim 
to develop self-sustaining MFIs and other financial services institutions (Robinson, 2001; 
Hannig and Jansen, 2010). The World Bank’s Finance for All (FFA) agenda, for example, 
de-centers firms/households as the focal point for financial inclusion interventions and, 
to the extent that they hinder the development of the financial sector, discourages the 
use of subsidies to improve direct access.  
Led by influential bodies like the World Bank’s Consultative Group to Assist the 
Poor (CGAP), FFA inspired approaches to financial inclusion have favored the closer 
integration of the microfinance industry into global circuits of capital. Access to financial 
services provided by MFIs and other local financial institutions has thus, by extension, 
entailed inclusion of the poor into global financial markets (Roy, 2010). In other words, 
the market, as well as its logics and global institutional systems, takes center stage as the 
primary arbiter of access to financial services. The state is relegated to a supporting role 
more focused on creating “enabling environments” (DFID-SDC, 2008). 
These equity versus efficiency debates animate the various perspectives and 
approaches taken to build sustainable and inclusive microinsurance markets, which are 
plagued by a number of challenges including moral hazard, adverse selection, 
information asymmetries, high transaction costs, and of course, persistently high levels of 
risk that are difficult to price at affordable levels. Morduch (2006) notes that in his 
canvass of microinsurance schemes, he could not find a single example of a small-scale 
crop insurance program that successfully served the poor, made profits, and reduced risk 
without the aid of state subsidies (see also Hazell, 1992). Moreover, most microinsurance 
schemes, particularly ones that are initiated by specialized providers and civil society 
 37 
organizations, are only able to offer very limited coverage and/or benefits without 
subsidy support (Churchill and Garand, 2006; Jacquier et al., 2006).  
Yet despite these many challenges, the development and maturity of 
microinsurance markets around the developing world have prompted a move toward 
efficiency perspectives that echo similar shifts in the broader microfinance landscape. In 
its 2017 report on inclusive insurance, GIZ7 calls for a holistic financial systems approach 
that focuses on establishing “an enabling business environment,” which includes 
“effective laws, regulations, and supervisory structures [that] create a legal certainty for 
the insurance industry and for consumer protection” (GIZ, 2017: p.30). In line with 
M4P-inspired frameworks, the focus is shifted away, then, from targeted support for 
individual microinsurance providers/schemes, and centered instead on extending the 
“access frontier,” defined as “the maximum proportion of usage possible under existing 
structural conditions of technology, infrastructure, and regulation” (DFID, 2005: p.11). 
The success of this approach hinges largely on its ability to properly incentivize different 
types of providers, particularly in the private sector, to enter into low-income markets; 
maximizing choice and plurality are thus emphasized. In the microinsurance space, 
private actors like insurance companies move into a much more central role in 
addressing the risk management needs of the poor.  
Corporations-cum-Development Agents: Business and Social Welfare at the Bottom-of-the Pyramid  
 
Incentivizing private companies to take risks, invest, and innovate in what C.K. 
Prahalad referred to as bottom-of-the-pyramid (BoP) markets, is a critical component of 
expanding the access frontier. Writing from a business management perspective, 
Prahalad and Hart (1999) first advanced the BoP concept, which argued that the profit-
maximizing ethos of private businesses (particularly multinational enterprises) could be 
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aligned with the aims of poverty alleviation by building markets that deliver welfare 
enhancing goods and services to the poor. While earlier iterations focused on the poor 
exclusively as consumers, the BoP framework has evolved over the past decade to re-
conceptualize them as “co-creators of value” (UNDP, 2008; London and Hart, 2011). 
Dubbed by some as BoP 2.0 (Simanis and Hart, 2008), these approaches seek to build 
businesses that engage the poor not only as consumers, but also as employees, partners, 
and/or entrepreneurs (Whitney and Kelkar, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 2008; Dolan and Scott, 
2009).  
Research on formal institutional voids has highlighted the challenges and barriers 
that BoP ventures must overcome to create new markets in this space (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997; London and Hart, 2004). Due to the high degree of “institutional distance” 
between developed and BoP markets, there are significant knowledge gaps that hinder an 
enterprise’s ability to understand demand, build operations, and to mobilize resources in 
these largely uncharted spaces (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999; 
Ricart et al., 2004; Webb et al., 2010).  In order for profitable operations to take root, 
BoP ventures have recognized the need to leverage local networks, embedded 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and informal institutions, which have 
collectively amassed the required experience/knowledge of the target BoP consumer 
base (Rivera-Santos and Rufin, 2010; Webb et al., 2010; London and Hart, 2011). “BoP 
ventures thus seek to combine the best of both worlds—the resources and technological 
capacity of the formal economy and the indigenous knowledge, human face, and local 
embeddedness of the informal sector” (London and Hart, 2011: p.10). The normative 
vision of BoP markets, then, is that of mutually-benefitting, “symbiotic market-based 
ecosystems” (Prahalad, 2006: p.7), whereby a win-win alliance between private sector 
companies, local infrastructures, and low-income individuals is forged to generate 
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sustainable, profitable, and socially beneficial outcomes—a triple bottom line approach 
(Elkington, 1994).  
In the business of microinsurance, Craig Churchill and other commentators have 
pointed out that these partnerships, which are often formed between formal insurance 
companies and informal mutual-assistance groups (i.e. ROSCAs, burial societies, etc.), 
are an indispensible part of creating microinsurance markets and deepening their 
penetration:  
One of the great challenges in serving BOP consumers is to get the product to the market; yet, 
insurance companies are particularly weak at distribution. The main solution to this problem is 
to collaborate with another organization that already has financial transactions with low-income 
households so the insurer can leverage existing infrastructure to reach the poor (Churchill, 2006: 
p.19). 
 
Efficiency, discipline, innovation, strategy, and effective marketing—all hallmark 
principles of the BoP concept—have also been recognized as integral components in 
scaling-up microinsurance provision (Radermacher, et al., 2006; Wipf and Liber, 2006; 
Churchill and Cohen, 2006; Churchill and Garand, 2006). Thus, the financial inclusion 
and BoP frameworks are not only central to the articulation of microinsurance, they are 
inextricably linked to one another.  
Before his untimely death, C.K. Prahalad summarized his argument and his 
aspirations this way: “We must recognize that the conversion of the BoP into a market is 
essentially a developmental activity…new and creative approaches are needed to convert 
poverty into an opportunity for all concerned” (Prahalad, 2011: p.xxx). The notion that 
business and the private sector have important roles to play in development is not a new 
idea, of course, but Blowfield and Dolan (2014) have observed an important shift 
associated with the recent rise of BoP discourse:  
In the space of less than two decades, there [has] been a shift from companies viewing developing 
countries as a location in which to do business (the role of the development tool), to 
understanding that to a degree it was not only possible but necessary (for moral or material 
reasons) for companies to see themselves less as the inanimate hammer and more as the 
instrumental carpenter, i.e. to be a development agent (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014: p.25). 
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Financial service providers like insurance companies have thus been re-cast as 
development agents within a discursive and managerial space forged open by market-
based approaches to poverty reduction. Since a market that works for the poor is one 
that “expands choices available to poor people and produces market outcomes that 
benefit the poor” (DFID, 2005), success is measured by the extent to which the private 
sector is able to drive up levels of production, employment, wages, and consumption at 
the BoP. As Prahalad and other prominent BoP proponents would argue, the best way to 
achieve this is through the profit motive and through strategic partnerships with 
community-based entities. 
BoP Ventures as Governmental Force: Reshaping the New Lines of Belonging 
 
As businesses have assumed a more central role in driving development 
outcomes, BoP and private sector led models have drawn their fair share of critique 
(Woller, 2002; Karnani, 2007; Cross and Street, 2009; Dolan and Roll, 2013; Blowfield 
and Dolan, 2014; Banks and Hulme, 2014). In a systematic review of the BoP literature 
over the past decade, for example, Kolk et al. (2014) found very little evidence of BoP 
initiatives in which the poor were engaged as co-creators despite the aspirational 
articulations of BoP advocates. Instead, they found that most BoP initiatives were 
conceived and implemented by the enterprises themselves (or their NGO partners), and 
almost exclusively dealt with poor households and communities as consumers. They also 
found that, conceptually, BoP frameworks operated on narrow income-based definitions 
of poverty (i.e. per capita income thresholds of $1-$2/day), which limited their 
engagement with the multi-dimensional, structural drivers of poverty (World Bank, 
2000). 
Blowfield and Dolan (2014) highlight the inherent paradox of this business-
development alliance. They observe, for example, that while corporations are 
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accountable to their shareholders for financial returns on investment, similar 
accountability structures are not in place to ensure that they uphold their commitments 
to social, environmental, and/or development outcomes. Moreover, they argue that the 
prioritization of financial returns over social welfare confers an “epistemic privilege” to 
market-oriented definitions of success, which lead to the reinterpretation of positive 
outcomes at the expense of alternative ways of measuring success (ibid.). Business 
perspectives on what we might consider a “development success” or a positive welfare 
outcome are based on narrow metrics (i.e. return on investment), which are easily 
measured, recognized, and accepted by the business community. Moreover, the very way 
business frames or conceives a development problem is such that it recognizes only 
those problems that the market is particularly suited to solve (Banks and Hulme, 2014).  
Meanwhile, problems that the market can’t solve—political disenfranchisement, 
inequalities of wealth and power, gender and/or racial discrimination—are sidelined or 
otherwise ignored (Cross and Street, 2009; Schwittay, 2011; Banks and Hulme, 2014). 
This has led Blowfield and Dolan to conclude that “the problems business deems 
significant and the solutions it proffers often accord more with the needs of capital than 
the needs of the poor” (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014: p.30). As a result, the primary 
beneficiary of the business-development alliance is no longer the rights-bearing subject 
of a state, but is rather “a value-driven consumer, whose needs, desires and preferences 
are defined and fulfilled by the market” (ibid.: p.30). 
 Building on this insight, Catherine Dolan has argued that BoP initiatives produce 
“new ecologies of belonging and exclusion” in the sense that new lines are drawn 
between those who have certain desirable moral qualities (i.e. responsible, enterprising, 
ambitious, etc.), and those who do not (Dolan, 2012: p.6). Companies construct and 
maintain this boundary by deploying a range of market technologies (e.g. training in sales 
and financial discipline, time management and performance metrics, etc.) to produce a 
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particular “useful” type of market subjectivity (Dolan & Johnstone-Louis, 2011; 
Schwittay, 2011; Dolan, 2012). Thus, the definition of what it means to be poor becomes 
“highly circumscribed in ways that have little to do with poverty itself” (Blowfield and 
Dolan, 2014: p.33). Instead, BoP initiatives center on the moral qualities of the 
enterprising poor and exclude those who don’t fit the bill—the landless, disabled or 
elderly, for instance. In other words, the intervention of BoP enterprises creates new 
dynamics of exclusion. 
In microinsurance markets, the viability and effectiveness of the product depends 
on the characteristic of the risk being covered; not all risks are insurable (Siegel and 
Alwang, 1999). Siegel et al. (2001) outline certain criteria for a risk to be considered 
“ideal” for microinsurance products:  
A) The risk must be randomly and independently distributed among insured clients, B) risks 
and losses of insured clients should be determinable, measurable, and not catastrophic, and C) 
the risk and loss should not be influenced by the actions of insured clients (e.g. no moral hazard) 
(Siegel et al., 2001: p.9).  
 
Ideal risks also mean ideal partners and clients. Insurance companies deploy a range of 
management technologies to both identify suitable partners and insurable clients and to 
implement systems that can control the terms of the exchange. For example, insurance 
contracts are used to define the insurable risk, organize financing of the insurance and 
exercise control over the flow and management of its funds (McCord, 2001). All these 
techniques are used to reify the boundary between the insurable and uninsurable poor. 
 Thus, as scholars have pointed out, the notion of mutually benefitting 
partnerships between low-income communities and corporations-cum-development 
agents, which sits at the heart of BoP discourse, must be examined critically. Cross and 
Street (2009) have argued that the benign BoP rhetoric of “partnership” obscures the 
vast power disparities that exist between well-resourced corporations and the BoP 
communities they wish to engage. Rather than simply penetrating these “usable” spaces 
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(Ferguson, 2005), Dolan and Roll argue that businesses “create BoP economies through 
a set of market technologies, practices, and discourses that render the spaces and actors 
at the bottom of the pyramid knowable, calculable, and predictable to global business” 
(Dolan and Roll, 2013: p.125). Corporations thus impart forms of economic governance 
and governmentality that transform the social structures, networks, and institutions of 
the poor in ways that are more amenable to market intervention—and do so in the name 
of poverty reduction. These transformations not only delineate between the enterprising 
and unproductive poor, the insurable and uninsurable, but also reinforce the notion that 
poverty is a product of market failure, and that the solution, therefore is further market 
integration (ibid.). 
Adverse Incorporation and Dispossession: Critiquing the “Sheen” of Inclusion 
 
 Social theorists have long recognized that closer integration—or inclusion—of 
the poor into global markets do not lead inexorably to positive welfare outcomes. 
Ananya Roy warns that “what is at stake here is a crucial shift from the idea of 
development as social services and the improvement of human capital to development as 
integration into global financial markets” (Roy, 2010: p.47). Rankin (2001: p.20) points 
out that this shift comes with real effects, arguing that incorporating the poor into 
financial systems through microfinance must be recognized as a state strategy to 
“devolve responsibility for securing economic opportunity to individuals acting as 
responsible agents of their own well-being…in a manner consistent with a neoliberal 
agenda.” These perspectives highlight how the “positive mobilizing narratives” (Mader, 
2014: p.11) of the financial inclusion discourse, in which financial norms supersede social 
norms, work to shift responsibility for welfare from the state onto the individual (Roy, 
2010). 
Moreover, Hickey and du Toit (2007) have argued that these accounts miss the 
ways in which markets and economic institutions themselves create or exacerbate 
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poverty. Often, the poor are “adversely incorporated” into markets, which themselves 
are “powerfully determined by their location within complex and power laden 
institutional arrangements and commodity chains” (ibid.: p.17). Kate Meagher has argued 
that inclusive growth discourses tend to miss the ways in which processes of inclusion 
are highly selective and how “informal markets are altered rather than simply connected 
to the global economy” (Meagher, 2015: p.838).  
David Harvey has critiqued the “neoliberal turn” through a Marxist framework 
arguing that it is a political project aimed at the restoration of class power (Harvey, 2007). 
He argues that “new fields for capital accumulation in domains formerly regarded off 
limits to the calculus of profitability” are opened up by dominant classes, leaving in their 
wake “the dismantling of institutions and narratives that promoted more egalitarian 
distributive measures” (ibid.: pgs.22, 35). Following Harvey’s formulation, Mader (2014) 
argues that microfinance makes poverty the basis for creating new credit relations which 
works to extract surplus value from the poor into financial systems. Accordingly, 
microfinance is situated within larger processes of capitalist expansion whereby poverty 
is transformed into an investible asset for the rich (ibid.). Beyond the capture of the 
poor’s economic surplus value, this line of argument supposes that in the emergent social 
configurations mediated by microfinance, the poor’s social networks, cultural practices, 
and local institutions are also subject to dispossession and/or change (Rahman, 1999; 
Rankin, 2001; Smets and Bähre, 2004; Elyachar, 2005; Bähre, 2007a; Roy, 2010). 
Central to this movement is a conceptual framework that reifies the non-
monetary assets of the poor as social capital. This framework borrows heavily from the 
articulations of Robert Putnam who defines social capital as “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993: p.167). Putnam’s instrumental 
conceptualization of social capital has been taken up most notably by the microfinance 
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industry. Conceived in this way, studies have shown that social capital can be deployed as 
a form of collateral for those who lack the financial assets necessary to access bank loans 
(Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; van Bastelaer, 2002), can diminish information 
asymmetries (Grootaert and Van Bastelaer, 2002), and can lower transaction costs 
(Anderson et al., 2002). As Bähre (2007a) points out, Putnam-inspired analyses of social 
capital have grown in popularity among scholars who are aligned with a neoliberal 
economic ideology. 
In her seminal ethnography of Cairene workshop markets, Julia Elyachar 
demonstrated that this conceptual shift is far from benign; it is a key part of 
reconstituting the social networks and cultural practices of the poor as part of the free 
market: 
With this conceptual transformation, social networks of the poor could now be seen as an 
important ingredient of large-scale economic success. What might earlier have been seen 
as informal economy—that which is not state, that which is not the real economy—was being 
absorbed into prevailing notions of the economy…At the same time the concept of social 
capital reinforces the idea that this is all about economy, and that social networks are at the core 
of what makes economy, and society, function (Elyachar, 2005: p.186). 
 
Building on Harvey, Elyachar argues that “valorizing the cultural practices of the poor as 
a form of social capital and financializing their social networks through relations of 
debt…is an important aspect of accumulation by dispossession” (ibid.: p.29). And 
indeed, several ethnographic studies of microcredit operations have illustrated Elyachar’s 
central point that the appropriation of the poor’s social capital toward the financial 
practice of loan repayment has, in many cases, led to disempowerment. For example, the 
leveraging of existing solidarity/community based groups to enable micro-lending has 
been shown to exacerbate community tension and increase social pressure (Rahman, 
1999; Kar, 2013), entrench, rather than challenge existing social hierarchies, notably, 
household-level gender inequalities (Kabeer, 2001; Rankin 2001; Mayoux, 2001; 
Molyneux, 2002; Rankin 2002), and ultimately serve to deteriorate what social capital 
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there was in the first place (Moser, 1998; Bähre, 2007b). These empirical insights prompt 
us to interrogate the rhetoric of financial inclusion, a term whose “empowering, 
beneficial, and harmonious sheen” may obscure the ways in which inclusion itself can be 
an exercise of control and power (Schwittay, 2011). 
Navigating New Market Spaces: Formal and Informal Institutional Dynamics  
 
Relational Poverty: Accounting for the Regulatory Role of Social Institutions  
 
M4P inspired approaches to financial inclusion have appealed to policymakers 
and donors who want microfinance to continue its integration with the financial sector, 
but retain a stronger focus on poverty. And yet, despite important conceptual advances, 
the framework fails to fully incorporate theoretically informed perspectives on poverty. 
S. Johnson (2013) argues that M4P engages with a “residualist” view of poverty that 
conceptualizes the poor as a group that simply lacks the necessary income or resources 
to engage in markets. NIE-inspired M4P approaches have thus charted a path to 
inclusion that puts primacy on the lowering of transaction costs. But this view fails to 
engage with how poverty is produced in the first place. Beyond income-based 
definitions, poverty theorists have painted a broader picture of poverty that is multi-
dimensional and linked to wider processes of social exclusion (Sen, 1999; Saith, 2001). 
Thus, “relational”, as opposed to residualist, perspectives shift the focus of analysis away 
from poverty outcomes to the processes through which these outcomes are produced 
(Hickey and du Toit, 2007; S. Johnson, 2013). 
This has led to important questions regarding the institutional underpinnings of 
markets and the ways in which they shape poverty outcomes; this contrasts with M4P’s 
core focus on how institutions create enabling environments for the poor. For instance, 
S. Johnson (2013) has argued that relational poverty is embedded within social 
institutions—such as gender, religion, caste, space, and class—and that current analyses 
of inclusive markets tend to overlook their underlying role in social regulation. In her 
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analysis of the Indian economy, Harriss-White (2004) highlights how these various, and 
often overlapping social institutions structure the economy and how formal 
macroeconomic policy is implemented through their filters. Crucially, these social 
institutions, which are deeply embedded and resistant to change (North, 1990), can play a 
dominant regulatory role, particularly in contexts where formal regulation is weak or not 
enforced (S. Johnson, 2013). And as several scholars have shown—particularly through a 
critical feminist lens (e.g. Agarwal, 1994; Kabeer, 1998; Rahman, 1999; Rankin 2001)—
these institutions play key roles in regulating processes of inclusion and exclusion 
throughout the wider economy. It is through this function that poverty is reproduced, 
necessitating an analysis of markets that systematically accounts for these social 
institutions (S. Johnson, 2013).  
The 2002 World Development Report “Building Institutions for Markets” 
recognizes that while informal institutions can provide people with a way to access the 
market, they are often sources of exclusion. By contrast, formal institutions are 
understood as a way to include more people by building efficiencies into the market and 
mitigating information asymmetries (World Bank, 2001). Contexts in which formal 
institutions are weak or non-existent (i.e. developing countries) have been conceived of 
as formal “institutional voids” (Webb et al., 2010). However, critics have argued that 
such conceptualizations privilege modern/Western interpretations of what constitutes an 
“ideal market” (Mair et al., 2012). Subsequent research on informal economies have 
shown that instead, these voids occur in the midst of institutional abundance—a 
complex, interdependent ecosystem that needs to be made legible by formal market 
systems (Mair et al., 2012; Meagher, 2015). 
The growing recognition that informal, social institutions play key regulatory 
roles in the functioning of markets has signaled the need to move them more to the 
center of analytical frameworks. More accurately, institutional analyses must account for 
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the interactional dynamics between formal and informal institutions and the ways these 
produce outcomes related to development, welfare, risk, and poverty. In contrast, then, 
to the view that privileges formal institutions as a set of ideal market governance systems 
that enter into “voids”, this approach gives equal weight to informal institutions and re-
conceptualizes market/regulatory outcomes as products of situated, institutional 
interactions. 
Institutional Change from the Top-Down: Design Perspectives on Institutional Dynamics 
 
As discussed in the introduction, De Soysa and Jütting (2007) build on these 
insights to advance an analytical framework that links institutional outcomes to 
development outcomes (see Appendix A). In this framework, development outcomes are 
not attributed to a single set of institutions, but rather to several factors that include 
formal institutions, informal institutions, external factors (such as context, identity, and 
culture), and agency (i.e. the actions of government, civil society, private sector, and 
individual actors). While this framework captures the complex linkages and contextual 
factors that ultimately shape development outcomes, it does not explain how institutional 
change is induced. 
 For North (1990), change begins with individuals; institutions are created and 
altered by individuals and their organizations: 
Institutions…determine the opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take 
advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organizations evolve, they alter the institutions. 
The resultant path of institutional change is shaped by 1) the lock-in that comes from the 
symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organizations that have evolved as a 
consequence of the incentive structure provided by those institutions and 2) the 
feedback process by which human beings perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set 
(North, 1990: p.7). 
 
Since informal constraints (i.e. social/cultural norms, habituated behavior, etc.) have 
“tenacious survival ability” and are resistant to change, North argues that changes to the 
institutional framework typically consist of marginal adjustments to the complex of rules, 
norms, and enforcement (ibid.).  
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 This notion of “getting institutions right” (Rodrik, 2004) animates much of the 
NIE-inspired, design-based theorizations of formal and informal institutional dynamics. 
Central to much of Elinor Ostrom’s work on public service provision, for example, is the 
notion that “weak” institutions can be transformed into robust ones through an iterative 
process between service users and providers, a process she refers to as “co-production” 
(Ostrom, 1996). In this view, an optimal institutional arrangement can be forged or 
“crafted” through a gradual, evolutionary process that can ultimately produce welfare 
enhancing outcomes (Ostrom, 1992). Ostrom and her colleagues recognized that service 
users/clients collectively hold and have access to a wealth of local knowledge, skills, 
networks, and institutions between them, and that if these were not directed toward the 
creation of valued outputs, a hefty opportunity cost would thus be incurred (Ostrom, 
1996). From this view then, involving users in the production of services is a way of 
securing a more efficient utilization of resources.  
Moreover, the term “co-production” evokes the traditional production process 
by which a set of inputs is transformed into certain outputs—the production function. A 
principal (i.e. entrepreneur, firm, etc.) makes combinatorial decisions based on an 
analysis of costs and benefits in order to maximize output. In this formulation, local 
knowledge, networks, and institutions, collectively and commonly referred to in the 
literature as “social capital”, are understood as raw inputs that can be utilized to optimize 
the production function (ibid.).  
Taken together, this “calculus approach” (Hall and Taylor, 1996), which is 
heavily influenced by rational choice assumptions, views institutional formation and 
change as a purposive process that reflects the preferences and expectations of actors 
(ibid.). The perceived deficiencies of indigenous arrangements can be “made good” 
through optimally crafted partnerships; complementarities between providers and users 
can be identified and forged into a synergy. These concepts have resonance with 
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Prahalad’s (2006) notion of building “symbiotic market-based ecosystems” which serve 
as the foundation of successful BoP markets. They are also central to mainstream 
microinsurance discourse, which focuses on how to rationalize formal-informal 
arrangements according to a set of design principles in order to build an optimal 
institutional landscape for the expansion of formal microinsurance markets (Churchill, 
2006; McCord, 2006; Trommershäuser et al., 2006).  
Institutional Bricolage: A “Messier” Perspective on Institutional Formation and Change 
 
 The calculus perspective underpinning co-production perspectives has been 
criticized for being overly functionalist and mechanical; critics have questioned to what 
extent formal-informal institutional arrangements can be crafted or designed (Cleaver, 
2002; Cleaver, 2012; S. Johnson, 2013). Rather, Frances Cleaver, whose insights stem 
from her work on natural resource management, argues that the process of institutional 
evolution is much more ad hoc in nature, and shaped by deeply embedded socio-cultural 
norms. From this view, formal and informal institutions articulate and interact with each 
other in a complex process she describes through the metaphor of bricolage: 
Institutional bricolage is the process in which people consciously and non-consciously draw on 
existing social formulae (styles of thinking, models of cause and effect, social norms, and 
sanctioned social roles and relationships) to patch or piece together institutions in response to 
changing situations (Cleaver, 2012: p.45). 
 
Such a view critiques co-production’s instrumental rendering of social capital and 
informal institutions, and is meant to better reflect the dynamic social relations and 
cultural milieu that make up an individual’s social environment. 
Moreover, Cleaver points out the implicit bias in the way formal, bureaucratic 
institutions are favored due to their more identifiable and tangible modes of interaction. 
This bias assumes that institutional evolution marches along a unilinear trajectory toward 
either modernity (i.e. formalization) on the one hand or disorder on the other. These 
assumptions “obscure rather than elucidate the relational nature of collective action,” 
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and discard the array of institutional outcomes that might occur had they not been 
considered sub-optimal from a strictly formal standpoint (Cleaver, 2002: p.15). This 
culturalist, rather than calculative, perspective does not begin and end, then, with the 
rational utility-maximizing designer, but with a network of people within a contextual 
cultural milieu engaged in adaptive processes in which they “modify old arrangements 
and invent new ones” in line with the “acceptable ways of doing things” (Cleaver, 2012: 
p.34). And while there is recognition within NIE and co-production literature of the 
need to embed or “nest” formal institutions within these contextual fields (Ostrom, 
1990; North 1990; Ostrom, 2010a), these are rather mechanical views that fail to 
recognize and engage with the full depth of the socio-cultural embeddedness of decision-
making and cooperative relations.  
This failure can lead formalist, design-based perspectives to miss the ways in 
which institutional arrangements can reproduce and reinforce power inequalities that are 
deeply embedded within existing social structures and networks. Cleaver (2012) critiques 
what she terms “mainstream institutionalism” for focusing too heavily on the publicly 
visible processes of decision-making (e.g. public proceedings, meeting minutes, 
conferences etc.), while ignoring the “offstage, invisible, and, everyday dynamics” of 
macro and micro level politics that shape daily life. Moreover, mainstream 
institutionalism tends to capture only narrow aspects of people’s identities—as 
entrepreneurs, landless laborers, or state bureaucrats, for example—which gloss over the 
plurality of social identities and motivations that interact in ever shifting ways. Bricolage 
has been advanced to better capture “the exercise of power through a plurality of 
institutions and actors, social practices, and everyday encounters—not just through state 
governance and public spaces” (ibid.: p.22). If financial markets and market actors are 
regulated by “polycentric” (Ostrom, 2010a; Ostrom, 2010b) institutional arrangements, 
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then accounting for the way power works through these overlapping structures and 
actors is essential in understanding the full scope of institutional formation and change. 
Conclusion 
 
 The emergence of microinsurance as both a viable business and a potential 
instrument for development brings together a number of relevant literatures that have 
been reviewed in turn. The basic economic case for microinsurance frames it as a 
financial technology that offers the poor a modern, efficient way to manage their risks; 
informal mechanisms and strategies not only provide inadequate coverage, they may also 
contribute to the persistence of poverty. Critical anthropological perspectives highlight 
the ways in which (commercial) risks are social constructions, which are in large part 
shaped by the definitions employed by insurance companies. For all the risks commercial 
insurance claims to mitigate, it also introduces new forms of risk that originate from and 
are subject to the vagaries of the market.  
These competing theoretical perspectives on markets and risk echo the animating 
questions at the heart of the broader financial inclusion and inclusive markets debate. 
The dominant neoliberal development frameworks fundamentally conceive of poverty as 
a product of market exclusion. Moreover, given the importance of financial sector 
development to economic growth, wide-scale exclusion from the formal financial system 
has taken on heightened salience within this literature. Over the course of the past few 
decades, the global microfinance industry has emerged to address and mitigate this 
exclusion. Financial inclusion initiatives and policy frameworks have followed suit; 
various approaches (i.e. Finance for All, Making Markets Work for the Poor, etc.) have 
contributed to a development agenda focused on eliminating barriers to the financial 
market.  
This has corresponded with a gradual shift away from the rights-based 
approaches that characterized the early foundations of microfinance. Market-based 
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perspectives are mainly concerned with improving market systems and identifying 
efficiencies that would help create sustainable financial services. Within this framework, 
then, the private sector performs a more central role in generating positive development 
outcomes. Corporations like insurance companies bring to bear their managerial 
techniques, their enterprising ethos, and expertise to engage with a historically excluded 
consumer base at the BoP. In so doing, they aim to draw low-income individuals and 
communities into the market not only as consumers, but also as producers—“co-
creators” of BoP, i.e. microinsurance value chains. To close the “institutional distance” 
between developed market systems and the BoP, companies are encouraged to partner 
with and leverage local, community-based infrastructures.  
However, the body of evidence reviewed above suggests that while microfinance 
can offer a much-needed measure of stability to poor households and firms, it can also 
be complicit in processes of accumulation by dispossession. As Harvey’s notion implies, 
value—both monetary and symbolic—is generated through the appropriation of the 
poor’s social capital in order to serve the needs of capitalist expansion. Elyachar (2005) 
argues that the question of who captures this value is essentially a political issue with 
broad implications. Or, as Erik Bähre puts it in the context of financial inclusion: “The 
vocabulary of ‘providing access’ to the poor that is salient in development circles fails to 
take essential power inequalities into consideration” (Bähre, 2012: p.160). 
Through this lens of political economy, the importance of accounting for the 
power hierarchies and dynamics that are embedded within these market-based, private 
sector led approaches to financial inclusion come into clearer focus. This is a particularly 
relevant critique for BoP-inspired ventures like microinsurance, which extol the virtues 
of building mutually beneficial partnerships between insurers and community-based 
institutions. What does inclusion into the formal insurance system entail for informal 
service providers who serve as distribution channels for well resourced, highly capitalized 
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insurance companies? How do inherent power inequalities along the microinsurance 
value chain skew the distribution of benefits? How are clients affected? These questions 
echo the broader debates that frame the financial inclusion/inclusive markets literature 
reviewed in this chapter: Does inclusion lead inexorably to positive welfare outcomes? 
Or are the poor being incorporated into markets on terms that structurally disadvantage 
them in the long term? 
While market-based conceptual frameworks like M4P have advanced to 
recognize that markets themselves can be a source of risk, it nevertheless engages with a 
residualist view of poverty that fails to account for the multi-dimensional and dynamic 
ways in which poverty is produced. Social institutions like gender, religion, class, and 
caste regulate processes of inclusion and exclusion that have wide-ranging implications 
for market access, participation, and empowerment. And while the importance of these 
social institutions is recognized in the M4P and allied literatures, mainstream institutional 
perspectives tend to view them mechanically, as raw inputs that can be “made good” or 
utilized to craft ideal arrangements that produce desired outcomes. “Critical 
institutionalists” (Cleaver, 2012) contend instead that institutional dynamics are a more 
organic process captured in the notion of “bricolage,” in which formal and informal 
institutions are mutually constitutive.  
 The frictions generated by these various theoretical and empirical insights on 
institutions help to form the conceptual framework for this current study of 
microinsurance markets in South Africa. The literature makes clear that both formal and 
informal institutions have, respectively, the potential to exert either emancipatory or 
exclusionary forces on microinsurance clients. What is not entirely clear is how regulatory 
outcomes are impacted by the interactions between these formal and informal 
institutions: What drives processes of institutional change and ultimately, how does this 
translate into risk outcomes for microinsurance clients? Moreover, what is the role of 
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individual agency in processes of institutional development? While some (Douglas, 1986) 
argue that individual agency is nearly entirely constrained by socially embedded 
institutions, others in the co-production mold (Giddens, 1984; Ostrom, 1996) place a 
greater emphasis on the primacy of individual agents in forging institutional outcomes. 
Cleaver offers a middle path: 
I reject a view of individuals as rational and essentially economic resource appropriators, and 
attempt to reconceptualize them as conscious and unconscious social agents, deeply embedded in 
their cultural milieu but nonetheless capable of analyzing and acting upon the circumstances that 
confront them. Individual action is characterized both by agency and structural constraint 
(Cleaver, 2002: p.16). 
 
In this spirit, my thesis will aim to shed light on how microinsurance providers and 
clients navigate a shifting institutional landscape, and how their actions, in turn affect 
institutions. It will also explore the ways in which institutional dynamics constrain agency 
in ways that are seen and unseen. Ultimately, the interplay between prevailing 
institutional arrangements and individual agency produces regulatory outcomes that 
shape how the benefits of microinsurance are distributed. The methodological 
framework adopted for this study, which will be elaborated upon in the following 
chapter, stems from these theoretical insights.  
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3—Researching microinsurance across the formal-informal divide: 
Reflections on a mixed methods approach 
 
More than 20 years after democracy was inaugurated in South Africa, activists 
and scholars have drawn attention to the enduring structures that continue to segregate 
the population along racial and economic lines. Cape Town has been described through 
the lens of “spatial apartheid” (Turok, 2001; Lemanski, 2004) to describe a socio-
economic reality in which affluent, well-serviced suburbs that surround the city are 
predominantly inhabited by white people while black and colored residents live in the 
low-income, insecure townships on the outskirts of the city.8 Even without the prism of 
compelling statistics, a simple 45-minute drive along the N2 highway, which connects 
Khayelitsha to the wealthy waterfront communities of Cape Town, lays bare the 
economic and spatial disparities that continue to divide white from black residents. In 
Cape Town, the formal and informal divide is visibly and tangibly inscribed onto this 
bifurcated social reality.   
 This setting proved to be an appropriate backdrop for an empirical study of 
formal and informal institutional dynamics. I quite literally drove the length of the N2 
highway that separated formal and informal research settings, shuttling back and forth 
between insurance headquarters nestled in the comfortable suburbs of developed Cape 
Town and the dilapidated township of Khayelitsha, which is where burial societies, 
funeral parlors, and microinsurance clients were based. As I will elaborate upon in this 
chapter, conducting research on both formal and informal institutional systems 
demanded that I adopt different research strategies; while I utilized “formal” research 
techniques to access formal sector actors (i.e. phone/email requests for scheduled sit-
down interviews), I relied primarily on relational strategies in the informal sphere in 
order to build trust with my respondents. Building this trust was vital in the sense that I 
                                               
8 A legacy of the Group Areas Act of 1950, which forcibly relocated black, colored, and Indian people away from city 
centers across South Africa. 
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had to overcome more cultural, racial, and linguistic barriers in these “informal” settings 
than I had to in formal settings.  
 Another methodological challenge was to design strategies in order to capture the 
interaction of formal and informal institutions. Though in some ways an abstract, 
conceptual exercise, there were several occasions over the course of my fieldwork that 
afforded me opportunities to physically observe these interactions play out (e.g. 
observing insurance agents negotiate terms with burial society administrators, comparing 
formal and informal insurance contracts, etc.). My primary strategy was to incorporate 
questions related to formal-informal dynamics into my interview topic guides. But, as I 
will discuss, opportunities to engage in participant observation also yielded key insights 
on this formal-informal relationship. 
 I chose to base my fieldwork primarily in Cape Town for a variety of reasons. 
First, in my preparation to select a field site, I was struck by the work of anthropologist 
Erik Bähre who based his own ethnographic study of financial self-help groups in the 
townships surrounding Cape Town. He wrote extensively about the rapid expansion of 
insurance operations into these townships and how it surprised him to find that 
seemingly more residents held funeral insurance policies than they did membership in 
burial societies (Bähre, 2007b; Bähre, 2012). He located this observation within a broader 
paradigm shift propelled by Bottom-of-the-Pyramid frameworks in which financial 
services businesses like insurance companies were increasingly looking to profit from, 
rather than ignore, poor clients. These dynamics seemed particularly relevant for my own 
study. 
 Second, as this study required that I obtain interview data from both formal and 
informal providers/operators, Cape Town was an ideal choice in that many of South 
Africa’s largest insurance companies have offices and/or headquarters in the city and 
surrounding areas. These include large insurance corporations like Old Mutual, 
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Metropolitan Life, Sanlam, Liberty Life, Safrican, and Santam among others. Moreover, 
KGA Life, a smaller-scale, boutique funeral insurance company based in Cape Town, 
offered me the opportunity to shadow their sales staff in one of their retail offices, many 
of which are located in the heart of several township communities. As I will detail below, 
the KGA Life office in Khayelitsha proved to be a highly productive empirical site as I 
was able to directly observe the tangible points of intersection between the formal and 
informal spheres, i.e. the interactions of insurance sales agents on the one hand and 
informal operators, as well as low-income clients, on the other. 
 Third, I was drawn to the ways in which the unique social, economic, and cultural 
histories of Xhosa migrant communities in Cape Town were interwoven with the 
emergence of burial societies and microinsurance. In particular, labor migration patterns, 
which stretch all the way back to the 19th century and are invariably shaped by the 
discriminatory laws imposed by the apartheid regime, resulted in millions of Xhosa 
settling in and around the Cape Town area, hundreds of miles away from their ancestral 
homes in the Eastern Cape. As Bähre (2007a: p.10) points out, “the emergence of burial 
societies was a result of labour migration.” But I also discovered that the cultural 
imperative to return bodies back to the Eastern Cape was translated directly into higher 
transport costs, which in turn, helped boost the demand and desirability of financial 
insurance products. While I unpack these cultural and economic links in subsequent 
chapters, the selection of Cape Town and the Xhosa dominated communities in 
Khayelitsha allowed me to examine these intersections and entanglements in more depth. 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the qualitative and quantitative 
methods I chose to collect my data, the rationale for these methodological decisions, and 
the types of analyses I utilized to make sense of the data collected. I also share a number 
of reflections about my methodological experiences in the field. In particular, I consider 
my own positionality as a researcher from an elite university in the United Kingdom 
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conducting research in a South African context in which most, if not all, social actors saw 
and interpreted me as an “outsider.” Moreover, I draw upon and add to relevant studies 
done in this area of scholarship, which have shaped my own research design. This 
includes empirical approaches undertaken to better understand the financial practices of 
the poor (e.g. Rutherford, 2000; Roth, 2001; Bähre, 2007a; Collins et al., 2009; and James, 
2014) as well as scholarship that has explored the interactions between formal and 
informal systems and institutions (e.g. Ostrom, 1996; Cleaver, 2001; Harriss-White, 2004; 
Phillips, 2011; Cleaver, 2012, and Meagher, 2015).  
Research Design: Utilizing Mixed Methods 
 
Methods Overview 
 
This study draws on fieldwork I conducted in South Africa—predominantly 
Cape Town and the adjacent township of Khayelitsha—between June 2015-April 2016. 
This data collection period was preceded and set up by a month long pilot study I 
undertook in June 2014, which allowed me to establish initial contacts with key sources 
and to develop a general structure for my approach to the field. The Centre for Financial 
Regulation and Inclusion (Cenfri), a non-profit think tank based in Cape Town, and the 
University of Cape Town served as institutional hosts for my research. I turned to them 
often for resources, contacts, and general advice about the local research context. 
 I utilized both qualitative and quantitative research techniques. On the qualitative 
side, I conducted 68 semi-structured one-on-one interviews and 5 focus group 
interviews. In addition, Cenfri allowed me to participate in one of their on-going 
qualitative research projects, which aimed to gather clients’ perspectives on the informal 
funeral parlor market in South Africa (see Van den Berg et al., 2016). These were 
organized as a series of 7 focus group interviews as well as 12 semi-structured, one-on-
one interviews with informal service providers (i.e. funeral parlors and burial societies). 
Finally, I collected and analyzed a number of documents including policy documents, 
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marketing materials, and contracts. On the quantitative side, I designed a survey that 
targeted microinsurance clients. In total, I collected the demographic and attitudinal data 
of 76 respondents. 
 To access both interview subjects and survey respondents, I relied on a 
combination of purposive, opportunistic, and snowball sampling techniques. Purposive 
sampling was also used to identify and collect the relevant documents for analysis. 
Overall, my sampling strategy was structured around the empirical objectives of the 
study. It was critical that I was able to interview actors in both the formal and informal 
spheres, as well as microinsurance clients and funeral parlor/burial society members. 
Generally then, there were three categories of actors (i.e. formal actors, informal actors, 
and clients), which required different strategies in order to secure access. I detail these 
sampling strategies further in the following sections.  
Semi-Structured and Focus Group Interviews: Qualitative Methods and Negotiating Access 
 
The core research questions that structure this thesis are exploratory and 
descriptive in nature. As such, following Noaks and Wincup’s (2004) typology of 
interview strategies, I turned to one-on-one semi-structured interviews as my primary 
mode of data collection. This format allowed me to explore specific issues of interest 
with some depth and to probe respondents with questions that were organized around 
relevant themes (Silverman, 2014). But it also allowed me to retain some flexibility to be 
more responsive to the interviewee’s own natural train of thinking. Moreover, the pilot 
trip I conducted in 2014 allowed me to gain a better understanding of the types of 
questions that would elicit the most relevant information without being overly invasive. 
For example, I anticipated that I would be asking potentially sensitive questions to 
microinsurance clients since it involved their personal financial practices. But the clients I 
met during the pilot trip did not seem particularly evasive in answering my questions 
related to their income, financial difficulties, or their experiences with microinsurance. 
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The pilot trip was thus instrumental in helping me craft contextually appropriate and 
effective interview questions and topic guides. 
Over the course of the research, I identified four broad groups of social actors 
that needed to be interviewed: 1) State regulators/legislators; 2) Formal providers; 3) 
Informal providers; and 4) Clients. As such, four separate topic guides were created for 
each respective group (see Appendix C). Though individual questions varied for each 
respondent type, the topic guides followed a similar structure designed to elicit 
reflections on the current microinsurance institutional landscape and to understand, from 
the respondents’ perspectives, which institutions and/or institutional arrangements held 
sway in terms of regulatory relevance and impact. Of the 68 semi-structured interviews I 
conducted, 23 were with insurance industry actors (e.g. sales agents, administrators, 
executives, technology service providers, and industry association representatives), 4 with 
state actors (e.g. regulators, legislators, and program administrators), 4 with informal 
providers (e.g. funeral parlor operators and burial society administrators), and 37 with 
microinsurance clients. 
All interviews were conducted in person and recorded for accuracy. Each 
interview began by informing participants of the project’s aims and assured that their 
names would be changed to ensure anonymity and confidentiality (respondent names 
have been changed throughout this thesis). Consent to publish interviewees’ responses 
under these conditions was also obtained before the start of every interview, and 
participants were given the option to withdraw at any time. Although I loosely followed 
the procedures for informed consent as prescribed by Ryen (2004), I was mindful to 
avoid what Riessman (2004: p.473) refers to as “ethical universalism,” or the assumption 
that the safeguards of informed consent that are applied in one cultural context could be 
exported unaltered into another. I made sure to seek feedback from local researchers at 
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my host institutions that the measures I utilized to uphold ethical standards for research 
were contextually appropriate.  
 Generally speaking, the research did not involve information that, if disclosed, 
would put respondents in any sort of risk. Nevertheless, subjects were informed at the 
beginning of every interview that I was a doctoral student based in the United Kingdom, 
and that any information disclosed would be used for research purposes only. Further, 
interview subjects were given the option to request that any specific piece of information 
be redacted from the transcript if they decided to keep it confidential, though this option 
was never invoked.  
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) note that the issue of access to data is not 
resolved simply by gaining entry into a setting, but is rather subject to a constant process 
of negotiation with gatekeepers. As such, because my study required that I negotiate 
access with different types of gatekeepers to a wide range of settings, I had to utilize a 
variety of strategies to obtain my interview data. For formal sector actors, i.e. industry 
and state, I relied on a combination of purposive and snowball sampling methods. Cenfri 
was instrumental in connecting me with industry and state contacts who were engaged 
heavily with the operational and regulatory aspects of building the South African 
microinsurance market. Other interviews with formal actors were secured directly 
through email/phone solicitation. To obtain interviews with informal sector actors, i.e. 
burial society and funeral parlor administrators, I relied heavily on a local facilitator, 
Goodwill Nxusani, who was embedded within the community structures and networks 
of his home area of Khayelitsha. Without his intermediation, obtaining interviews 
directly with these sources would have proved difficult. 
Barbera-Stein (1979) observes that the process of negotiating access with 
gatekeepers can itself produce important insights about the field. In my study, 
negotiating access to microinsurance clients as well as burial society/funeral parlor 
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members helped to reveal important power dynamics that had to be accounted for in my 
analysis. As I would discover, for instance, funeral parlors in particular are very careful to 
maintain control over their clients’ information; they do not want insurance companies 
circumventing them to access clients directly. As such, my attempts to access funeral 
parlor clients through funeral parlor operators were repeatedly rebuffed and/or 
redirected. I was forced instead to find alternative ways to interview burial 
society/funeral parlor members (i.e. via focus groups organized by Goodwill; see more 
below). 
I was able to access microinsurance clients through purposive/opportunistic 
sampling techniques. I made an arrangement with KGA Life to shadow the sales agents 
in their Khayelitsha retail storefront. I decided to make my visits at the start of each 
month to coincide with clients receiving their monthly cash transfers from the state (i.e. 
child grants, old age pensions, etc.). With this cash in hand, clients would make the short 
trek over to the Khayelitsha branch to make their monthly premium payments, making 
this time the busiest transactional period of the month. Once their transaction would be 
complete, sales agents requested that they sit with me for a short interview. I was able to 
make 6 visits of this type to their branch office over the course of my fieldwork.9  
 As it relates to semi-structured client interviews, one limitation I discovered with 
my sampling strategy was that it solicited responses from KGA clients who had every 
reason to be satisfied with microinsurance; they were premium-paying customers after 
all. Predictably, attitudinal questions that targeted this cohort yielded overwhelmingly 
positive responses. To counterbalance this natural bias in my sample, I worked with 
Goodwill to organize a series of focus group interviews that I conducted out of his 
home. These focus groups were comprised of his neighbors and the only guideline I 
                                               
9 In subsequent chapters, interview data derived from these one-on-one client interviews will be denoted by referring 
to the client as “Respondent” followed by a corresponding number (e.g. Respondent X; Fieldwork Interview). 
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provided Goodwill was that he invite people who had at least some experience with 
funeral insurance and/or burial societies/funeral parlors (regardless of if these 
experiences were positive or negative). As expected, the attitudinal responses I received 
in these focus group settings were far more varied. This format also enabled me to access 
burial society/funeral parlor members. The 5 focus group interviews yielded data from 
40 additional clients.10 
 Finally, Cenfri’s qualitative study on the informal funeral parlor market in South 
Africa yielded useful supplemental data for my study.11 Although I was just an observer 
for these focus group discussions, I was able to provide some input that helped shape 
the interviewer’s questions. Joining this project also afforded me the opportunity to 
branch out of my research base in Cape Town to hear from clients in different parts of 
the country. The project convened 4 focus groups in Johannesburg and 3 in Durban, as 
well as in-depth, one-on-one interviews with funeral parlor operators and burial society 
administrators from the Eastern Cape, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal, and North West 
provinces. As might be expected by incorporating this geographic diversity, my study 
benefited immensely from exposure to a range of different perspectives and practices. 
Most notable, for instance, were the differences in funeral traditions and beliefs between 
the Xhosa respondents in the Western Cape and the mostly Zulu respondents I observed 
in Durban, and the ways in which these differences affected their respective engagements 
with funeral insurance. But more relevant for my analysis were the remarkable similarities 
in the stories I heard from people across the country. Underlying the socio-cultural 
differences between these groups was a more fundamental political economy of risk and 
risk management that seemed to play out across contexts. Stories about the same types 
                                               
10 In subsequent chapters, interview data derived from these focus group interviews will be denoted by referring to the 
setting as “Group Interview” followed by the corresponding group number (e.g. Respondent #X; Group Interview 
#X). 
11 In subsequent chapters, interview data derived from these focus group interviews will be denoted by referring to the 
setting as “[Johannesburg or Durban] Focus Group Interview” followed by the corresponding group number (e.g. 
[Male or Female] Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #X). 
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of abusive practices, frustrations, fears, and adaptations, were recorded in all these 
locales, lending a measured degree of generalizability to my findings. 
Analyzing Documents 
 
Interview and survey data were supplemented by the collection and analysis of 
relevant documents. The sampling strategy with regard to documents focused on the 
three main actors at the heart of my study, namely the state, insurance company, and 
informal operator. The analysis of state documents produced in relation to 
microinsurance regulation aimed to reveal the underlying interests of the state as it tried 
to balance competing priorities in the process of formalization. The main documents 
analyzed in this regard were: 1) The Financial Sector Charter (FSC); 2) The South African 
Microinsurance Regulatory Framework; 3) The Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services (FAIS) Act; and 4) The Long Term Insurance Act of 1998 and the Insurance 
Laws Amendment Act of 2008. The selection of these policy documents was guided by 
the interview data, which indicated that they had the most relevant influence on the 
regulation of microinsurance in South Africa.  
In addition to these, I collected marketing material and contracts used by both 
insurance companies and funeral parlors. These documents not only shed light on how 
these different organizations operated, they also helped to reveal their motivations as 
they interfaced with clients, the state, and other providers. Representative examples of 
these types of documents are included in Appendices D-F. 
 All documents were read through a constructionist lens. This approach is not as 
concerned with the factual content contained in these documents, but is more attuned to 
the contextual milieu, motivations of actors, and narrative fields that produced these 
documents (Silverman, 2014). Atkinson and Coffey (2004: p.79) argue that documents 
are “social facts, in that they are produced, shared, and used in socially organised ways.” 
Moreover, they “actively construct the very organisations they purport to describe.” 
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These perspectives are germane to my study insofar as documents, particularly state 
documents, are integral to the enactment of formalization processes. In other words, 
they do not simply contain information; they have an actual effect on the social field. As 
I will show, this dovetails with the efforts of formal corporations to dictate the terms of 
formalization in their favor. The documents collected for this research study were thus 
considered to the extent that they help shape the interaction between formal and 
informal institutions. 
Quantitative Methods: Designing a Topically Relevant, Contextually Appropriate Survey  
 
 In addition to these qualitative approaches, I designed and deployed a survey to 
capture basic demographic data (i.e. sex, age, marital status, income, work status, etc.) 
and client attitudes toward risk and insurance (N=76; see Appendix F).12 In order to 
measure attitudes toward risk, I wrote several prompts reflecting plausible sources of risk 
that corresponded to different microinsurance products, namely insurance for property, 
health, life, and unemployment. As an example, I would ask respondents to rate on a 
Likert scale (‘1’ being ‘Not worried at all’ and ‘7’ being ‘Very worried’) how much they 
were concerned about “Damage to your home” (which corresponded with property 
insurance) or “Providing for your family in case something happens to you” (which 
corresponded with life insurance). The intention of the measure was to identify which 
sources of risk clients actually worried about in their daily lives and to quantify that 
concern relative to other potential risks. I was also interested in understanding if 
insurance companies were providing microinsurance products that aligned with the 
needs of their clients. 
 In piloting the survey, however, I discovered that the Likert scale was largely 
ineffective in its ability to capture attitudes toward risk. No matter how it was explained, 
verbally or in text, respondents seemed to interpret the prompts in a binary “yes-or-no” 
                                               
12 The survey was also translated into isiXhosa (see Appendix G). 
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sort of way. If the prompt asked them to rate their level of concern about “Sickness of a 
family member,” for example, respondents would indicate yes and circle ‘7.’ If they were 
not concerned, they would circle ‘1.’ Any nuance between these two responses—which 
the Likert scale is ostensibly designed to capture—was lost. I thus abandoned the Likert 
scale for the risk portion of the survey and customized an alternative measure that 
prompted respondents to rank risk scenarios in terms of their relative levels of concern. I 
averaged these responses to shed some light on what types of risk—related to health, 
property, life, or unemployment—seemed to be front of mind concerns for the survey 
respondents. 
Interestingly, the same problems I encountered with the Likert scale on the risk 
measure did not seem to carry over to the portion of the survey that aimed to capture 
attitudes toward formal microinsurance. As such, I chose to retain the scale for this 
measure. This section of the survey sought to gauge clients’ attitudes toward different 
aspects of microinsurance operations including their experiences with insurance agents, 
mechanisms for recourse, communication, and claims administration. Ultimately, I was 
interested in quantifying respondents’ general levels of trust with microinsurance, as 
qualitative interviews identified trust as a key factor in the success or failure of 
microinsurance markets. For the analysis, I used simple descriptive statistics to 
summarize the survey data. While I highlight and discuss the more notable results within 
the text of subsequent chapters, I include the complete set of quantitative results in 
Appendix H. 
Methodological Reflections: On Conducting Research in South Africa 
 
On South Africa 
 
 Conducting research in a setting like South Africa required that I reflect 
constantly on my own position within the field. South Africa has often been described by 
social scientists as a dual economy to illustrate the ways in which apartheid produced two 
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distinct social realities  (Porteous and Hazelhurst, 2004). As an American, London-based 
researcher encountering this “strange” cultural context (Silverman, 2004), I had to adopt 
different strategies to navigate both these realities and to be conscious of how my own 
“western” thought/empirical frameworks translated within this social field. 
 In the more affluent, racially white, and formal side of this dual society, I found 
that western cultural conventions translated rather seamlessly. Obtaining and conducting 
interviews with insurance agents/executives, state regulators, and other formal players 
were relatively straightforward endeavors. But on the other side of this divide—
predominantly poor, racially black (Xhosa-speaking South Africans in my study), and 
regulated largely by informal institutions and cultural conventions—I had to account for 
the power asymmetries that existed between myself and my interview subjects and 
acknowledge the ways in which my basic ontological assumptions did not always 
comport with the social realities on the ground. 
To navigate the obvious linguistic, cultural, as well as ethical boundaries/barriers, 
I enlisted the help of a local research assistant named Sandisiwe Ncube. In Julia 
Elyachar’s study of craftsmen workshops in el-Hirafiyeen, a residential complex on the 
outskirts of Cairo, she reflects upon the presence of a “third,” or a triadic, as opposed to 
dyadic, relationship between “field” and “researcher(s)” as a relevant, yet overlooked 
factor in the process of ethnographic production: 
In a project that attempted to grasp the different forms of power acting on one ethnographic 
setting such as el-Hirafiyeen, multiple perspectives on that ethnographic reality were imperative. 
No one perspective on the complex reality that was el-Hirafiyeen was adequate…If only one 
person were conducting fieldwork in such a site, the ethnographic picture that would result would 
be severely limited. This in addition to the inevitable shaping of reality imposed by the concepts 
that we mobilize in the conduct of fieldwork, as well as in the process of analyzing and writing 
(Elyachar, 2005: p.34).  
  
Much of my reflections on the institutions, power dynamics, processes, and outcomes 
that inhabited my field site were triangulated through Sandisiwe’s own lens. Moreover, 
she was an ideal assistant for this particular project not only because of her intuitive 
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understanding of Khayetlitsha’s cultural, linguistic, and social context, but also because 
she had extensive professional experience as a consultant working on microinsurance 
policy in South Africa. She proved to be an important resource in terms of orienting me 
to the broader microinsurance landscape, catching me up to speed on the latest 
regulatory debates and developments, and providing important connections to her 
contacts within the industry. In the field, Sandisiwe’s familiarity with the language and 
social norms of the clients quickly earned their trust, a trust which was then extended to 
me, a foreign researcher. On top of these versatile roles, Sandisiwe was an invaluable 
sounding board as I refined my ideas/approaches and learned more about the local 
cultural context. 
 In addition to Sandisiwe’s assistance, a University of Cape Town research team 
recommended Goodwill based on their work with him on a sanitation project in 
Khayelitsha. Based on this recommendation, I reached out to Goodwill in order to help 
build connections within the Khayelitsha community. And much like my interactions 
with Sandisiwe, Goodwill was more than just a language translator, he acted as my local 
facilitator. He embodied an intermediary position that required him to translate between 
cultures, ways of thinking, and the dual agendas of the researcher (myself) and the 
interview subject. In this way, the addition of a third helped to bridge, or at least mitigate, 
the constraints imposed by the pre-existing power inequalities and cultural incongruities 
that existed between Western researcher and local interview subject. His presence (as 
well as Sandisiwe’s) allowed certain knowledge to be unlocked in ways that would 
otherwise have remained buried away. 
On Race 
 
 Given South Africa’s contentious history, race continues to be an ever-present 
specter on the socio-politics of the country’s systems and everyday relations. This was a 
dynamic I was aware of going into the field site, and as a self-identifying Korean-
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American, I was curious to see how my own identity would be interpreted by and 
interact with different groups of actors. In informal gatherings, I quickly discerned that I 
had access to certain types of conversations that would have been considered taboo 
under other circumstances. In the company of exclusively white South Africans, for 
example, I found that they felt entirely at ease sharing certain opinions they would have 
been more hesitant to share had a black South African been present (e.g. complaints 
about race “quotas” under Black Economic Empowerment regulations, comments about 
how things were better in the apartheid days, etc.). I was exposed to similarly “unfiltered” 
talk when I was in the exclusive company of black South Africans (e.g. views on land 
reparations, expressions of hatred toward white people, etc.).  
I concluded that my own identity as a Korean-American did not register neatly 
into the famously delineated racial categories that continue to underpin South Africa’s 
post-apartheid social structures and institutions. Within white South African perceptions, 
I was not seen or interpreted as a marginalized racial minority. And although, on 
occasion, I was referred to as “umlungu” (the Xhosa/Zulu word for white person) in my 
dealings in Khayelitsha, it was my sense that the word was used probingly, almost as if 
locals were trying to figure out how to place me. The more time I spent in the KGA Life 
branch office and with Goodwill in his home and community, I sensed that I was 
eventually construed as belonging to some nebulous, miscellaneous category (e.g. I was 
referred to quizzically as a “Chinese” on multiple occasions), and importantly, not 
belonging to a racial group with historic ties to oppression.  
I was struck by how my experience contrasted with Bähre’s (2007a) own 
fieldwork in the townships of Cape Town, in which he described how his white identity 
potentially made him a target of politically motivated violence or a victim of a generalized 
hatred toward white people. He was forced to adopt research strategies that, while 
mitigating risk, limited his maneuverability and ability to conduct participant observation. 
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For example, he was unable to live in the township near his research assistant Edith as he 
originally intended, could not conduct research safely without her presence, and could 
not take public transportation to his field site. Nevertheless, he found ways to 
circumvent these constraints: 
To increase safety and receive information, we walked around a lot in the neighbourhood. By 
walking around we were able to start many fruitful conversations, exchange gossip, and engage 
in small talk with those we met on our way. This way, I was more visible than I would have 
been if I had only driven around the neighbourhood. My constant visibility helped to take away 
some of the suspicions that people must have had and it showed that I was a different kind of 
White person, because Whites generally tend to move around by car only (Bähre, 2007a: p.18-
19).  
 
In other words, Bähre’s whiteness introduced an important variable to a contextualized 
social field in a way he had to account for through risk mitigating strategies. By contrast, 
I sensed that locals received me with more of a bemused passivity. It is entirely possible 
that I was simply unaware of the potential risks, but after a few initial visits to 
Khayelitsha, I felt at ease walking around without Goodwill or Sandisiwe, though for 
research purposes, I rarely needed to do this. 
The fact that I did not fit neatly within South Africa’s racial binaries may also 
explain, in part, why I seemed privy to unusually candid thoughts and opinions. Elyachar 
(2005: p.34) reflected on how she would “consciously mobilize” the assumptions and 
perceptions her informants had about her and her research assistant; she argued that the 
responses she elicited under these assumptions were ethnographically relevant. Similarly, 
I chose not to make my own personal views known, particularly when respondents 
shared controversial opinions assuming that I would not find these views to be 
objectionable, i.e. a white respondent’s view about black people, and vice versa. This 
proved to be a valuable source of unfiltered insight in the sense that, like many other 
South African institutions, insurance companies, microinsurance, burial societies, and 
funeral parlors are spoken about and interpreted through a racial lens. Having access to 
these unfiltered perspectives proved to be empirically relevant and significant. 
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On Researching the Formal-Informal Interactions 
 
 Building on the work of Sally Falk Moore, Cousins (1997) argues that the 
interaction of formal and informal institutions must be analyzed by distinguishing 
between rules and practice, and “in terms of an analysis of power and the politics of 
meaning”: 
Institutional analysis must include both a structural analysis of complexes of rule-orders…and 
also a processual and actor-oriented analysis of struggle, of action which is ‘choice making, 
discretionary, manipulative, sometimes inconsistent, and sometimes conflictual’ (Cousins, 1997 
citing Moore, 1978: p.4). 
  
He goes on to argue that since formal and informal institutions operate at the micro, 
meso, and macro levels, an analysis that centers power/politics must be able to link 
social actors at the micro-level with the macro level institutions that shape the wider 
political economy (ibid.). As such, an important focus of my empirical work was to 
understand processes of meaning-making and legitimization as new formal and informal 
institutional arrangements were being negotiated. 
In her study of common resource management in the Usangu basin in Tanzania, 
Frances Cleaver advances the notion of institutional bricolage to describe the ways in 
which bureaucratic (formal) and socially embedded (informal) institutions interact. She 
highlights three aspects of bricolage: 1) The multiple identities of the bricoleurs; 2) The 
ways in which institutions draw from each other and are re-purposed toward new ends; 
and 3) The prevalence of arrangements that foster cooperation, respect, and reciprocity 
(Cleaver, 2001).  
Empirically, Cleaver’s insights attuned my research to three specific 
processes/phenomena. First, I focused on the social identities of the various actors, or 
bricoleurs, and the ways in which they not only navigated the institutional space, but 
affected change to these institutions as well. In other words, I was interested in the 
question of agency and how it related to processes of institutional development and 
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change. Second, Cleaver’s insight that institutions actively draw from each other and the 
surrounding cultural milieu prompted me to give equal analytical weight to the role of 
informal, social institutions as I did to formal, bureaucratic ones. As I will argue, 
institutional change does not flow in one direction from the top-down or from the 
bottom-up, but is better described as a “piecing together” process that draws upon the 
social and institutional context. Finally, to Cleaver’s third point, my research also focused 
on how institutional outcomes shape regulatory outcomes. While it is understood that 
formal institutions regulate behavior through the enforcement of contracts and laws, and 
informal institutions regulate through customs and norms, what does it mean in terms of 
regulatory outcomes when formal and informal institutions interact? By anchoring my 
empirical work onto these three areas, I was able to refine my interview questions to 
elicit responses that spoke more directly to the processes of interest.  
On Researching Financial Practices 
 
Conducting research on people’s daily financial practices is a notoriously difficult 
endeavor. In their seminal work, Portfolios of the Poor, Daryl Collins and his colleagues 
developed a painstakingly detailed approach they refer to as the “financial diaries” 
method, which was designed to capture the rich complexities of the poor’s financial lives. 
They note that “finance is the relationship between time and money, and to understand it 
fully, time and money must be observed together” (Collins et al., 2009: p.187-188). The 
issue of time is not only an empirical consideration in the sense that financial 
management practices need to be tracked longitudinally to get an accurate sense of 
income/expenditure fluctuations, but is also a methodological issue in the sense that it 
takes time to establish trust, which is essential: 
…our interviewers had to be very sensitive. This was part of the considerable effort made to 
establish a friendly relationship with everyone in the household and to allow a comfortable 
environment that would encourage respondents to be open…We were ever mindful that this was 
a very sensitive relationship—with householders revealing their most intimate financial details to 
us, we did not take our role as ‘confessor’ lightly (ibid.: p.188-189). 
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As part of the effort to build trust and create this comfortable environment, I adapted 
many of the insightful, and more empathetic “human-centered” techniques used by 
Collins and his team. For instance, I made provision within my research budget to 
provide lunch for focus group respondents who convened at Goodwill’s home.13 In fact, 
many of the more insightful, less guarded comments emerged while eating lunch together 
after the focus group interviews had concluded. I also found that it was essential to have 
focus groups comprised of individuals who were roughly in the same income category; 
the fact that respondents could relate to one another’s experiences made them more 
likely to share the intimate aspects of their financial lives. 
I credit Sandisiwe and Goodwill for the skillful and empathetic ways in which 
they mediated one-on-one, as well as group interviews. Though the discussions often 
involved sensitive personal finance issues, the tone they set was often light and full of 
humor, which helped create a more conducive environment to the sharing of honest 
dialogue and reflection. Moreover, as Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) have noted, 
when research is overt, interview subjects often suspect field researchers of belonging to 
some undesirable group that should be treated with caution. But again, I felt my identity 
as a foreigner helped allay any concerns respondents’ may have had that I was secretly a 
representative of the government or some insurance company. Based on the fact that I 
did not fit neatly into the social field, it did not require too far a leap for local 
respondents to believe that I was a researcher from a distant locale; sensitive information 
could thus be shared without as much concern that it would be used inappropriately. 
 In Deborah James’ study of debt, she points to another methodological challenge 
concerning people’s unwillingness to discuss illegal financial practices, which are 
important to account for both empirically and ethnographically: 
                                               
13 Goodwill’s wife shopped, cooked, and served the meal. She was compensated for both the food and her labor. 
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Faced with such understandable circumspection, I in turn found circumspection to be the best 
remedy. Tales offered up, in the abstract, about well-known moneylenders, and stories recounted, 
in general terms, about ‘scams’ practiced by furniture store repossession agents, proved easier to 
gather and discuss than did firsthand accounts from those subjected to the dealings of such 
lenders and agents, or from the agents themselves (James, 2014: p.9). 
 
As I will discuss in the following chapters, informal funeral parlors engage in practices 
that state and industry players view as illegal from a formal regulatory perspective, but 
which are, at the same time, integral to maintaining solvency in a cash-volatile low-
income market space. Predictably, funeral parlor operators did not disclose these 
practices in my interviews. Instead, like James, I learned of these more illicit financial 
activities indirectly from industry sources (who admittedly have an agenda), but also from 
ex-burial society administrators/funeral parlor workers, and clients with familiarity of 
how the informal funeral market operates. 
 Finally, over the course of my fieldwork, my relationship with Goodwill opened 
up numerous opportunities for me to engage in participant observation. He arranged for 
me to sit in on two burial society meetings, which were held in community centers near 
his home. Moreover, during the course of my fieldwork, Goodwill’s grandmother and 
father-in-law passed away within a few months of each other. Despite his bereavement, 
Goodwill graciously allowed me, for the purposes of my research, to attend the funeral 
of his grandmother in Khayelitsha and to closely follow his preparations for the funeral 
of his father-in-law.  
There is a fair amount of debate, particularly among anthropologists, related to 
the degree of “participation” needed for this method to yield ethnographically notable 
insights (Spradley, 1980; Bernard, 1994). DeWalt and DeWalt (2011) argue that 
participation rests along a spectrum with “nonparticipation” on one end (e.g. acquiring 
cultural knowledge by watching television or reading novels) and “active participation” 
on the other (e.g. fully engaging in activity being observed, or “going native” [Jorgenson, 
1989]). Following this, given my limited resources and time in the field, I engaged in 
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what they might describe as “moderate participation;” I was present in the field yet 
relatively passive in the situations to which I was invited.  
Regardless, forgoing semi-structured interviews in favor of a participant 
observation approach in these ethnographic settings proved to be a prudent choice. As 
important as it was for me to understand this significant life-cycle event (a funeral), 
which essentially underpins South Africa’s entire microinsurance market, I had to remind 
myself that these were still emotionally significant and delicate moments in the lives of 
my informants. It would have been culturally inappropriate—and I believe empirically 
counter-productive—to have conducted interviews in these settings. Nevertheless, 
participating in these funerals yielded invaluable ethnographic data. Participant 
observation allowed me to be “enmeshed” (Geertz, 1995) by the social, cultural, 
emotional, and financial experiences of having to prepare for the funeral of a loved one 
while being poor in South Africa. Though it was merely a glimpse into this intimate 
moment of daily life, the experience centered the focus of my analysis on the ways in 
which financial practices, both formal and informal, are embedded within the cultural 
context. 
Concluding Thoughts: Limitations and Constraints  
 
 The limitations of the methodological strategy I adopted reflect the extent to 
which “moderate participation” falls short of “active participation” with regard to 
generating first-hand, directly observable empirical data. When it came to 
unregulated/illegal practices, in particular, one-on-one and focus group interviews were 
only able to elicit what I considered to be second-hand data in the sense that respondents 
were relaying stories of their own experiences as victims of such practices. When I 
interviewed burial society and funeral parlor administrators, some whom were accused of 
being “cheats,” I predictably only received noble accountings of their legality, 
competence, and sterling service to their clients. This was a phenomenon that was by no 
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means confined to informal institutional settings. Insurance company respondents were 
quick to label their informal competitors as frauds and abusers, while extolling their own 
value to this “unserviced” market. Any questions regarding the adverse effects of 
formalization were consistently dismissed and/or rationalized.  
 In an ideal world without the constraints of time, financial resources, and 
cultural/linguistic/racial barriers, the only way to access this first-hand data would have 
been to fully embed myself in both formal and informal institutional spheres, and 
participate actively in the financial practices described in the subsequent chapters of this 
thesis. The best alternative to this infeasible approach was to adopt James’ (2014) 
strategy of circumspection. This involved holding “formal” and “informal” respondents 
up against each other. While funeral parlor operators had very little to say about how 
they fell short, for example, they had plenty to say about their insurance company 
partners. Similarly, much of what I learned about the informal funeral services market, I 
heard from formal providers who have had extensive experience working with burial 
societies and informal funeral parlors. Thus, I was always mindful to interpret this 
second-hand data with a grain of salt, crosscheck stories with multiple different sources 
when possible, and develop a composite approach to the qualitative data in my analysis. 
 A key limitation of my quantitative data lies in its generalizability. Since the 
sampling strategy I undertook for the survey was tied to the purposive/opportunistic 
sampling techniques I utilized to interview microinsurance clients, I could not employ 
inferential statistical methods to generalize my findings in any meaningful way to a 
broader population. The quantitative data, while useful in highlighting certain trends, can 
only make limited claims that apply exclusively to my sample of 76 respondents. 
 Despite these constraints, the qualitative and quantitative data I managed to 
collect speaks to the underlying institutional dynamics that are the focus of this empirical 
study. Follow-up research could be devoted to a deeper dive into the practices of 
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informal funeral parlors and burial societies, which might yield critical, first-hand 
qualitative data that can corroborate, contest, and/or add to the findings of this study. A 
well-resourced follow-up study could also build upon the preliminary descriptive 
statistical trends highlighted by my quantitative data to conduct a more robust, randomly 
sampled survey that can generalize trends to the broader population. Thus, while the 
methodological strategy I designed did produce original data relevant to the core 
empirical questions of my study, its limitations also point to opportunities for future 
research.  
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4—The long return home: Burial societies and the informal 
institutions of risk management 
 
The Eastern Cape will always be home. We live here [Western Cape], because we have to work 
here, but we must always remember where our home is. That’s where our people are from. Our 
ancestors are from there. We have to go back home (Respondent #59; Fieldwork Interview; 3 
March 2016). 
 
 In this very brief statement, the respondent, a Xhosa-speaking woman who lives 
in Khayelitsha, reveals much about the cultural bedrock upon which the South African 
microinsurance market stands. She migrated from the Eastern Cape in 2001 at the age of 
23 with her parents who were searching for work. Although she met and married her 
husband in Khayelitsha, and has no immediate plans to return to the Eastern Cape, her 
notions of home are still defined in relation to where her ancestors are thought to reside. 
And like many Xhosa people living and working in Khayelitsha, she and her husband 
send remittances back to support family members and/or invest in a rural homestead in 
the Eastern Cape. In so doing, they maintain their material, relational as well as spiritual 
connections to their ancestral place of origin. 
By “going back home,” the respondent is referring here to her absolute need to 
return to the Eastern Cape in the event of her death. This cultural mandate necessitates a 
significant commitment of resources and manpower to enable the mobility of bodies, 
both alive and dead, across vast distances (see Lee, 2009; Lee, 2012). Despite the 
challenges brought on by socio-economic and political upheaval and the ensuing shifts in 
rural-urban migration patterns, South African indigenous communities, including the 
amaXhosa, have managed to devise mechanisms that cultivate and maintain norms of 
solidarity and reciprocity, which have institutionalized over time to mitigate this burden 
of returning home. 
Here and throughout the course of the thesis, I refer to these mechanisms as 
belonging to a wider set of informal institutional arrangements. These contrast with 
formal institutions, which are the set of regulations, norms, and rules derived from and 
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codified by the state. But much like formal institutions, informal institutions perform 
regulatory functions that both facilitate transactions and constrain individual action. They 
are informed by the cultural milieu and are deeply embedded within situated social 
networks. Moreover, informal institutions are legitimated by and mutually constitutive of 
accepted forms of interpersonal exchange; they are the “rules in use” as opposed to the 
codified rules of the state (De Soysa and Jütting, 2007). 
This chapter will trace the history and development of informal institutions that 
play key regulatory roles in the management of risks related to death in South Africa. 
Specifically, the analysis will center on emergent institutional forms like burial societies 
and funeral rituals, as well as the accompanying social norms and belief systems that 
structure the terms of cooperation and reciprocity. The aim of this chapter, then, will be 
to advance an understanding of how history, culture, and context-specific factors shape 
informal institutions, and how they, in turn, exert a regulatory force on risk management 
strategies and behaviors outside the regulatory framework of the state. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, accounting for the deeply rooted 
cultural beliefs regarding life, death, ancestors, notions of the homeland and the afterlife 
is crucial in understanding why the Xhosa people are willing to commit significant 
resources and engage in collaborative economic strategies to ensure dignified funerals for 
their kin. Drawing on cultural and ethnographic scholarship on funeral rituals and belief 
systems, as well as my own fieldwork interviews, I illustrate the ways in which culture 
shapes informal institutional processes. Second, I will lay out a brief history of how burial 
societies developed as an institutional response to the demands of organizing funerals. 
The legacy of colonialism and apartheid, while not a central focus of this analysis, will be 
considered in their relation to labor migration patterns, spatial inequalities, and other 
enduring boundaries of economic inclusion/exclusion that continue to impact the ways 
in which burial societies operate.  
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In the last section, I turn my attention more explicitly to the institution of the 
burial society and how it regulates social relations, the circulation and management of 
cash, and the administration of funerals. I will outline the general types and 
characteristics of burial societies, which vary in form and function. As I will demonstrate, 
burial societies embody and enact economic, social, and cultural institutions that have 
been developed over time into concrete regulatory arrangements that govern this sphere 
of economic activity, as well as structure social relations. Since these norms are self-
enforced—or enforced within the community—through social mechanisms, rather than 
by external laws/regulations, I conceptualize these institutions as “informal” institutions. 
As it relates to the rest of the thesis, these insights will aim to illuminate the 
interconnectedness between cultural traditions/beliefs, the informal institutions that 
arose to respond to these cultural obligations, and the South African microinsurance 
market. 
Ancestors, Rituals and the Afterlife: The Metaphysical Underpinnings of Risk 
 
Ancestors and Their Relations to the Living: A Brief History 
 
Umntu ngumntu ngabantu. (A person is a person through other people)- Xhosa proverb 
 
 The Xhosa people, collectively known as amaXhosa (herein referred to simply as 
“Xhosa”), consist of several tribes that are linguistically, rather than strictly ethnically, 
related. Their common language is referred to as isiXhosa. Given their cultural and 
linguistic uniformity, however, the Xhosa are commonly recognized as the second largest 
Bantu14 ethnic group in South Africa, behind only the Zulu-speaking people. John 
Henderson Soga, a Xhosa missionary and historian, speculates that the original Xhosa 
tribes were descendants of migrants traveling south from the coastal and/or Great Lakes 
regions of East Africa. They eventually settled in the southeastern region of South 
                                               
14 Bantu is a general label used to describe the ethnic groups in Africa who speak a class of languages referred to 
collectively as ‘Bantu.’ In the South African context, Bantu is an apartheid-era term referring to the racially oppressed 
black South African population.   
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Africa, which is referred to today as the Eastern Cape. According to Statistics South 
Africa, the vast majority of the Xhosa people (more than 5 million out of an estimated 
total of 8.1 million) reside in the 
Eastern Cape today (See Figure 2). 
A sizeable number of Xhosa (1.4 
million) also reside in parts of the 
Western Cape, particularly in the 
peri-urban areas surrounding Cape 
Town where I conducted my 
fieldwork (Statistics South Africa, 
2011).  
 The well-known Xhosa proverb inscribed at the top of this section speaks to an 
ontological worldview that diverges from classically Western conceptions of 
individualism. Historically, the Xhosa believed that the essence of what it means to be 
human is found not in the individual, but in the relationships between people. This 
concept is central to the indigenous South African philosophy of “Ubuntu,” which 
Ramose (2009) approximates roughly as “Humanness,” or that which “regards being or 
the universe as a complex wholeness involving the multi-layered and incessant 
interaction of all entities.” Soga (1932) described the ancestor spirits as being included 
along with the living within this cosmology: 
These spirits are active, concerning themselves with the things which pertain to their unseen 
world, and, at the same time, keeping in touch with the living, and requiring the living to keep 
in touch with them through ritual acts and ceremonial rites (ibid.: p.8). 
 
Setiloane (1986) referred to these spirits as “isithunzi,” which is loosely translated as 
“shadow” or “shade.” It was understood to be a type of aura that emanates from and 
surrounds the physical human body. It is communal by nature and is the social glue that 
makes relationship between people possible. And unlike the physical body, isithunzi is 
Figure 2- Density map of isiXhosa speakers in South Africa. 
© Statistics South Africa Census 2011. 
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immortal; “it is either a man’s shadow or breath which becomes his ghost after his 
death” (Gluckmann, 1937: p.118).  
Thus for the Xhosa, while death may bring an end to the physical body, the spirit 
or isithunzi, lives on in its relation to both ancestors long passed as well as the relatives 
left behind. Max Gluckmann argued, then, that death should be understood more as a 
“reconstitution of social relationships” (ibid.: p.120). The dead are conferred a new 
status; they join the ranks of their ancestors and, in turn, demand commemoration from 
their living relatives through the enactment of various rituals. The social world of the 
Xhosa, and many other indigenous African communities, is made up of both the living 
and the dead (Lee and Vaughan, 2008). 
Gluckmann went on to provide some insight as to why next-of-kin were 
motivated to maintain strong ties with their ancestors:  
A group will be larger and stronger the longer the line of ancestors it can count, the further it can 
grope back into the past for its beginnings. Since the people are linked together through their 
ancestors, the dead must not be lost to society. They represent the past life of the group, links 
binding together the living. The cult of the ancestors then gives life to the kindred which it would 
not otherwise possess…For the dead are held on to and are thought merely to be initiated into 
another part of society, the spiritual and unseen but potent part of it, and the people are 
perpetually concerned with maintaining contact with this unseen world (ibid.: p.129). 
 
The relationship between the living and their ancestors is characterized by both love and 
fear (Van Heerden, 2002). The ancestors, if venerated properly, have a benevolent power 
that can intervene positively in the lives of their relatives—an idea conveyed by 
customary exhortations addressed to the deceased at the grave like “Uze usikumbulele 
apo uya kona” or “Remember us for good from the place to which you have gone” 
(Soga, 1932: p.320). This was a common sentiment I encountered during my fieldwork in 
Khayelitsha: 
We must always remember our ancestors because they are looking over our family, né? It is very 
important for us. That is why we remember them in important times like a wedding or when my 
child was born. If I get sick, I will ask them for help to get better. So it is very important to 
remember them (Respondent #57; Fieldwork Interview; 1 March 2016). 
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On the other hand, if the ancestor spirits are disobeyed or slighted in some way, it is 
believed that they have the power to sanction their errant kin through various afflictions 
and/or misfortunes (Gluckmann, 1937; Van Heerden, 2002). Mayer and Mayer (1971: 
p.151) described the spirits as being “ethically as well as ritually fastidious, growing 
offended not only by omission of sacrifice but by lapses from morality in daily 
behaviour.” Thus, the Xhosa take great care to honor, but also placate their ancestors. 
 Much like the social structures of their living world, the relationships between the 
living and the “living dead” (Mbiti, 1975) are gendered and reflect situated power 
relations: 
In the traditions of the South African Bantu-speaking peoples, the ancestor cult was closely 
connected with the patrilineal kinship system. The living were believed to be influenced 
particularly by their deceased patrilineal ancestors and senior male agnates. Maternal ancestors 
were not without significance, but mostly the mother’s agnates were the ones that mattered. The 
group gathering for ritual was the patrilineage, with the most senior male by patrilineal descent 
acting as leader (Pauw, 1974: p.106). 
 
Funeral rituals differ based on the sex and status of the deceased. For example, the death 
of a male head of household, especially a chief, would demand more elaborate 
arrangements than a woman’s death would. Part of the reason for this as Gluckmann 
alluded to above, is to maintain the patrilineal line. Establishing shared (male) ancestry 
helped to clarify and perpetuate kinship structures/hierarchies through the generations, 
which is crucial not only to reinforce familial bonds, but also, on occasion, to adjudicate 
material disputes, i.e. over inheritance that passes along a patrilineal line.   
In the modern era, scholars have noted a “cultural revivalism” occurring around 
customary events like funerals, whereby participants brandish their ritual fluency in order 
to strengthen their claims in the new post-apartheid dispensation (Lee, 2012). James 
(2009: p.238), for example, notes that gravesites “have acquired a heightened significance 
as sites for the concentration of social memory;” she observed that they serve to 
establish legitimate claims to formerly dispossessed land in Mpumalanga. Mourning 
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rituals can thus be read as “mnemonic” processes (McCaskie, 1989) that link adherents 
to a shared cultural and political heritage. Lee and Vaughan (2008: p.346) argue that in 
the postcolonial context, “contestations over the management of death have occasioned 
a renewed debate over collective identity and statehood, now voiced in terms of 
‘citizenship.’” In other words, as the modern state has reconfigured social relational 
structures, longstanding cultural practices like funerals play key roles in a new “politics of 
belonging” through which groups make claims on the state as citizens (ibid.). In these 
intimate and consequential matters for the living, their relationships with the ancestor 
spirits continue to figure prominently culturally, socially, and politically. As Soga (1932: 
p.318) thus concluded, “death to the Xosas [sic] does not, indeed mean extinction. The 
soul lives on, continuity of the family is preserved.” 
Navigating Liminality in the Afterlife: Xhosa Funeral Rituals and Obligations 
 
 The worldview that bestows such a privileged and contemporaneous role for 
ancestor spirits has historically been reflected in the funeral/bereavement practices of the 
Bantu-speaking tribes of southern Africa. The purpose and function of these rituals are 
manifold, addressing pressing concerns ranging from the metaphysical (i.e. propitiations 
to the ancestors to avoid the risk of punishment), to the social, particularly as it relates to 
assertions of kinship and local/political belonging (Geschiere, 2005; Page, 2007). More 
recent scholarship on funerals highlight how money spent on ceremonies is an important 
avenue for community members to participate in local social and political life (Mazzucato 
et al., 2006) and are important opportunities to visually exhibit markers of social prestige 
(Van der Geest, 2000). Others have highlighted their role in reconstituting physical, 
spiritual, and social relationships that have been “ruptured” (Lee and Vaughan, 2008 
p.344) due to death. As van Gennep (1960) has argued, funeral and mourning rituals help 
to repair societal disintegration by offering a transitional process that restores a balance 
between the deceased and the living.  
 86 
Funeral rituals can be understood, then, as socio-cultural institutions that have 
developed over time to mediate the relationships between the living and their ancestors. 
Two rituals in particular, umkhapho (“accompanying”) and umbuyiso (“returning”) serve as 
useful bookends to understand how the Xhosa people translate their beliefs of death and 
the afterlife into an institutionalized response. Immediately following a death, the spirit 
of the deceased is understood to enter into a liminal state. Mbiti (1975: p.69) explains 
that before the burial, “the living-dead occupy the ontological position between the 
spirits and men.” The umkhapho ritual is thus performed to accompany the spirit to the 
place of his/her ancestors. To accompany the spirit, an animal is slaughtered; the type of 
animal that is chosen depends on the status (and sex) of the person who had just passed. 
For a male head of household, an ox or a cow is slaughtered, while a goat may be 
slaughtered for anyone else, i.e. women and men of lower social standing (Van Heerden, 
2002). Jabulile Lwazi, a Zulu woman I interviewed and whose funeral customs are similar 
to that of the Xhosa, explained how she had to perform this ritual for her late husband, 
who was the patriarch over three generations of kin: 
We had to buy a cow to slaughter according to the Zulu traditions. The cow will take him to 
where our ancestors are. He was the head of the household, so it is why we had to do a cow. We 
put the skin of the cow over the coffin and we slaughter the rest of the cow to serve the guests. We 
also had to buy a goat for the cleansing15 (Lwazi, J.; Fieldwork Interview; 16 January 2016). 
 
The process of accompanying the spirit to the ancestors is made complicated in 
situations where the death occurred away from the homestead, or in the event of an 
accidental, “unnatural” death. For instance, in the case of fatal road accidents, which 
have been on the rise in South Africa, Lee (2012: p.205) raises the specter of a “dual 
dislocation,” whereby the spirit is first separated from the body due to the sudden, 
violent death, and then thrust into an unfamiliar place far from home. Lee observed that 
                                               
15 According to Hutchings (2007), the goat is needed for what is known as imbuzi yokugez’ izlanda (goat for washing of 
the hands), a cleansing ritual for those who helped prepare the burial to rid them of the “pollution” that is thought to 
emanate from the corpse.   
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in these unfortunate situations, relatives would respond by “speaking” to the corpse, 
while journeying with it back home, much the same way one would descriptively lead the 
blind. This compelling need to speak was something I also encountered in focus group 
interviews with people who had trouble accessing the bodies of their relatives in the 
mortuaries in which they were being held: 
Sometimes it is very bad with these [funeral] parlors, they won’t let us see the body until we 
bring them papers. But you see, when our family member has died, we have to go to whisper in 
their ear. Sometimes they are there for four or five days alone and their bodies will be getting soft 
in the box. That is very hard. The spirit is not at rest, we must whisper in their ear to tell them 
where they are and what has happened (Female Respondent; Durban Focus Group Interview 
#3; 15 January 2016). 
 
Lee also notes the importance of how the “proper ritual shedding of blood at death, as 
for example performed through animal sacrifice prior to the funeral service, can help to 
ensure a dead person’s spirit is safely led to the realm of the ancestors” (ibid.: p.204). 
Thus, the unanticipated spilling of blood during an “unnatural” death like a road accident 
fatality, imposes another layer of distress for living relatives who fear that the spirit will 
lose its way and/or not be at rest. Family members are thus obligated to clean the blood 
at the site of the accident so that further misfortunes might not occur and that the spirit 
can be led back to the homestead. From these accounts it becomes clear that umkhapho 
can involve a great deal of emotional and physical labor in order to ensure that spirits are 
guided properly to the realm of their ancestors.  
 Van Heerden (2002: p.8) describes the umkhapho ritual as a somber occasion: 
“No fermented sorghum beer is consumed and there is no dancing…as life in the Xhosa 
tradition is ‘communal,’ grieving is also a communal activity.” The length of the 
communal mourning period seems to vary. In van Heerden’s account, people sat with 
the bereaved and shared their pain for around two weeks. In my interviews, respondents 
indicated a mourning period of at least a month and definitely sometime within a year of 
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the burial.16 Regardless of the exact length of time, ritual mourning continues until the 
performance of the umbuyiso ritual, which means bringing the spirit of the ancestor back 
home. The umbuyiso ritual requires the slaughter of a second animal (an ox for a male 
and a cow for a female), and unlike the umkhapho ritual, umbuyiso is a celebratory ritual 
where sorguhum beer (“umqombothi”) is consumed, dancing/singing is performed, and 
the whole community invited into the homestead to share in the feast. The occasion is 
also marked by the widow removing her mourning attire. The spirit has found its 
ancestors and has now returned to its eternal home to be at rest.  
Burying Well: Ritual Fluidity and Mobility 
 
 From these various accounts, it is clear that funeral rituals are conducted with a 
certain measure of urgency. Living relatives have strong motivations to “bury well” or 
appropriately to ensure that the souls of their ancestors are at peace. The proper 
performance of these rituals not only serves the spirits, but also imparts a number of 
benefits for the living. For instance, Gluckmann (1937) observed how the funeral offered 
kin the social context to come together, grieve and air grievances collectively, and to 
ceremonially affirm the (reconstituted) bonds between survivors and their common 
ancestors. In his correspondence with Rev. Andile Mbete, van Heerden reveals that these 
rituals also have a healing quality for the participants: 
It is healing because the focus is not just on the beast that is slaughtered, but the focus is that as 
a family or clan. You gather there for two days and in the course of the gathering there is talk, 
there is team building, and when the following day, the neighbourhood arrives, elderly people and 
wise women stand up and address you, and they sort of praise you by being grateful to those who 
made you who you are. In that sense the spirit of the ancestor is honoured and you feel 
encouraged and strengthened (Mbete, A.; Correspondence with van Heerden, 2002: p.9). 
 
 Van Heerden suggests, however, that the motivation to bury people properly 
does not necessarily imply that there are rigid, immutable ways of conducting funeral 
rituals. Instead, family members are expected to take the rituals seriously by “not holding 
                                               
16 The length of the mourning period depended, in some part, on how long it would take for the family to save 
enough money to purchase a second cow for the umbuyiso ritual. 
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back” or by not being “stingy” in some way (ibid.). Regardless of how a particular funeral 
is carried out, ritual behavior has been documented to be surprisingly flexible and 
adaptable to shifting social and cultural environments over time. A number of scholars 
have noted, for example, that indigenous beliefs and rituals have synthesized with 
Christian traditions in ways that are mutually accommodating (Pauw, 1974). And 
contrary to early expectations that urbanization/modernization would spell the death 
knell for certain more mystical belief frameworks, anthropologist B.A. Pauw observed 
that, instead, funeral rituals were being adapted to the urban environment: 
Certainly the traditional cults have not survived as complete cults in the same form as they are 
still performed by pagan traditionalists in remote rural communities, but the persistence of 
certain basic beliefs and rituals among a considerable proportion of Bantu living in towns is 
unmistakable. The extensive adaptation and innovation in belief and ritual are evidence of their 
vitality…Ancestor beliefs and rituals do not constitute anachronistic ‘survivals,’ but have been 
adapted within the context of the comprehensive process of cultural change (Pauw, 1974: 
p.109).    
 
 As will be discussed further, the ways in which the Xhosa have come to 
conceptualize “town” versus “rural” (or perhaps, more accurately workplace versus 
home) reflects a wider social phenomenon (i.e. rural-urban circular migration) and reveals 
a dimension of spiritual mobility that has increasingly become a fundamental part of 
burying well. Mayer and Mayer (1971: p.151) make it clear that while the spirits can and 
do go wherever the living go (“…there is absolutely nowhere the spirits cannot reach, if 
the one they love is there,”) they prefer to be where their “real home” is, i.e. the rural 
homestead: “They like to be about the cattle-kraal and to hold their own unseen 
assemblies (inkundla) in the place where the living elders still assemble” (ibid.). For the 
Xhosa I interviewed in the Western Cape, this understanding of the spirits’ preference 
was clearly reflected in their unwavering commitment to return back to their ancestral 
homeland in the Eastern Cape:  
It’s important to have your final resting place with your ancestors. I want to rest with my 
grandmother. I want my children to know where I am when I die. They must know where her 
people are from (Respondent #57; Fieldwork Interview; 1 March, 2016). 
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We have our ancestors in the Eastern Cape. By our culture, we have to be buried with them or 
it’s like throwing them away or separating from them (Respondent #61; Fieldwork Interview; 
3 March 2016).  
 
Even if I work here, all the money goes home to support home. I just work here, but this is not 
my home (Respondent #63; Fieldwork Interview; 3 March 2016). 
 
To be clear, these types of responses were the most common among my 
interview sample; even respondents who had lived in Khayelitsha for decades still 
considered the Eastern Cape “home,” and expressed that a return there (in death) was 
obligatory. However, there are indications that the younger generations are increasingly 
open to burying their dead and performing funeral rituals in “town.” The ethnographic 
account I provide in Chapter 8, for example, will be based on a funeral I attended in 
Khayelitsha, rather than the Eastern Cape, which would have been customary under the 
circumstances. From these observations and the rich historical literature on African 
funeral rituals/beliefs, it is clear that death cultures and practices are far from static, but 
are rather shaped in dynamic ways by changing economic, social, and political conditions 
over time. In the following section, I historicize the emergence of modern day South 
African funeral practices in the light of such large-scale transitions such as 
modernization, urbanization, labor migration, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
South Africa in Transition: The Historical Context of Burial Societies 
 
Stretching Beyond the Homeland: A Brief History of Xhosa Labor Migration  
 
 Ngwenya (2003: p.90-91) defines the burial society as a “relatively autonomous, 
historically-distinct, local mutual-aid institution, which may be based on occupation or 
gender and whose goal is to provide social relief and support (material and non-material) 
to a member or member’s family that is experiencing conditions of distress due to 
death.” To this comprehensive definition, I would add that burial societies are also 
mediating institutions that enable living relatives to meet the myriad cultural obligations 
to the spirits of their deceased kin, as outlined in the previous section. Ngwenya’s 
 91 
inclusion of the clause “historically-distinct” in her definition is worth noting as well; the 
burial societies in South Africa must be understood in relation to its unique socio-
economic and political transformations. In South Africa, these are invariably tied to 
apartheid and its legacies, in particular, labor migration. 
As South Africa transitioned from a peasant, subsistence-based economy into a 
modern capitalist state, a combination of economic factors and discriminatory legislation 
shaped labor migration patterns that endure even today. A series of natural disasters in 
the late 1800s, including droughts (Beinart, 1982), the spread of lung sickness among 
cattle (Ross, 1999), and a devastating rinderpest epidemic (van Onselen, 1972) laid waste 
to the Xhosa economy in the Transkei and Ciskei bantustans.17 Although an economic 
disaster for the Xhosa, who relied heavily on cattle for their pastoral/agrarian livelihoods, 
these events proved to be a boon for white industrialists, particularly mine operators, 
who had been struggling with labor shortages. Bundy (1979: p.114) quotes a speech given 
by the President of the Chamber of Mines in 1911 to reflect the prevailing thinking at the 
time: “The tendency of the native is to be an agriculturalist…He cares nothing if 
industries pine for want of labour when his crops and home-brewed drink are plentiful.” 
When this subsistence economy collapsed, the Xhosa people were compelled to enter 
low-wage labor. The available figures during this period reflect this transition in terms of 
migration flows. Bundy estimates that in 1893, approximately 27,511 migrants left the 
Transkei. By 1916, this figure was up to around 90,000, the majority of whom were 
headed to the mines in the Transvaal region.18  
Industrial (gold and diamond mining) interests in low-wage labor dovetailed with 
those of white farmers who felt the threat of competition from the black peasant farmer 
class. In what Bundy describes as the political union of “gold and maize,” white interests 
                                               
17 Bantustans refer to territory set aside for specific black ethnic groups, i.e. Bantus, under the apartheid regime. 
Transkei and Ciskei were Bantustans set aside for Xhosas. They are located in the modern-day Eastern Cape. 
18 Figures taken from Bundy (1979) Table 3 pg. 121.  
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were translated into legislation that “would retain potential labourers, but so circumscribe 
their status as to transform them from ‘independent’ squatters, lessees, or sharers to 
dependent, wage-earning servants” (Bundy, 1979: p.134). A series of stringent anti-
squatter laws (e.g. 1894 Glen Grey Act, Location Act 32/1909, Natives Land Act of 
1913) drastically lowered the number of black-owned farms through forced evictions and 
essentially converted independent black peasants into wage laborers or labor-tenants. At 
around the same time, restrictive legislation, known collectively as influx control, was 
also passed to regulate the free movement of this new migrant labor class (Ross, 1999). 
In particular, the Urban Areas Act of 1923 restricted the number of black Africans 
allowed to reside in urban areas (Wilson, 1972) and those who were permitted to live in 
cities like Cape Town were forced to live in townships far away from White population 
centers, a spatial legacy that endures today (Ross, 1999). Moreover, subsequent legislation 
like the Bantu Urban Areas Act of 1964 was even more restrictive to African women, 
who had to receive permission to join their husbands in the city (Cock, 1980). The laws 
were thus disproportionately constraining to women who were forced to stay in 
Bantustans and rely on remittances sent by their husbands (James, 1999a).  
These movement restrictions were held largely in place until the 1986 Abolition 
of Influx Control Act and the dismantling of the apartheid apparatus. As anticipated, the 
black urban population surged. No longer considered illegal in urban areas, women 
migrants moved out of the bantustans in growing numbers and sought to establish 
groups of their own, which were not so dependent on men (e.g. Kiba groups formed 
among Sotho women hailing from the Northern Province [James, 1999b]). Lee (2011) 
argues that this unleashed new gendered dynamics on the development of burial 
societies, which shaped how migrants managed the challenges of “death on the move.” 
Moreover, burial societies afforded women the opportunity to establish themselves in the 
social networks of their new urban communities: 
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Far from being a simple tool that reaffirmed one’s connection to a rural ‘home’ through the 
faithful maintenance of ‘traditional’ burial rites, burial society membership was used to 
consolidate women’s position in town…migrant women added new layers to these networks, and 
crafted their membership in burial societies to embrace a less ethnically specific yet distinctly 
urban African identity, and to cement their growing prominence in the moral and material 
economies of township life (Lee, 2011: p. 229). 
 
 It was anticipated that circular internal migration, which was tightly controlled 
and enforced, would eventually dissipate as labor migrants were expected to settle 
permanently in their new urban homes. However, it should be noted that labor migration 
patterns have not changed with the abolition of influx controls (Posel, 2004). The latest 
census data show that net in-migration figures in the Western Cape were up in 2016 
from 2011, and sustained high levels of out-migration were observed in the Eastern Cape 
over that same period (Statistics South Africa, 2016; See Appendix I)19. In my sample as 
well, 93.4% of the respondents I interviewed in Khayelitsha originally came from the 
Eastern Cape and still considered it “home” (see Figure 3). 
Where does the Respondent Originally Come From? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Eastern Cape 71 93.4 93.4 93.4 
2 Western Cape 3 3.9 3.9 97.4 
3 Kwazulu-Natal 1 1.3 1.3 98.7 
4 Northern Cape 1 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
Figure 3- Respondent's home of origin (N=76) 
 
Posel (2004 p.287) concludes that “in an environment of increasing labour market 
insecurity and rising unemployment…the household of origin may provide ‘insurance’ 
for work-seekers, care of children, and a preferred place for retirement.” In other words, 
labor migrants continued to maintain not only a spiritual connection to their homelands, 
but a socio-economic connection as well. 
                                               
19 Net in-migration into Western Cape in 2011 was 1.1 million. In 2016, it was 1.3 million. Conversely, net out-
migration from the Eastern Cape in 2011 was 1.5 million and held steady in 2016 (Statistics South Africa, 2016). 
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Urbanization, Migration, and HIV/AIDS: The Emergence and Evolution of Modern Burial 
Societies  
 
 Burial societies in South Africa emerged and evolved against the backdrop of 
these political and economic transitions. Modern-day burial societies were primarily 
established to help labor migrants repatriate corpses back to distant rural homesteads. In 
her classic study of women’s social organizations in South African townships, Mia 
Brandel suggests that the first recorded burial society was started in Vrededorp in 1915; 
even then she noted that “death in town is expensive” (Brandel 1955: p.296). Burial 
societies then began to emerge en masse across the country as early as the 1930s 
(Dennie, 2009). As rural-urban migration started to gain steam, the economic and 
logistical need for burial societies became increasingly acute (Thomson and Posel, 2002; 
Vearey et al., 2011). The rapid expansion of burial societies was fueled primarily by a 
combination of high burial costs and the migrants’ fear of pauper burials in places far 
away from their homelands. Remarkably, while the costs of burials remained high, there 
was a marked decline in pauper burials around this time:  
Whenever possible, Africans chose not to allow their deceased to be buried as paupers. Indeed, 
what amazes is not Africans’ desire to escape pauper burials, but that nearly all of them 
succeeded in doing so. In the first half of the twentieth century, Africans’ standard of living 
showed little or no improvement; but their standard of dying vastly improved (Dennie, 2009: 
p.321). 
 
Burial societies were the primary explanation for this phenomenon.  
Like many other South African social institutions, burial societies had to evolve 
in response to the country’s broader political and socio-economic transformations. As 
the country monetized, for example, traditional kinship structures that were suited for 
subsistence economies were gradually replaced by more capitalist modes of production 
(Bähre, 2007a). Male laborers who were allowed to reside in urban areas under apartheid 
legislation organized themselves into hometown associations referred to as “abakhaya,” 
or “those of one home”—essentially groups of laborers who were from the same areas in 
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the Eastern Cape. These abakhaya networks played a crucial regulatory role: “The social 
control of abakhaya kept migrants in line with the expectations of migrant labour, 
namely to save money for the homestead without spending it on women and alcohol in 
the city” (ibid.: p.36). Migrants’ ties to their rural homesteads were also reinforced 
through the establishment of burial societies on the basis of these abakhaya 
identifications. Clustered in this way, migrants were able to establish burial societies that 
linked with counterpart societies in their home locations (see Mayer and Mayer, 1971); 
these trans-provincial unions coordinated the logistics and raised the funds needed to 
transport the corpse home for burial. 
With the fall of apartheid and influx control measures, abakhaya-based 
identifications and networks also diminished in importance. In their place, Bähre (2007a) 
points to the emergence of neighborhood relations as vital social formations. By 
neighborhood, Bähre is mostly referring to people who live close to one another. In 
contrast to abakhaya networks, however, neighbors were not necessarily from the same 
areas in the Eastern Cape. Neighborhood identifications were the basis along which 
groups formed any number of financial mutuals. For example, respondents in my 
interviews referred to neighborhood-based burial societies as “street” burial societies. 
Thus, while what constitutes a “neighbor” can be vague from a geographical perspective, 
Bähre argues that participation in financial mutuals like burial societies, helped identify 
people as neighbors: 
Burials particularly helped to define a neighbourhood. The collection of money determined who 
were considered neighbours. The collection engaged people in reciprocal relations that were 
regarded as constitutive of neighbourly relations. In other words, being neighbours was realised 
by doing neighbourly activities (ibid.: p.46) 
 
According to Mpumelelo Nxasana, one of my informants who has had years of 
experience managing burial societies before accepting his current post with a private 
insurance company, many burial societies started adopting more sophisticated financial 
 96 
practices, marking an important shift in the scope and internal logics by which they 
operated: 
It was [in the 1980s] that the first burial societies started in the way of insurance, it was called 
‘uzwelonke’ [‘covering everybody’] that means they were focusing to bury everybody across South 
Africa…the concept of uzewelonke was saying as long as you’re from South Africa, even if you 
are coming from Durban and working in Cape Town, we will be able to transport your body, 
also pay out some form of a claim so that you get buried…[in uzwelonke], it changes from 
paying ‘as-and- when’ there is an event into more of a premium sort of arrangement where you 
pay now, whether it is R20, on a monthly basis (Nxasana, M.; Fieldwork Interview; 11 
December 2015).   
 
The concept of uzwelonke, which essentially adopted a premium-benefit model (i.e. 
informal insurance), helped transform many burial societies from small abakhaya-based 
pooling schemes into sprawling, federated organizations, which better catered to the 
mobile lives of migrant laborers. Verhoef (2001) points to the establishment of the 
National Stokvel Association of South Africa (NASASA), an umbrella organization 
founded in 1988, to help mobilize and channel the vast, “untapped” sources of finance 
pooled by informal mechanisms like stokvels and burial societies toward more 
productive/efficient vehicles in the formal financial sector. Similarly, in a 2002 report to 
the Committee on Trade and Industry on the state’s “Broad-Based Economic 
Empowerment” (BEE) agenda, the National Co-operative Association of South Africa 
(NCASA) recommended that the state support the growth of burial societies—then 
valued at an annual savings of more than R3 billion—by facilitating their integration with 
the formal banking/insurance sector.20  
These transformations were necessitated in part by the increasing economic 
pressures placed on informal social support mechanisms like burial societies by the 
forces of rapid urbanization/labor migration, and exacerbated most notably by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic, which contributed to rising mortality rates in the 1990s and early 
2000s (Collins and Leibbrandt, 2007; Vearey et al., 2011). It is believed that the epidemic 
                                               
20 http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/2003/appendices/030626ncasa.htm 
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resulted in a simultaneous increase in burial society membership as well as a decrease in 
the age of its members, reflecting a widespread concern with an early death (Lee, 2009; 
Mbiba, 2010; Vearey et al., 2011; Núñez and Wheeler, 2012); these trends put many 
burial societies under considerable financial strain.  
As various scholars have noted, the increased demand for burial services during 
this time has coincided with and most likely contributed to the commoditization of 
funeral and burial services (Duguid, 2002; Lee, 2007; Lee and Vaughan, 2008; Núñez and 
Wheeler, 2012). Commoditization, in turn, has reshaped mourning practices. Lee (2011) 
gives the example of how modern technologies deployed by funeral businesses (i.e. 
refrigerated mortuaries, new embalming and exhumation techniques, etc.) have enabled 
the performance of certain burial rites over vast distances and thus revived the practice 
of honoring traditional funeral rites based on returning to rural homesteads. Other 
innovations have been documented such as “trouble funds,” which are essentially 
emergency savings mechanisms built into the structure of burial societies (Vearey et al., 
2011). Thus, as Lee and Vaughan (2008: p.357) argue, “the products of modernity have 
mediated shifts in the meaning and management of death.” And far from diminishing or 
“sterilizing” the cultural significance of burial rituals/practices, commercialization of the 
funeral industry seems, in some ways, to be enabling, and indeed reviving, engagements 
with historically shaped death cultures: 
…the forces of globalization and technological change have helped fashion alternative cultural 
landscapes within which Africans could re-invent their relations to death and the dying process. 
That these dynamics could be simultaneously ‘modern’ and deeply ‘historical’ attests to Africans’ 
extensive and multi-faceted engagement with death over the course of the last two centuries (Lee 
and Vaughan, 2008: p.359). 
 
There exists today a diverse array of burial society institutions in South Africa, 
ranging from small, street burial societies that help constitute and structure neighborly 
relations (per Bähre) to large, semi-professional organizations that span the entire 
country (Thomson and Posel, 2002). Through their various stages of evolution, burial 
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societies have adopted a number of key regulatory functions that help structure 
economic and social responses to the risks associated with death. In the final section, 
these regulatory functions will be examined in some detail. 
Traditional Burial Societies and the Informal Regulation of Risk Management 
 
Three Types of Burial Societies 
 
Although estimates of burial society membership vary and are difficult to come 
by, a series of annual surveys called FinScope (run by the FinMark Trust Initiative) 
suggest that anywhere between 5-7 million people in South Africa are currently in a 
burial society.21 Further, Thomson & Posel (2002) estimate that burial society 
membership averages around 80 people per society (skewed heavily by the larger burial 
societies). If these estimates have stayed somewhat constant, one could approximate 
around 60,000-90,000 burial societies in South Africa, which would be fairly consistent 
with most reported estimates (see DGRV South Africa, 2003).  
Thomson & Posel (2002) also differentiate between three types of burial 
societies. First, traditional burial societies are mutual-aid schemes that rely upon norms 
of reciprocity and solidarity, as well as sets of mutually agreed upon rules. They are 
typically small in scale, non-profit, and community-based. Most of these traditional burial 
societies hold regular meetings, usually once a month, and are managed by a small 
committee. Second, hybrid burial societies are those that have been initiated by 
entrepreneurial-minded individuals who conceive of burial societies more as businesses 
than as mutual-aid schemes. These hybrid types still retain the social and cultural 
dimensions of traditional societies, which remain popular among the members, but have 
largely ceded control of financial/claims administration to a third party, i.e. an 
underwriting insurance company. 
Finally, commercial burial societies are those that have fully embraced “modern” 
                                               
21 https://www.finmark.org.za/finscope/finscope-consumer/#toggle-id-9 
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financial practices. These commercial societies have abandoned principles of mutuality 
and are driven primarily by the profit motive. The “burial society” moniker is mostly 
used as a marketing scheme to sell group-life insurance products. Members of these 
societies do not typically know each other and pay into anonymous risk-pools that are 
managed by an insurance administrator along strict financial/actuarial principles. Since 
commercial “burial societies” are essentially formal insurance products, they are 
considered in subsequent chapters. Similarly, since hybrid societies are where formal and 
informal institutions interact, these will be examined at length in Chapter 6. The 
remainder of this chapter will focus on traditional burial societies, which are exclusively 
informal (i.e. not registered with the state). 
General Characteristics of Traditional Burial Societies 
 
 A traditional burial society is self-reliant. It is funded only through the 
contribution of its members and is (nominally) managed collectively. In practice, a 
committee—typically comprising a chairperson, secretary, and a treasurer—manages the 
operations of the burial society. Most burial societies charge a joining fee and regular 
monthly contributions, which are deposited into bank accounts or a post office account. 
In some of the more organized burial societies, the committee shares bank statements 
with members during the regular meetings to help ensure transparency and 
accountability. Moreover, most burial societies have some kind of constitution that 
outlines the key terms like premium and benefit rates, monthly meeting schedules, fines 
and other idiosyncratic rules that are unique to every burial society. 
Interview respondents indicated that the market rather than actuarially based 
calculations dictate the pricing of monthly premiums and benefits:  
The informal insurers (burial societies) take market rates and sometimes cut a bit off the price 
or remove some restrictions (e.g. shorter waiting periods or removing maximum age restrictions) 
effectively increasing their risk without realizing it (Actuary; Email Correspondence; 29 
February 2016). 
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In other words, the tradeoff between prudential soundness and competitive behavior is a 
salient feature of informal insurance markets. Informal actors establish themselves in the 
market by undercutting each other in prices and/or services to attract customers, while 
inadvertently exposing themselves to higher (and often unsustainable) levels of liabilities. 
This dynamic will be examined more in later chapters in relation to the practices of 
formal insurance companies and the regulatory state. For now, it is enough to highlight 
that pricing and design conventions for traditional burial societies primarily follow a 
market, rather than actuarial, logic. Despite these competitive pressures, the results of my 
survey indicate that premium/benefit ratios were remarkably uniform across my sample 
(N=35), suggesting that burial societies are largely mimicking each other in terms of their 
pricing structures. On average, sample respondents were paying R157 per month in 
premiums for an assured-sum benefit of R13,842 on average (See Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4- Average monthly expenditure on burial society premiums and assured-sum coverage (N=35) 
 
 Beyond the economic and social (regulatory) functions that burial societies 
provide, they are also valued for their responsiveness to the lived realities of their poor 
members, perhaps in ways that commercial burial societies and/or insurance companies 
are not. For instance, the poor often struggle with income volatility, making it difficult to 
consistently pay their monthly premiums. The incompatibility of irregular incomes with 
formal systems that demand regularized payment have been observed in other cases like, 
 101 
for example, mortgage payments (Eckstein, 1990; Roy, 2005) and loan repayments 
(Varley, 2002; Leyshon et al., 2004; Collins et al., 2009). These studies have shown that 
for these incompatibilities to be mitigated, systems must find ways to adjust in order to 
accommodate the challenges posed by irregular income/employment. In the case of 
burial societies, many have instituted grace periods (three months is fairly standard) that 
allow members to maintain their coverage without having to repay the initial joining fee.  
Members also express a certain comfort level and familiarity with the way burial 
societies operate, and receive basic assurances that their cultural motivations are 
understood intimately:  
Burial societies are easier because you are with friends and family. Everyone within the burial 
society understands the importance of a speedy and decent burial (Respondent #35; Group 
Interview #3; 20 January 2016). 
 
Burial societies are more trustworthy than insurance companies because the process is less 
difficult. Not much paperwork is required. Burial societies only require the death certificate and 
then they work to bury your relatives (Godfrey; Fieldwork Interview; 1 March 2016). 
 
Burial societies understand our culture and provide cover according to our needs. They provide 
funds for the cows because they know we need that for the funeral tradition and for feeding 
people (Respondent #69; Group Interview #5; 17 March 2016). 
 
Even if problems arise or payments are missed, there is a shared sense and expectation 
that norms of solidarity supersede hard and fast rules. One of the key advantages of 
traditional burial societies, then, is the flexibility with which they operate: 
Every burial society has its rules and regulations that need to be followed and all members agree 
upon them but since we are human beings, somewhere, somehow we can bend the rules for that 
one person who came forward with a valuable reason. We are also human beings and we reside 
in communities like them so it is wise for us to be fair to our fellow community members and we 
do understand other challenges they face. Otherwise we do not do favors because if we open that 
gap we will end up becoming victims of the situation. When you are dealing with people you have 
to be flexible and careful at the same time. Otherwise things can get messy (Secretary for Baba 
Burial Society; UniQ Insights Interview Transcripts; 8 February 2016). 
 
This measure of flexibility and empathy is at the heart of why traditional burial 
societies continue to be valuable risk management institutions for the poor despite the 
emergence of modern financial products like microinsurance. As Thomson and Posel 
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(2002: p.85) argue, “the effectiveness of the ‘traditional’ burial society movement must, in 
the end, be judged not by the financial soundness of individual burial societies, but by 
the success or failure of reciprocity.” Along these lines, I argue that norms of reciprocity 
are reinforced through the economic and social regulations that traditional burial 
societies both embody and enact. While this institutional ethos is often at odds with the 
demands of financial/prudential best practice, it is designed specifically to adapt to the 
volatility of high-risk, low-income environments. 
Burial Societies as Economic Institutions: Regulating Financial Responses to Risk 
 
 Traditional burial societies are regulated by a number of financial rules and norms 
aimed at striking a workable balance between their commitments to mutuality and the 
need to maintain a basic level of financial soundness. This begins with how burial 
societies design their premium and benefit structures. For instance, on the benefits side, 
assured-sum societies are ones that pay out a specified benefit on the death of a covered 
member. These contrast with indemnifying societies that promise to meet the cost of 
certain funeral related goods or services (i.e. coffin, undertaker etc.). In theory, indemnity 
policies guard against fluctuating costs (thus mitigating more risk), but often require 
burial societies to hold some minimum level of cash reserves as well as to impose more 
restrictive membership policies. Not surprisingly, all the burial societies I encountered in 
my fieldwork were assured-sum societies, although it should be noted that the existence 
of indemnifying societies were documented by other studies (Molefe, 1989; Thomson 
and Posel, 2002).  
 Assured-sum benefits are rarely large enough to cover funeral costs in their 
entirety. Part of the reason for this, apart from low cash flow, is due to relatively flexible 
and open beneficiary policies in which burial societies permit multiple people to be 
covered under the same policy. And unlike some microinsurance products, there are 
rarely any stringent requirements (i.e. medical reports, age, etc.) to qualify for coverage. 
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Respondents suggest that this is one of the most popular features and commonly cited 
reasons for people to continue to turn to traditional burial societies: 
I like the burial societies because I can cover up to ten. The formal insurance it’s only up to five, 
my husband and my children. But in Xhosa culture we have extended families that we must 
cover. Formal insurance may not be well equipped to cover that many people, so burial societies 
fill that gap (Respondent #56; Fieldwork Interview; 1 March 2016). 
 
I have a burial society on top of my insurance because the burial society can cover my parents 
who are very old. KGA (insurance) is too expensive for my parents, and I can’t afford the 
premium (Respondent #37; Fieldwork Interview; 4 February 2016). 
 
That burial societies are willing and able to offer these coverage options is a key 
expression of the reciprocity principle and a wedge feature that distinguishes them from 
other options like formal insurance. It is worth pointing out again, however, that these 
policies are not actuarially sound but rather priced against competitive market rates. Since 
cash payouts are low, it is common for members to join multiple burial societies to 
ensure sufficient coverage. For their part, burial societies do not restrict their members 
from joining other societies. 
As already noted, on the contributions side, the majority of burial societies have 
moved to a premium-based model whereby members contribute a set monthly sum; this 
constitutes the primary income stream for these types of burial societies. If a burial 
society were to run out of funds on any given month, whether by misappropriation or by 
several beneficiaries dying in a short span of time, it can revert to an “as-and-when,” or 
collection model, which requires members to contribute above and beyond their monthly 
premiums to help cover the shortfall until the society replenishes its funds. It is in 
instances like these that norms of reciprocity are put to the test:  
When they (burial societies) become insolvent, when they’re having difficulties, out of corruption 
or whatever reason, sometimes they are just gone. The burial society structures are constantly 
evolving. You have your grandparent’s burial societies with certain rules like ‘pay-off when there 
is a death,’ for example. The next generation will wonder why they have this obligation for 
people they don’t know. They are deciding more and more that it should be tit-for-tat because 
you may provide in this case, but sometimes they don’t come back for you because they’ve moved 
away…the children are moving around and the burial society model is failing them (Silvia, 
Independent Consultant; Fieldwork Interview; 12 January 2016).  
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Here, Silvia is pointing to the growing precariousness of reciprocity in the face of 
mobility. As younger generation members become more mobile (i.e. constantly moving 
away and into township neighborhoods), the logic of having to contribute to the funerals 
of strangers—especially when the family of those same strangers might move away when 
it is their turn to reciprocate—becomes unsettled. As relational ties become weaker and 
social networks more dispersed, burial societies that have historically relied upon the 
logics of reciprocity are put under strain if members divest themselves from these norms. 
As will be discussed shortly, various economic and social institutions play key roles in 
fostering/enforcing norms of reciprocity and solidarity. But increasingly, burial societies’ 
success in maintaining viability hinges on their strength as economic, rather than social, 
institutions. Trust erodes quickly and reciprocity-based social relations falter when burial 
societies fail to deliver on their financial commitments: 
There was the case of Chitibhunga [burial society in Khayelitsha]. They had many clients but 
they can take their premium for year after year and then when it is the time to pay for the 
funeral, they will just make up some reason not to pay. One day, they were in the community 
with many branches and then over night they just closed up and disappeared. After that, I will 
never trust these burial society guys (Nxusani, G.; Group Interview #4; 23 February 2016). 
 
Burial societies have thus developed institutional mechanisms to guard against 
the various risk factors that can lead to insolvency. Basic accountability and transparency 
measures like regular financial disclosures and reliable record-keeping practices are 
effective against fraud. Committee members are also known to share their personal 
information with members to create direct lines of communication for complaints 
and/or queries. Joining fees and waiting periods, although not universally applied, help 
guard against adverse selection. Morbidity risk (an unexpected spike in deaths in a short 
period of time) is usually counteracted by temporary adjustments to the 
premium/benefit regime, as described above. And finally, non-payment of contributions 
from members is typically policed through a combination of social pressure and nominal 
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fines; failure to comply can result in social stigma or expulsion from the burial society 
enforced by the managing committee. Though unregulated from a formal, state 
perspective, burial societies rely heavily upon these self-enforcement and regulatory 
mechanisms to ensure that they remain viable as mutual-aid institutions.  
Helping Hands: Cultivating Reciprocity and Solidarity through Social Regulation 
 
 While being able to meet the expenses of a funeral is of primary concern to 
members, there are other necessities that burial societies fulfill:  
Interviewer: May we quickly give again the advantages of the burial societies? 
 
Respondent: The advantages are that you have helping hands during a funeral, with the cooking 
and other chores (Female Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #4; 12 January 2016). 
 
You need people who will sing during the prayers. You have to stay the whole Saturday and so 
you need helping hands for the food and the drinks. If you don’t, people will talk about you 
(Female Respondent; Durban Focus Group #2; 15 January 2016) 
 
“Helping hands” is a gendered term that refers to the support bereaved families rely 
upon on the day of the funeral. This typically takes the form of shopping for groceries, 
cooking, cleaning, and serving the funeral guests. The fact that this is done on a 
volunteer basis implies two things. First, it obligates people, particularly women, to 
attend the funerals of a relatively wide network of family, friends, and neighbors. Second, 
it relies upon and is sustained by mutually agreed norms of reciprocity: 
In a burial society, friends and community members come to the funeral and provide support. It 
is better if you attend and contribute too because one day it will come back to you (Female 
Respondent; Durban Focus Group #1; 14 January 2016). 
 
 Reciprocal norms are cultivated through a variety of social mechanisms. For 
instance, many modern burial societies require their members to wear uniforms during 
regular meetings and publically during funerals to reinforce, at least aesthetically, a sense 
of solidarity. On uniforms, Warnecke (1994: p.48) observed that they “form an integral 
part of being a member of a society. Not wearing the uniform implies that a member 
does not take her membership seriously and that she is posing a threat to the morale and 
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unity of the society.” Moreover, regular meetings are also opportunities to strengthen 
social bonds between members: 
For our burial society meetings, we meet every week and it is like a sort of social gathering where 
people drink and eat together. It’s not a party. It’s a weekend activity…The formal meeting 
happens at the end of the every month. When there is a meeting, there is an agenda. Each and 
every member has a record statement, almost like a bank statement, and we can share whatever 
concerns we have to the committee. We do conduct business but it is an opportunity to meet the 
others who we haven’t seen since the last meeting. It brings us together (Male Respondent; 
Johannesburg Focus Group #4; 12 January 2016). 
 
 Solidarity is forged by fostering a sense of organizational discipline and order 
(Thomson and Posel, 2002). To this end, most burial societies impose small cash 
penalties for infractions of agreed upon rules, which may be delineated in the group’s 
constitution if they have one. Fines can be levied on a host of misbehaviors: 
tardiness/absence from meetings, failure to wear uniforms, and missed payments, to 
name a few. As one might expect, these fines can be unpopular among members, leading 
some to accuse administrators of racketeering. But on the balance, these fines are 
typically too small to be a serious temptation and are intended instead to reinforce a 
collective commitment to a set of shared rules.  
 Reciprocity, solidarity and, by extension, the social regulations that have been 
developed to reinforce these norms, have their limits. Taken together, the economic 
utility of these norms, social relations, trust, and networks has been studied extensively in 
the social capital literature and has been recognized for smoothing economic transactions 
(Putnam, 1993; Anderson et al., 2002; Bebbington et al., 2004). However, social capital 
frameworks have been critiqued for trumpeting romanticized accounts of solidarity that 
sanitize the inherent messiness of social relations (Rahman, 1999; Mayoux, 2001; Rankin, 
2002; Bähre, 2007a; Bähre, 2007b; Hietalahti, 2013). Bourdieu’s Marxian analysis of social 
capital takes this messiness as a starting point to highlight how underlying power 
inequalities mediate associational life, including reciprocal relations. Thus, among those 
who are socially/economically unequal, reciprocal obligations can serve as a form of 
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control, and a class strategy to maintain power: 
…giving is also a way of possessing (a gift which is not matched by a counter-gift creates a 
lasting bond, restricting the debtor’s freedom and forcing him to adopt a peaceful, cooperative 
attitude); because in the absence of any juridical guarantee, or any coercive force, one of the few 
ways of ‘holding’ someone is to keep up a lasting asymmetrical relationship such as indebtedness, 
and because the only recognized, legitimate form of possession is that achieved by dispossessing 
oneself—i.e., obligation, gratitude, prestige, or personal loyalty (Bourdieu, 1977: p.195). 
 
Thus, Hietalahti (2013: p.17) argues that social ties are “mediated by complex 
webs of solidarity and conflict within the ambivalent politics of everyday life.” Following 
this, I argue that an analysis of burial societies as social institutions must be re-centered 
around notions of ambivalence, conflict, and unequal power relations to more fully 
capture the dynamics of reciprocity/solidarity. Doing so unveils the messy politics of 
inclusion, which are often missed by romanticized accounts of mutual-aid societies that 
assume that solidarity exists among its members. These internal politics can be based on 
something as petty as the location of one’s home in a neighborhood, or on something 
more intangible like social reputation:  
In my case it was the street society that I was not happy with. Someone passed away who does 
not live on the same street but owns a house there. The funeral proceedings were not even 
conducted on our street, but we were all asked to send R50 to the bereaved family where they 
live, and yet I lost my mother in-law who lived only five streets from our street, they refused to 
contribute and stated as a reason that they only cover residents of our street (Male Respondent; 
Johannesburg Focus Group #4; 12 January 2016). 
 
All people are supposed to be equal but not all people are treated equally. For example, if I 
pass away, all my cousins favor me, so because they favor me, they’ll just take out R3,000. But 
others who are not favored will only get R1,000 cover. They’ll donate money based on favoritism 
(Male Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #4; 12 January 2016).  
 
Closely intertwined social relationships between neighbors can also entail a degree of 
negative social pressure. Respondents expressed anxiety about conforming to certain 
societal expectations regarding the “right” way to conduct a funeral. Being considered 
poor or stingy is considered shameful, and so the motivation to pay more for funerals is 
at least partially driven by this social pressure: 
The coffin is viewed by the whole community. If it doesn’t look good, people will start talking 
and gossiping. It’s like peer pressure. A person who doesn’t have money will suffer because of 
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this. Even if you’re poor, you have to buy new clothes, the kids have to dress well. The money 
can easily push up to R40,000 (Female Respondent; Durban Focus Group #2; 15 January 
2016).  
 
Introducing these more complicated narratives into the analysis invites closer 
attention to the inherent power inequalities that shape the relations between burial 
society members. As just one example, Thomson and Posel (2002: p.99) observed that 
“the power of a strong, unaccountable leader detracts from the mutuality of a burial 
society. It is the members who bear the risks, but they are unable to participate in the 
control of the risks.” As robust as social and economic safeguards may be, burial 
societies remain fragile and vulnerable to exploitation by powerful, more engaged 
individuals: 
It is difficult and you feel exhausted when you try and organize something and one trusted 
person in the community sabotages all your hard work because of greed. The need of burial 
societ[ies] is there, the situation has not changed…But we need to pray to God that he grants us 
men and women of character, people of integrity. We need Christ’s intervention in order for this 
to prosper (Treasurer for Nceduluntu Burial Society; UniQ Insights Interview Transcripts; 7 
February 2016). 
 
The impacts of these underlying power inequalities will be analyzed in more depth in 
Chapter 7. What is germane to this present chapter is the extent to which the viability of 
traditional burial societies rests on a tenuous, collective commitment to mutually agreed 
upon and enforced norms of reciprocity and solidarity. As I have shown, the strength of 
these norms, and the institutions created to sustain them, are constantly put to the test by 
the reworking of social, relational structures brought about by broader forces like rapid 
urbanization, labor migration patterns, modernization, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
And while the economic pressures of maintaining viability can weaken these norms, 
social and economic institutions, as described above, have adapted ways to strengthen 
mutualism by smoothing, and at times constraining, ambivalent social relations. But these 
institutions have limits and must be reinforced through a constant process of 
performance and maintenance.  
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Conclusion 
 
 To understand why death constitutes such a high economic risk for the poor and 
stimulates informal risk management institutions in South Africa, it is imperative to 
account for the cultural and historical context in which death occurs. Otherwise, utility 
maximization perspectives might simply interpret the poor as being irrational for 
committing so much of their scant resources, financial and otherwise, to ensure that their 
kin are provided dignified funerals. The first section of this chapter sketched a broad 
overview of the cultural history of Xhosa cosmologies of death. Accounting for this 
history is crucial in understanding why such a high (financial) priority is placed on 
funerals. In the Xhosa imaginary, the dead are not dead but are the “living dead,” stuck 
in a liminal state until the proper funeral rituals (i.e. umkhapho and umbuyiso) are 
performed. To insult them by being “stingy” is to invite calamity. Funerals themselves 
are cultural institutions that simultaneously shape and are shaped by the way people 
respond to death. 
 These cultural obligations became increasingly difficult and expensive to fulfill as 
the Xhosa experienced distance from the “homeland”—the Transkei and Ciskei regions 
of the Eastern Cape. The emergence and evolution of burial societies are inextricably tied 
to South Africa’s history of colonization, economic modernization, and apartheid, which 
unleashed a steady pattern of labor migration that continues to this day. Far from 
abandoning their obligations to their ancestors, Xhosa migrants developed institutions, in 
particular, burial societies, to help pool and coordinate their resources to overcome vast 
distances. These institutions were not static but dynamic, adapting to the ever shifting 
political-economic circumstances that re-shaped social structures, networks, and 
relations. Economic institutional innovations like waiting periods, trouble funds, and a 
switch to premium collection models helped burial societies remain financially viable. 
Social institutions evolved to regulate relational interactions between members and 
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reinforce norms of reciprocity (e.g. regular social gatherings, mandated uniforms to signal 
solidarity, etc.). 
 Moreover, evidence of these transformations can be seen in the ways burial 
societies are structured today. Rather than being based solely on relations of kinship, or 
even abakhaya hometown associations, many burial societies are now formed among 
neighbors. Bähre (2007a) has made the point that what constitutes a “neighborhood” is 
somewhat vague, and that participation in burial societies is one way in which this 
particular social grouping is both constituted and reinforced. As one might expect, 
relationships among neighbors can be fraught with tension, conflict, and power 
inequalities and which, exacerbated by changing economic and social pressures, can lead 
to ambivalent forms of mutualism. This has important implications for traditional burial 
societies, which rise or fall on the strength of maintaining reciprocal and solidaristic 
norms. Nevertheless, burial societies have persisted even with the emergence of formal 
financial options like microinsurance due to the various ways in which they respond to 
both the financial and social needs of their members, namely, social support (i.e. “helping 
hands”), flexible terms that can weather irregular income streams, and culturally 
competent practices that are aligned with their lived realities.  
 A useful way to understand the burial society, then, is to view it as a 
consolidation of the various economic, social, and cultural institutions—conceptualized 
together as “informal” institutions—that aim to shape individual behavior toward an 
effective mutualism. As this chapter has demonstrated, these informal institutions are 
expressed explicitly (e.g. the use of fines to forge discipline) and implicitly through the 
cultivation of reciprocity and solidarity to structure interactions. They must overcome 
ambivalent social relations and operate in tension with powerful actors who can 
undermine this tenuous mutuality. Thus, in the following chapters, these informal 
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institutions are examined in relation to individual agency, as well as the formal 
institutions that have in recent years encroached upon this space.  
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5—The big squeeze: Discourses and techniques of microinsurance 
formalization 
 
Since the early 2000s, the state has engaged in a systematic effort to formalize the 
funeral insurance and services market in South Africa. This effort has been part of a 
broader financial inclusion agenda driven by the state’s mandate to address the socio-
economic inequalities that still characterizes South Africa’s post-apartheid society. Given 
the size and scope of informality in this market, however, formalization has proven to be 
a difficult and elusive task. The state has struggled to balance competing interests and has 
generally lacked the capacity and/or will to enforce insurance regulations in the low-
income segments of the market. This has resulted in an uneven and ambiguous 
regulatory environment.  
Motivated by the recognition that microinsurance markets present untapped 
opportunities for growth and profit, the insurance industry has had to resolve the 
challenge of conducting business in this uneven regulatory environment. The efforts by 
the state to formalize this space, which had been informally regulated for several decades, 
were contemporaneous with this sudden interest by industry. It would thus be reasonable 
to understand formalization as a process driven fundamentally by corporate interests. 
Nevertheless, the state has its own interests that were distinct from, but not incompatible 
with those of industry. In a South African context in which large portions of the 
population were excluded from the formal financial system, the state took an active role 
in pushing the financial services industry to engage underserved, low-income markets. 
To its credit, the state recognized the need to develop separate legislation tailored 
to the realities of microinsurance markets and subsequently initiated a lengthy 
consultative process that culminated in the publication of the South African 
Microinsurance Regulatory Framework in 2011. While this consultative process sought 
feedback from informal players, their engagement was largely ad-hoc and perfunctory. It 
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was instead the sustained engagement between state and industry, which propelled 
efforts to formalize the funeral insurance space. The resulting policy document can thus 
be read as a negotiated outcome between formal sector actors that reveals their 
underlying motivations and the frictions that exist between their conflicting agendas. 
This chapter takes this policy document as a jumping off point to examine how 
formal microinsurance institutions operate within and shape this predominantly informal 
space. Two broad questions frame this chapter. First, what are the underlying 
motivations that animate the process of formalizing the South African microinsurance 
market? Since formal sector actors are driving this effort, this question is targeted mainly 
at them; understanding their motivations helps to shed light on the nature and direction 
of formalization (whether the state prioritizes certain policy objectives over others, for 
example). And second, how does formalization actually proceed in practice? What 
discourses, techniques, and strategies do insurance companies and state regulators 
employ? 
To answer these questions, the analyses presented in this chapter focuses on two 
sources of data. First, the analysis draws primarily from data collected through semi-
structured one-on-one interviews, which were conducted with a variety of formal sector 
actors including insurance sales agents, administrators, legislators, regulators, technology 
service providers (TSPs), and industry association representatives. Second, relevant 
policy documents were collected and analyzed. The selection of these documents was 
guided by the interview data; three documents, in particular, were recognized as having 
the most relevant influence on the regulation of microinsurance in South Africa: 1) The 
Financial Sector Charter; 2) The Microinsurance Regulatory Framework (hereafter 
referred to as the Microinsurance Framework); and 3) The Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act.  
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Given that the exploratory and descriptive nature of the first question calls for a 
more inductive approach to the data, thematic analysis was used to examine both the 
interview transcripts and the documents. The aim of this analysis was to identify the 
broad themes that capture the competing/complementary motivations that propel 
industry and state actors in their attempt to formalize the funeral insurance market. The 
analysis yielded three themes/motivations, which will be explored in turn: 1) Business 
interests; 2) Consumer Protection; and 3) Financial Inclusion. I argue that these 
motivations are fundamentally at odds with one another and must be negotiated by 
actors who occupy different positions of power. Accounting for these power dynamics is 
key to understanding how formalization shapes the unregulated microinsurance market. 
The second question builds on the insights of a critical stream in 
anthropology/sociology that has examined how informal economies have been affected 
by their incorporation into formal markets (see Schwittay, 2011; Dolan and Roll, 2013; 
Meagher, 2015; Dolan and Rajak, 2016). Among other things, this literature has 
highlighted the critical role that discourse plays in framing certain unmet needs as 
problems for the market to solve (Li, 2007; Schwittay, 2011; Dolan and Roll, 2013), in 
legitimizing certain “experts” who are the most qualified to tackle these problems (see 
Ferguson, 1994; Roy, 2010), in advancing “technical” solutions that obscure and sideline 
structural drivers of exclusion (see Ferguson, 1994; Maurer, 2002; De Goede, 2004; Li, 
2007), and in re-constituting the poor as “prudent fiscal subjects” who are the ideal 
beneficiaries of an expanded and inclusive formal market/sector (Schwittay, 2011; 
Mader, 2014). Following this scholarship, I examine how discursive agendas calibrate the 
social field to enable formalization. I consider the ways in which discourse frames 
different actors into particular moral categories (e.g. informal providers as “illegal” 
operators, insurers as “trusted” financial service providers, etc.) and aligns 
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microinsurance formalization with South Africa’s broader market-led development 
agenda.  
Moreover, discourse works hand-in-hand with concrete managerial strategies to 
constitute “ideal” microinsurance clients. Building on the literature on 
“governmentality”—what Foucault (1982: p. 341) referred to as the “conduct of 
conducts”—ethnographic work on Bottom-of-the-Pyramid (BoP) ventures has 
highlighted how market technologies and practices (e.g. surveys, data collection, market 
research, management, training, etc.) are instrumental in re-structuring and re-purposing 
BoP markets (i.e. informal economies) to make them “knowable, calculable, and 
predictable to global business” (Dolan and Roll, 2013: p.123) and to govern them in ways 
that align with formal market logics (Cross and Street, 2009; Mair et al., 2012; Dolan and 
Roll, 2013; Meagher, 2015). Along this vein, I identify a number of managerial techniques 
employed by the South African microinsurance apparatus to shape a market space more 
amenable to its practices and rationalities, thus enabling formalization. These include 
group-based underwriting, institutional partnerships, market segmentation, and 
consumer education. I argue that while the processes of formalization through state 
regulatory channels have largely stalled, they have nevertheless proceeded through these 
discursive and managerial techniques, which are enacted by formal sector actors, 
particularly insurance companies. 
The Drive to Formalize: Setting the Regulatory Context 
 
The Financial Sector Charter and the Road to the Microinsurance Framework 
  
As it pertains to the state’s approach to microinsurance regulation, the three 
aforementioned documents—the Financial Sector Charter (hereafter, Charter), the 
Microinsurance Framework, and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 
(hereafter, the FAIS Act)—have had the most direct relevance and impact on the 
industry. While the Charter has had an indirect, yet still significant, impact by outlining 
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the broad inclusive agenda within which the insurance industry operates, the 
microinsurance framework and the FAIS Act contain explicit regulations that aim, with 
varying degrees of success, to regulate microinsurance providers. Each of these 
documents will now be examined in turn. 
In August 2002, the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
(NEDLAC), a forum of government, business, labor, and community constituencies 
reached broad agreements to “transform”22 the financial sector by taking proactive 
measures that were designed to address historic and systemic inequalities: 
We, the parties to this charter, therefore commit ourselves to actively promoting a transformed, 
vibrant, and globally competitive financial sector that reflects the demographics of South Africa, 
and contributes to the establishment of an equitable society by effectively providing accessible 
financial services to black people and by directing investment into targeted sectors of the economy 
(Financial Sector Charter, 2004: Section 1.2).  
 
These agreements materialized into the Financial Sector Charter, which came into effect 
in January 2004. The Charter was formulated within the broader Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) framework and implements its principles/objectives in the 
financial sector.23 It notes that while the South African financial sector is generally 
regarded as highly developed, it continues to struggle with a number of challenges related 
to equity, including low levels of black participation in the sector and limited support for 
small-to-medium enterprises owned and operated by black businesspeople. Thus, the 
objectives of the Charter were to 1) Constitute a framework and establish the principles 
upon which BEE would be implemented in the financial sector; 2) Provide the basis for 
the financial sector’s engagement with other stakeholders including government and 
labor; 3) Establish targets and responsibilities in respect of each principle; and 4) Outline 
processes for implementing the charter and mechanisms to monitor and report on 
progress (Financial Sector Charter, 2004: Section 1.3).  
                                               
22 Transformation is a term that broadly refers to the objectives of policies that benefit historically disadvantaged 
groups, i.e. black South Africans. 
23 For more on Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment: 
http://www.dti.gov.za/economic_empowerment/bee.jsp 
 117 
In pursuit of these objectives, the Charter committed signatories to transform 
key aspects of their respective systems and operations, including human resource 
development, procurement, ownership, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and access 
to financial services. As it relates to improving access to financial services, key provisions 
in the Charter established concrete access and employment equity targets that applied to 
all South African financial services industries, including insurance. At the time of their 
signing, the insurance industry committed itself to a target of 6% of the low-income 
market that would have “effective access to short-term risk insurance products and 
services” (e.g. funeral insurance) by 2008 (Financial Sector Charter, 2004: Section 8.3.1).  
Though a voluntary agreement rather than formal law, the Charter nevertheless 
wielded an important influence over the practices and strategies of insurance companies: 
Interviewer: From Old Mutual’s perspective, what would you say is driving engagement in 
microinsurance markets? Is it more to do with market opportunities, or does the regulatory stick 
of the state come into play as well? 
 
Respondent: It’s a little bit of both, I’d say. I mean, on the one hand, under the Financial 
Sector Charter, you must, as an insurer, in some way, shape or form, show that you are 
providing access to insurance…it plays a role. We still have products that allow us to claim 
certain things, like the ‘Zimele’ products, which allow us to get access points for our BEE (Van 
der Westhuizien, A., Old Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 28 September 2015). 
 
By “Zimele,”Anna van der Westhuizen, an insurance executive at Old Mutual, is 
referring to a set of simplified, flexible product standards, which facilitated the 
development of life insurance products targeting the low-income market. As she also 
refers to in her response, these products helped Old Mutual fulfill their Charter access 
obligations.  
 Concurrent to the enactment of the Charter, the Parliamentary Committee on 
Finance (PCoF) held hearings in 2003 and in 2005 concerning widespread reports of 
market abuses in the informal funeral services industry. FinMark Trust, which was 
commissioned to conduct the investigative study, found that the scope of these abuses 
varied depending on what type of provider was involved. For instance, while they found 
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a relatively low incidence of criminal activity like fraud and theft among burial societies, 
they discovered that funeral parlors regularly engaged in a number of practices deemed 
to be abusive (e.g. not offering clients the option to claim cash instead of services, 
overvaluing their services relative to premiums paid, offering rigid funeral packages that 
prohibit clients from opting out of services they don’t need, etc.). It should also be noted 
that documented cases of abuse were not confined exclusively with informal providers, 
but with formally registered insurers as well. In these cases, insurers rarely engaged in 
illegal activities, but in ones that were still considered to be abusive such as bundling 
insurance products in ways that inexperienced, financially illiterate clients might not be 
fully aware (see FinMark Trust, 2005). 
 As a response to these hearings and investigations, the National Treasury and the 
Financial Services Board (FSB) convened a joint task force to discuss potential reforms, 
which eventually broadened into a more comprehensive review of the entire 
microinsurance sector (since microinsurance is nearly synonymous with funeral insurance 
in South Africa). Out of this work, the National Treasury released a discussion paper for 
public comment in 2008, which proposed a standalone microinsurance regulatory 
framework that outlined a formalization path for informal providers and provided 
concessions to formal players to incentivize their entry. Ostensibly, this consultative 
process was inclusive of both formal and informal stakeholders, but all indications were 
that it was formal industry that drove the agenda, particularly the industry lobbies (The 
Long-Term insurance industry is represented by the Association for Savings and 
Investment South Africa [ASISA] and the Short-Term insurance industry is represented 
by the South African Insurance Association [SAIA]): 
When it comes to legislation in the financial space, there is a lot of consultation. I must give 
credit to National Treasury. They don’t just impose legislation on industry, not at all. And 
industry is free to say anything if they feel strong about the issues. So with this microinsurance 
[framework] the industry has been involved right from the beginning….And ASISA and 
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SAIA are very coherent; they speak with one voice (Modiba, J., FSB; Fieldwork Interview; 10 
November 2015). 
 
I would say the associations had the loudest voice. ASISA, SAIA. Industry has a lot to lose or 
gain (Rajah, J., National Treasury; Fieldwork Interview; 9 November 2015). 
 
Finally in July 2011, the National Treasury published the Microinsurance Framework 
Policy Document, which incorporated and elaborated upon the feedback received from 
industry as well as some of the larger informal players (involvement of burial societies 
and funeral parlors, or lack thereof, in these consultations are discussed further in 
Chapter 6).  
The Microinsurance Framework: A Broad Overview 
 
 Rather than specify a list of products that would be considered microinsurance, 
the framework operationalizes a generic definition that delineates a set of parameters for 
products to qualify as microinsurance. This definition, which essentially sets the 
boundaries of formalization, seeks to reflect at least two key criteria:  
1) It should reflect the features of products demanded by the low-income market; and 2) It 
should generate sufficiently low prudential risk so that microinsurance products can safely be 
provided by a wide range of microinsurers and be straightforward to distribute, these factors 
combining to merit simplified regulatory requirements (National Treasury, 2011: Section 2.1).  
 
The intended objectives of microinsurance formalization are four-fold. First, it aims to 
enable improved access to good-value, appropriate formal insurance products to low-
income households, thus advancing financial inclusion. Second, it enhances consumer 
protection. Third, it creates a path toward formalization for informal providers. And 
finally, it also aims to create a favorable and even-handed regulatory environment to 
incentivize formal players to enter the market and spur competition. 
 Central to the regulatory framework are two key components of insurance 
supervision: prudential regulation and market conduct regulation. As research and 
practice have demonstrated, traditional insurance laws cannot simply be applied to the 
microinsurance markets because most prospective microinsurers simply do not have the 
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resources to comply. For example, the Long-term Insurance Act requires all insurers to 
hold a minimum of R10 million in capital reserves unless an individual exemption is 
issued (Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998; Section 29). These types of regulations 
serve as barriers that keep small-to-medium size insurers out of the market, while 
monopolizing the (formal) low-income microinsurance space for large corporations who 
are the only players with enough resources to engage. A lighter touch approach tailored 
to these low-income markets is thus warranted. On the prudential side, the 
microinsurance framework establishes “scaled-down” guidelines such as lower capital 
and reserving requirements (R3 million instead of R10 million), a lighter tax dispensation, 
and loosened actuarial standards (a microinsurer would not required to hire a full-time 
actuary, for example).   
 The market conduct regulations proposed by the framework were drafted in the 
spirit of consumer protection. This is especially pertinent for low-income clients who are 
likely to have had very little experience with formal insurance. Since the vast majority of 
funeral microinsurance products have been (and currently still are) distributed through 
intermediaries, the governing piece of market conduct legislation in force is the FAIS 
Act. The microinsurance framework proposed a special dispensation for microinsurance 
under FAIS, which developed tailored provisions for “fit-and-proper” criteria for 
intermediary service providers (e.g. education levels, regulatory exam, etc.), code of 
conduct guidelines, and a clearly established commission regime.  
Finally, the microinsurance framework recognizes that institutional partnerships 
play an integral role in the low-income space. While traditional insurance law permits 
only public companies to register as insurers (to help ensure transparency and 
accountability through corporate governance), the framework makes concessions to 
member-based entities, such as cooperatives and burial societies, as well as private 
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enterprises like funeral parlors, so that they can formally register for a microinsurance 
license. 
The Current Status of Microinsurance Formalization 
 
 The final section of the policy document proposed a timeline for 
implementation. This included plans to turn the document into a standalone 
Microinsurance Bill to be tabled before Parliament by 2014. Since that time, a number of 
broader regulatory developments have first stalled, and then blocked entirely, the tabling 
of this standalone bill. Chief among these developments was the introduction of the so-
called “Twin Peaks” financial sector reform bill (officially, the Financial Markets Act 
Regulation). This proposed sweeping reforms to the entire financial sector to strengthen 
its integrity in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008. Broadly speaking, the 
Twin Peaks model proposes to demarcate regulation and supervision into two separate 
spheres (hence, “Twin” Peaks): 1) Prudential regulation, which would be managed by the 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB); and 2) Market Conduct regulation, which would be 
carried out by the Financial Services Board (FSB). 
 In terms of what this means for the insurance space, the Twin Peaks reform 
process aims to put into effect a new Insurance Bill that would collapse the current Long 
Term and Short Term Insurance Acts into one omnibus piece of legislation. In effect, it 
was the introduction of this omnibus Insurance Bill that stopped the Microinsurance Bill 
in its tracks. Instead, it was proposed that the principles, guidelines, and regulations 
outlined in the microinsurance framework be folded into the larger Insurance Bill as well 
as other pertinent pieces of legislation (i.e. FAIS). This way, according to Jerusha Rajah, a 
National Treasury official I interviewed, microinsurance legislation would be made to 
cohere with the overarching national development plan. Rajah indicated that the reason 
for the delay in implementation was because the reform process had to move forward in 
distinct phases: 
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The Financial Sector Regulatory Bill, which is the Twin Peaks Bill, is at the Parliament right 
now. That bill comes first. The sequencing is important from both a legal side and a regulatory 
side. So that’s the first bill, that’s the overarching bill, and the Insurance Bill is, you could say, 
the first stage of two of the bills…so it’s important to look at the Insurance Bill in the context 
of Twin Peaks (Rajah, J., National Treasury; Fieldwork Interview; 9 November 2015). 
 
At the time of my fieldwork and writing, the Twin Peaks Bill and omnibus 
Insurance Bill have yet to be signed into law. While interim measures have been put into 
effect (e.g. product standards enforcement and FSB board notices), the overall impact of 
this regulatory delay has been a “loss of momentum” in the microinsurance market 
(Endres et al., 2014: p.13). This delay has led to an uncertainty in the market, which has 
had a disincentivizing effect on insurance companies to innovate and/or more fully 
invest in their microinsurance ventures: 
This microinsurance paper has been promulgated for at least five or six years I think…so that 
creates uncertainty. I’m sure if you’ve read through the paper, you’ll see that there are a variety 
of other products…that’s obviously an ideal place that we’d like to start playing in as soon as 
we get clarity. (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 21 September 2015). 
 
Despite the uncertainty, however, competitive market incentives have still been 
strong enough to compel insurance companies to make inroads into microinsurance 
markets. Seen another way, formalization is proceeding along a market, rather than state-
regulatory vector. But because the state can more easily regulate these formal players as 
opposed to informal players (Scott’s [1998] notion of the state’s capacity to “see”), 
insurance companies feel that regulations are being enforced unevenly and unfairly: 
Our members [ASISA long-term insurers], to the extent this is how they feel, vocalize to us 
that the FSB places the regulatory burden squarely on them. They feel that [the FSB] should be 
looking out for both the informal and the formal sector of this market, but currently is not doing 
this evenhandedly [ASISA representative; Fieldwork Interview; 12 October 2015].   
 
According to many of the formal providers I interviewed, this uneven enforcement has 
contributed to a “culture of non-compliance,” in which even formal, registered insurance 
providers do not feel the need to fully comply with the current insurance laws on the 
book. It is within this context of regulatory uncertainty, then, that formal institutions, i.e. 
state and corporate practice and governance, are aiming to interact with and shape 
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informal institutions/economies. With the formal regulatory context set, I turn now to 
an analysis of the motivations, discourses, and techniques that are driving the 
formalization process in South Africa. 
The Big Squeeze: Revealing State and Corporate Motivations to Formalize 
 
 During a meeting with FSB regulators in March 2016, Cenfri (my host 
institution) presented their findings on abusive practices in the informal funeral 
insurance and services market.24 In the subsequent discussion, which was attended only 
by FSB staff and Cenfri consultants, I was surprised to observe a sort of resigned 
recognition settling into the room. Without changes to the status quo, it was 
acknowledged, efforts to formalize would ultimately be futile. The size and scope of 
informality, coupled with the limited capacity of the regulator to enforce laws, actually 
made it a “regulatory risk” for the FSB insofar as inconsistent enforcement would lead to 
a loss of credibility for the regulator and a culture of non-compliance. Moreover, it was 
readily accepted by the officials in the room that neither the state nor the market was 
providing much of an incentive for informal operators to register their businesses under 
formal law. 
 Nevertheless, given the documented abuses occurring in the market, the FSB was 
still obliged to do what they could given their limited capacity. One official referred to 
their approach to formalization as the “big squeeze.” The idea was to deploy every 
regulatory tool of the state to generate pressure from all sides to compel and/or 
incentivize informal operators to formalize. This meant exploring both the carrots and 
sticks of formalization. And although this meeting was convened in the spirit of 
consumer protection, it became clear throughout the course of my fieldwork that several 
motivations and agendas were shaping the formalization process. The results of a 
thematic analysis of the interview and document data indicate that state and industry 
                                               
 24 Cenfri permitted me to participate in this study as an observer. 
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actors are driven by three broad motivations: 1) Business interests; 2) Consumer 
Protection; and 3) Financial Inclusion.  
Business Interests: Leveling the Playing Field 
 
 In any industry, a formal, well-regulated market is typically good for business. 
Microinsurance providers pushing for higher levels of formalization saw this principally 
as a way of “leveling the playing field” with informal operators who are seen to be acting 
with impunity. Informal operators are not bound in the same ways insurance companies 
are to the formal laws that govern traditional insurance markets. This frees informal 
operators up to engage in a range of practices like undercutting prices, which makes 
competition unfair, at least from the perspective of a formal provider. According to 
Louis Katzke, an insurance executive with KGA Life, the practice of misrepresentation is 
particularly harmful to the wider (formal) market space: 
In the policyholders’ minds, these guys [informal operators] are all regulated and legal. So I’ve 
seen practices where these illegal guys know that they need to be underwritten, they don’t want to, 
but they’ll still advertise that they’re underwritten by KGA Life. And I’m sure it happens with 
other insurers as well. We’ve got complaints where the claim hasn’t paid out and then we tell the 
FSB, we don’t know who these guys are. These guys all misrepresent themselves as legally 
underwritten (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 21 September 2015). 
 
Trust in formal insurance, which is critical to establishing and maintaining a strong 
market presence, is eroded by these misrepresentations, with business being adversely 
affected (see Gibson, 2011; Endres et al., 2014; Van den Berg, 2016). The lack of 
enforcement exacerbates the problem: 
From a regulatory perspective, [this] lack of enforcement, lack of investigating unlegit [sic] 
funeral parlors, kills not only us but all the other formal insurers out there. Because without the 
FSB acting strictly against the guys who are operating illegally, that’s guys [potential clients] 
that will forever remain outside the ambit of formal insurance, which means less premiums for 
us. (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 21 September 2015). 
 
While the state struggles to rein in informal operators who are perceived to be 
engaging in these unregulated market practices, it is able to “see” formal providers in 
ways it cannot see their informal counterparts. Insurance companies feel that the piece-
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meal regulations that have been enacted to help curb abuses have done nothing but raise 
compliance costs on them. On other occasions, the state has cracked down aggressively 
on violations committed by insurance companies to “send a message” to industry. A 
rather highly publicized example was in 2013 when the FSB fined Sanlam R3 million for 
remunerating intermediaries with commission rates that exceeded the permissible 
amount (as stipulated by the Long-term Insurance Act, Section 49). John van Rooyen, a 
specialized funeral insurance administrator, indicated that the message sent by the state 
was loud and clear and actually had a chilling effect on the microinsurance sector: 
The punishment was out of context with the crime. I think the FSB was trying to make a point 
that the punishment will be so bad that you will not make any mistakes. I sense that this has 
led to a level of conservatism that I’m seeing now with underwriters…which I think [is] 
frustrating on the sales end. Nobody wants to make a mistake, and so we are seeing companies 
becoming much more conservative on taking risks in the low-income market. And it creates 
more opportunity for more unregulated people without the compliance to try different things to try 
to get away with it and we don’t see the regulator enforcing them. So we don’t see fair policing in 
what happens in the market (Van Rooyen, J., The Best Funeral Society; Fieldwork Interview; 
13 November 2015). 
 
With informal/illegal players operating in the shadows to undercut them in the market 
and with regulators laying the burden of compliance disproportionately on their 
shoulders, formal service providers support formalization as a way for the state to be 
able to “see” their informal competitors so that they can be regulated accordingly.  
Consumer Protection: Tackling Invisible Risk 
 
 As I would come to discover, there was a wide variety of opinions amongst 
government officials I interviewed regarding what they considered to be the state’s top 
priority regarding microinsurance regulatory reform. This split was most noticeable 
between officials in the FSB and those in the National Treasury. Joanne Modiba, the 
FSB’s point person on microinsurance, believed that protecting consumers was the 
state’s top priority in drafting/implementing these reforms: 
Interviewer: From the state’s perspective, what do you think is the primary policy objective that 
is driving the state’s action…that kind of supersedes everything else? 
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Respondent: I think for me it’s systemic financial soundness. That’s the main objective of the 
state. Financial inclusion and the others, those are secondary; it is one of the objectives, but it is 
not superseding…[The focus] was just for more prudent financial regulation and also to focus 
more on market conduct because if you look at the form of supervision and regulation, it’s more 
prudentially based and market conduct is secondary. [But] because there were so many 
fraudulent activities, a lot of people [were] losing money. So I think they took a decision to focus 
more on market conduct, which has to be on its own (Modiba, J., FSB; Fieldwork Interview; 
10 November 2015). 
 
As discussed above, regulatory structures are bifurcated in order for the state to protect 
consumers from both prudential sources of risk, as well as from what they perceive to be 
abusive market conduct practices by informal providers. 
From this perspective, formalization is the process by which these various 
regulatory regimes are brought to bear on an informal funeral space the state perceives to 
be prudentially unsound and rife with unfair practices. Apart from standard prudential 
measures like minimum capital reserve requirements, and market conduct standards like 
licensing exams, one of the key sources of “invisible risk” for funeral insurance clients in 
South Africa is the abuse related to the manipulation of commissions and the so-called 
monetary option (which will be detailed further in Chapter 6). Katzke points out that the 
abuse is tied to how underwriting partnerships with informal intermediaries are 
structured in the first place: 
Currently, the way all these contracts, or the majority of them are set up, is that the claim will 
be paid to the intermediary, who then has the responsibility to pay it out to the [end] 
policyholder. Now, what happens in practice? In a funeral parlor environment, that funeral 
parlor is providing a funeral service. So let’s say a policyholder comes to him, submits a claim, 
and we pay out the claim, the intermediary doesn’t pay out the money. The policyholder is getting 
the funeral service conducted instead. I don’t think that’s fair (Katzke, L., KGA Life; 
Fieldwork Interview; 26 February 2016). 
 
The option to claim a cash payout is critical because the value of the in-kind services 
almost never amounts to the entitled cash value. In fact, according to current insurance 
statutes in force, there is a provision that requires insurance intermediaries to provide a 
monetary option in lieu of services. This also applies to microinsurance intermediaries. 
But because this key piece of information is not disclosed to the end-clients, they are 
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simply unaware that they are entitled to, by formal law, a cash payout. In subsequent 
chapters, I provide some more nuance to this practice of withholding the monetary 
benefit, which is, in fact, a key risk management strategy that informal funeral parlors 
employ to remain viable in a volatile, low-market environment. But it is revealing, though 
not surprising, that both state and industry see this issue from a consumer protection 
perspective. They argue that this practice constitutes an “invisible” risk to clients and 
seem to dismiss its importance for the sustainability of informal businesses.   
Absent an enforcement strategy, respondents indicated that by making end-
clients more aware of their rights (i.e. regarding their legal rights to a monetary option), 
consumer education could be used as an effective means for them to essentially protect 
themselves:  
Guys [clients] that have educated themselves…that gives them bargaining power, and so once 
they got the cash [by exercising their right to a monetary benefit] they can go scout around, look 
for the best place, at the best price (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 21 
September 2015). 
 
This type of framing has effectively equated formalization with greater levels of 
consumer protection, at least from what the state and industry consider to be 
fundamentally unfair and abusive informal providers. 
Financial Inclusion: A Two-Pronged Approach 
 
 In contrast to the FSB’s view, Rajah (National Treasury) suggests that improving 
access to financial services, i.e. financial inclusion, is the state’s superseding priority. 
Interviewer: So from the your perspective, what would you say is the state’s policy prerogative, or 
the issue that frames your approach to microinsurance? 
 
Respondent: Well, it’s access, which is a very big policy objective…the microinsurance 
framework isn’t primarily intended to formalize funeral parlors. The main focus of 
microinsurance from where I sit is to improve access. It’s going to be to lower standards, it’s 
going to be less investment type products and more risk type products…It’s to focus on a market 
that hasn’t been focused on. It’s been informal, it’s been burial societies. It’s a sector that hasn’t 
been looked at by the big players. So we are promoting it with those intentions in mind (Rajah, 
J., National Treasury; Fieldwork Interview; 9 November 2015).  
 
 128 
In its list of stated policy objectives, the microinsurance framework corroborates Rajah’s 
view by citing financial inclusion as its top objective: 
Objective #1: Extend access to a variety of good-value formal insurance products appropriate to 
the needs of low-income households, thereby supporting financial inclusion (National Treasury, 
2011; Executive Summary). 
 
If the FSB’s focus on enforcement and compliance is the stick, National Treasury’s use 
of the carrot is intended to draw informal insurance providers into the formal regulatory 
system, thereby improving access to “formal” insurance products for their low-income 
clients. In this respect, the state’s overarching financial inclusion strategy centers on 
creating and facilitating a market ecosystem that makes it easier for low-income 
intermediaries and providers to extend access to the excluded poor. In other words, 
inclusion of informal insurance providers and low-income clients/households can be 
understood as one in the same. The subsequent policy objectives stated on the 
framework reveal that the state advances this inclusion agenda through a two-pronged 
approach: 
Objective #2: Facilitate formalised insurance provision by currently informal providers and in 
the process promote the formation of regulated and well capitalised insurance providers, thereby 
supporting the development of small businesses. This balances government’s dual objectives of 
extending the scope of regulation to all financial service providers, and supporting job creation 
through economic growth by encouraging small business participation in the insurance market. 
 
Objective #3: Lower barriers to entry [for currently informal providers], which should encourage 
broader participation in the market and promote competition amongst providers, also supporting 
poverty alleviation through economic growth and job creation (National Treasury, 2011; 
Executive Summary).  
 
In this framing, the attention shifts from sanctions to incentives; improved 
access, and thus financial inclusion, is achieved by converting informal providers into 
regulated entities and by lowering the barriers to entry for already established formal 
providers. I have demonstrated that the industry’s main interest in formalization is to 
level the playing field with informal providers in terms of compliance costs. The 
incentives for informal providers to register, on the other hand, are far less clear-cut.  
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Nevertheless, the microinsurance framework does propose explicit measures to 
help ease the transition from informal to formal. This includes a grace period of three 
years from the time of registration for informal providers to be in full compliance with 
the law; the state would withhold enforcement during this period. The framework also 
recognizes that onerous FAIS requirements are inappropriate for the microinsurance 
space and thus proposes a separate fit-and-proper category be created to lower the 
requirements placed on (informal) financial service providers/intermediaries. For 
example, the reforms propose that microinsurance representatives only be required to 
demonstrate an ability to read, write and calculate as an entry level criteria, as opposed to 
the current entry level requirement that they pass a regulatory exam (see National 
Treasury, 2011; Section 2.5.1). Other support structures including broad-based consumer 
education campaigns and concessionary tax treatment were also proposed to help ease 
the formalization process. 
Notable as well is how these financial inclusion objectives are inscribed within 
the language of market development (i.e. “development of small businesses,” “job 
creation through economic growth,” “promote competition,” etc.). This aligns with the 
spirit of the Charter, which affirms that “access to first-order retail financial services is 
fundamental to BEE and to the development of the economy as a whole” (Financial 
Sector Charter, 2004: Section 8.1). An analysis of these various policy documents reveals 
the extent to which formalization efforts are at the heart of the state’s “dual objectives” 
of promoting financial inclusion and market development.  
Clashing Motivations: Trade-offs Between Consumer Protection and Financial Inclusion 
 
 The thematic analysis reveals how three broad motivations, i.e. business interests, 
consumer protection, and financial inclusion, shape the formalization process. A cursory 
reading of the microinsurance framework might suggest that these different motivations 
 130 
are in sync. However, an analysis of the interview data suggests that these objectives may 
not be harmoniously aligned, and in some cases, contradict one another.  
 For instance, FAIS regulations, like regulatory exams, designed to protect 
consumers from unscrupulous and/or unqualified financial intermediaries run the risk of 
imposing onerous requirements onto informal providers, which may have the 
unintended effect of creating unnecessary barriers to market entry, thus impeding 
financial inclusion:  
The regulations are not promoting a fair business practice particularly for those who were 
previously marginalized. Prior to the FSB introducing these regulatory exams, there were over 
23,000 independent brokerages in South Africa, but by December 2012, there were only about 
14,300 because some people failed these exams, more than five or even ten times, where each 
time you have to pay R900…Even older people who have been there for ages, some of them, 
they couldn’t cope. One guy, because of failing these exams, he committed suicide. That was in 
2012 (Nxasana, M., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 11 December 2015). 
 
Thus, while formalization is the state’s response to abusive financial practices in the 
microinsurance sphere, blanket regulations designed to protect consumers can squeeze 
out the ability of small, informal businesses to develop/compete with insurance 
companies who can afford compliance costs. This holds true, as well, for insurance 
companies who may want to expand their microinsurance operations but feel that 
regulations are being enforced unevenly. In theory, the microinsurance framework seeks 
to strike a balance. In practice, however, these underlying agendas and motivations are 
negotiated by actors and are thus subject to power dynamics. In the following section, I 
examine the ways in which the formal sector, namely, state and industry actors, deploy 
discursive and management techniques to shape the formalization process according to 
their own interests. 
Liberators and Criminals: Calibrating the Discursive Space 
 
Given South Africa’s history, broad themes of justice and equity are deeply 
embedded within the country’s everyday political and economic discourse. Even in 
otherwise tedious policy documents like the Charter, appeals to these themes are explicit; 
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calls for a “transformed” financial sector and an “equitable society” that extends access 
to financial services to an excluded group (black people) are inscribed in its preamble. As 
it relates to the microinsurance space, these moral discourses are deployed to legitimize a 
formalization agenda that aligns with the country’s broader development objectives. The 
resulting discursive framework imbues different formal and informal actors, as well as 
clients, with certain moral qualities that shape how they relate to the formalization 
process.  
‘Positive Mobilizing Narratives’: Insurance Companies as Emancipators 
 
 In South Africa, the financial inclusion debate engages with a discourse centered 
on justice. The Charter, which lays out the core principles upon which the 
microinsurance framework is based, notes the following: 
Despite significant progress since the establishment of a democratic government in 1994, South 
African society remains characterised by racially based income and social services inequalities. 
This is not only unjust, but inhibits the country’s ability to achieve its full economic potential 
(Financial Sector Charter, 2004; Preamble). 
 
The Charter acknowledges that these inequalities continue to persist in the financial 
sector, which remains predominantly informal. Formalization is thus a fundamentally just 
process that helps reverse, or at least mitigates, systemically induced inequalities. In line 
with this, insurance company representatives I interviewed would often invoke a 
language of altruism and social justice when describing their microinsurance ventures. 
The foundation market business [Old Mutual’s microinsurance division] was always there as a 
part of the market that is very price sensitive, that is in so much need of access to insurance. So 
let’s go in there and see, grow the market as we can. Our aim is not to make money, and we 
haven’t made any money. That’s not our aim. Our aim is to try and see whether or not we can 
do the right thing, bring insurance to individuals who have not had access to insurance. It’s 
definitely got a strong philanthropic view around trying to make people’s lives better (Van der 
Westhuizien, A., Old Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 28 September 2015).    
 
 Of course, insurance companies are not charities. But as corporate entities 
looking to profit in low-income markets, they often appeal to classically neoliberal tropes 
of individual/consumer choice and empowerment to describe their driving motivations 
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and strategies. This is a discursive technique long observed by microfinance scholars who 
have noted how the “positive mobilizing narratives” (Mader, 2014: p.1) of microfinance 
have been central to their legitimization (Roy, 2010; Schwittay, 2011).  
For us, it’s about equipping these people with the knowledge and the skills to be able to forward 
themselves in life and to make progress, which will never happen if we take a paternalistic 
approach. That is not our approach…We want you to be in control of your own life and your 
own destiny and we will facilitate the road to better financial wellness for you and your family in 
whatever way that might be. That’s the only way we’re going to uplift people, by empowering 
them (Kuhn, L., Metropolitan Life; Fieldwork Interview; 29 September 2015).  
 
This discursive framework thus casts insurance companies and the formal financial 
system writ large as emancipators that “democratize” access to financial services for the 
historically excluded. As will be discussed in the following section, the ways in which the 
formal system deploys technologies to selectively identify and shape insurance 
subjectivities, thereby inscribing new boundaries of inclusion/exclusion, are obscured 
from view. 
Informal or Illegal? Illegitimate Financial Service Providers 
 
 By moralizing the formal financial system as fundamentally just and 
emancipatory, the moral discursive framework is superimposed upon the (expanding) 
boundaries of the formal sector; institutions within this boundary are legitimized, while 
those that continue to reside on the outside are invalidated. While the state recognizes 
that informal funeral parlors and burial societies help fulfill unmet financial needs and are 
themselves forms of enterprise, the discourse that underpins formalization constitutes 
them as illegitimate and ultimately subject to the state’s discipline: 
They [informal microinsurance providers] are seen to be operating illegally. Remember, the 
insurance legislation [mainstream insurance law] is in place, whereby if a person conducts 
insurance business, they need to have an insurance license or alternatively they need to be 
underwritten by a licensed insurer. And they need to be registered under the FAIS legislation 
(Modiba, J., FSB; Fieldwork Interview; 10 November 2015). 
 
…an appropriate transition period will be provided during which to reach 
legitimacy…Thereafter, the enforcement drive will focus specifically on any entities that still 
choose to operate illegally, with the power to oblige them to comply or else shut them down 
(National Treasury, 2011; Section 5.3). 
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 It is worth noting that while the term “illegal” (as opposed to “informal”) has a 
strong connotation of criminality, the moral force of the prevailing discourse works to 
obfuscate any nuance between “illegal,” “unscrupulous,” “informal,” and/or 
“unregulated” entities. In use, there is a slippage between these terms, which are, in 
effect, painted with the same broad brush: 
There’s the players who are completely unregulated. They don’t believe in underwriting, they 
don’t want to be regulated and this is really the headache in the industry for both insurers and 
legal funeral parlors out there (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 21 September 
2015). 
 
It [the microinsurance space] is very fluid. It’s very rural. It’s very, very strong in the informal 
ways of doing things…it’s dealing with people who operate very differently to this traditional 
insurance company that’s governed by actuaries and legislation…Something that gets me often is 
how many unscrupulous people are in this area that just prey on these people [low-income 
clients] who trust quite easily. (Engelbrecht, C., Sanlam; Fieldwork Interview; 13 November 
2015). 
 
With this slippage, particularly between the terms “informal” and “illegal” the widespread 
abuse that is observed in the funeral insurance market is laid at the feet of informal 
operators; formalization is the remedy: 
The microinsurance regulatory framework will be implemented against the backdrop of a large 
informal market where consumer abuse is rife. As already indicated, formalisation is therefore a 
core objective of the framework (National Treasury, 2011; Executive Summary). 
 
As institutions of this formal system, insurance companies and their 
microinsurance products are considered to be, by extension, safe, trustworthy 
alternatives to the abusive practices of informal providers. Foreclosed within this framing 
is any possibility that insurance companies themselves might be a source of risk and/or 
abuse. The moral discourse legitimizes them not only as liberators but also as agents that 
further the state’s objective to protect consumers. Informal operators are illegal and 
therefore illegitimate; their identities as small businesses, social support structures, 
and/or financial service providers are dismissed or otherwise ignored.  
Discursive Links to the National Development Agenda 
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 Scholars have noted that the developmental context of post-apartheid South 
Africa is one that challenges conventional distinctions between neoliberalism and the 
welfare state (Ferguson, 2007). Though heavily interventionist in the way the state directs 
the course of development, it does so in ways that “privilege the market as a central 
driver of economic and social life” (James, 2011: p.319). Thus in this context, the state’s 
financial inclusion agenda is legitimized by a market-based rather than a rights-based 
discourse: 
Inequalities manifest themselves in the country’s financial sector. A positive and proactive 
response from the sector through the implementation of BEE will further unlock the sector’s 
potential, promote its global competitiveness, and enhance its world-class status. Equally, the 
financial stability and soundness of the financial sector and its capacity to facilitate domestic and 
international commerce is central to the successful implementation of BEE (Financial Sector 
Charter, 2004; Preamble). 
 
The microinsurance framework, which was formulated within this political economy, 
embodies and enacts the market friendly discourse that underpins South Africa’s broader 
developmental agenda. As I have demonstrated earlier, the state’s multiple motivations 
and objectives in formalizing the microinsurance market are often at odds with one 
another. Onerous consumer protection regulations run the risk of “regulating small 
businesses out of the market,” for example. But within a discursive framework that 
privileges market rationalities, these conflicting objectives are made to cohere around the 
overarching goal of market development: 
The National Treasury’s broad policy agenda rests on five pillars- financial stability, consumer 
protection, better access to financial services, improved regulatory coordination, and 
comprehensiveness [meaning that all business in the financial sector should be on the regulatory 
radar]. These goals are mutually reinforcing (National Treasury, 2011; Introduction). 
 
 Schwittay (2011: p.381) has argued that these legitimizing discourses have aligned 
the “financial inclusion assemblage”—what she defines as the collection of “subjects, 
technics, and rationalities that aim to develop poor-appropriate financial products and 
services”—with the needs and problems of the target population. Moreover, these 
discourses have also “constituted the poor as prudent fiscal subjects” (ibid.: p. 385). The 
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burden to address and mitigate risk is removed from the structures and institutions that 
produce risk, and is displaced onto the individual: 
Consumerism has taken off in South Africa…we do a lot of financial empowerment in the 
process because ultimately it’s about allowing people and empowering people to make better 
financial decisions (Kuhn, L., Metropolitan Life; Fieldwork Interview; 29 September 2015).  
 
You should have the private sector…[this country] has a very nonchalant attitude toward poor 
people. There is no real recourse for them if something goes wrong, they have to go to the 
government. Whereas if there are private solutions, then they can end up protecting 
themselves…when you start teaching people to ask the right questions, they start protecting 
themselves (Ways, C., Forum for Assistance Business (FAB); Fieldwork Interview; 5 
November 2015). 
 
The discursive framework aligns microinsurance formalization with a national 
development agenda that privileges and valorizes formal market institutions. By the same 
token, many of the informal businesses that have historically serviced this space and 
engage in practices that are deemed by formal actors as “illegal” and/or “abusive” (but 
are actually essential survival strategies), are delegitimized as being opposed to, not just 
outside of, the formal financial system. Moreover, clients are transformed within this 
framework from rights-bearers to risk-bearers (Maurer, 1999), who should be 
empowered as individuals, and through improved access to the market, to address their 
own risk management needs. As I will show below, the discursive agenda that underpins 
microinsurance formalization in South Africa works hand-in-hand with management and 
marketing technologies to constitute these “ideal” insurance subjectivities.  
Management Technologies: Finding and Shaping the Ideal Insurance Subject 
 
Grafting onto the Informal Economy: Formalization through Market Access 
 
 Despite the delay in implementation of the microinsurance framework, insurance 
companies have still found ways to conduct their business in low-income markets: 
Yes, progress sooner would have been great but if you have a look at the current legislation, 
barring the concessions and the market insurance section, the industry can sell the 
products…Industry has been saying, ‘We need the bill to do it, we need the bill to do it!’ but 
that’s not 100% true. Because they can do it (Rajah, J., National Treasury; Fieldwork 
Interview; 9 November 2015). 
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They have managed to do so by deploying a range of techniques, chief among them, the 
forging of institutional partnerships, including formal-informal partnerships. While I 
analyze these partnerships in more depth in Chapter 6, I turn to them briefly now to 
introduce these partnerships as institutional mechanisms that enable access into 
unregulated spaces. 
 The expansion of microinsurance in South Africa is rooted in its first, and 
perhaps most significant, innovation: group-based underwriting. Thanks in large part to 
an active and robust informal institutional environment, insurance companies have been 
able to underwrite pre-established groups, i.e. funeral parlors, burial societies, churches, 
and cooperatives, effectively including their members into formal insurance markets. 
Insurance companies have also partnered with other formal businesses that have 
established deep roots in low-income markets, such as popular retailers like Shoprite and 
Pep.  
By partnering with informal institutions as well as businesses that cater to low-
income clients, insurance companies have essentially grafted their operation onto existing 
(informal) infrastructures to lower their distribution costs. These cost savings are what 
enables premiums to be lowered enough to sustain operations in a highly price sensitive 
microinsurance market. This grafting process is far from straightforward and requires 
intensive negotiation: 
Interviewer: What have been some of the difficulties in trying to gain access through these 
community-based structures? 
 
Respondent: Very difficult, it’s a very lengthy process…When you’re dealing with any of these 
traditional structures, you have to have a very clear understanding that the elders still make the 
final call. The shortest [time for negotiation] is probably 4-5 months from the first time that you 
see a community leader until you sign them up to get the scheme underwritten. You have to go 
through all of the layers, all of the protocols, all the leaders who then have to speak to the elders. 
It’s very lengthy. It’s not a quick sell (Van der Westhuizien, A., Old Mutual; Fieldwork 
Interview; 28 September 2015). 
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Since state regulators cannot see informal operators the way they do insurance 
companies, the linkages created by formal-informal partnerships are effectively used as 
conduits through which state processes of formalization (i.e. enforcement, consumer 
protections, etc.) are channeled: 
One of the major concerns that we have is that because the FSB has been unable to find the 
right model themselves to regulate these entities [informal operators], they are trying to do so 
through the insurers because we are registered…Insurers are fed up with being held to task or 
being hauled over the coals (Van der Westhuizen, A., Old Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 28 
September 2015).  
 
In practice, this means that insurance companies can be held liable for doing business 
with unlicensed intermediaries; this is one of the only mechanisms through which the 
FSB can compel informal players to formally register their operations.  
In recent years, insurance companies have explored other partnership models, 
including with mobile network operators (MNOs), as a way to reach low-income clients 
more directly. In these mobile insurance (m-insurance) ventures, defined as insurance 
sold through and with MNOs (Leach et al., 2015), traditional intermediaries like burial 
societies and funeral parlors are replaced by the MNO. The appeal of this distribution 
model is clear: not only can insurance companies reach low-income clients directly and 
en masse, but by overlaying their operations upon a mobile infrastructure that has made 
significant inroads into low-income market spaces, insurers are able to generate efficiency 
gains, which are built into the premium (Téllez, 2012). Despite these competitive price 
points, however, m-insurance products have thus far failed to achieve scale. The reasons 
for this failure will be explored more in Chapter 7, but for the purposes of the current 
discussion, corporate investment into m-insurance ventures highlights the on-going 
efforts of insurance companies to graft their operations onto existing infrastructures of 
BoP markets. 
Market Segmentation: Finding Ideal Clients and Ideal Risk 
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 Although group-based microinsurance models provide an entryway into low-
income markets, they typically yield low profit margins; relationships with intermediaries 
can also be difficult to negotiate and maintain. An ideal course for insurance companies, 
then, would be to circumvent these intermediaries altogether to reach clients directly, the 
so-called “holy grail” of microinsurance:  
The Holy Grail around microinsurance [are] advice-based models. To do advice-based models is 
extremely high cost because of the regulations and the high salaries of the FAIS-qualified 
agents. So it’s almost impossible in South Africa to do cost-effective advice-based models 
(Technology Service Provider; Fieldwork Interview; 10 February 2016). 
 
As the respondent alludes to above, such direct retail (individual policy) models are more 
expensive relative to group-based schemes. In order to sustain them, insurance 
companies have to build risk pools that are large and stable enough to cross-subsidize the 
riskiest clients. Microinsurers are thus highly incentivized to identify and sell policies to 
“ideal” clients who pay their premiums regularly in order to sustain these pools. 
 To first identify these clients, insurance companies rely on a widely used market 
research tool called the Living Standards Measure (LSM) published by the South African 
Audience Research Foundation (SAARF).25 The LSM tool segments the market into 10 
categories (10 being highest, 1 being lowest) according to certain indicators such as levels 
of urbanization, access to certain service provisions (e.g. running water), and ownership 
over certain assets (e.g. cars, houses, etc.) that are designed to measure living standards.26  
 Insurance companies use this tool to define their market, target their marketing 
strategies, and to design products appropriately. As Rangan et al. (2011) argue, the BoP is 
not a monolith, and must be delineated strategically (in their example, low-income vs. 
subsistence vs. extremely poor), in order to develop a nuanced portrait of the different 
needs and potential resources of each market segment; segmentation can often mean the 
                                               
25 http://www.saarf.co.za/lsm/lsms.asp 
26 For example, an LSM-1 household is understood to live in a traditional hut located in a rural/peri-urban location. 
They have minimal access to services and minimal ownership of durable goods.
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difference between the success or failure of a BoP venture. Empirically speaking, 
knowing into which LSM categories insurance companies invest their microinsurance 
products is a useful way to understand what they might consider to be an ideal type of 
client. By extension, the market segments that fall short of this “ideal” threshold reveal 
the limits of financial inclusion and microinsurance as a risk management tool for the 
poor. 
Market segmentation also provides a colorful illustration of the type of living 
standards these ideal microinsurance clients might enjoy. For instance, KGA Life, which 
has a small direct retail division that supplements their main group-based policy business, 
has streamlined their operations to get as far down the LSM scale as possible: 
We’re probably looking at LSM market 4-7. That’s not to say we discount LSM 1-3, but our 
research has shown that 1-3, their household income really is low. So typically what they would 
do there is to insure themselves in a more informal way. So that’s not to say we discount them, 
but we really are looking for the guys [clients] with the regular sort of income, more in the urban 
areas (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 21 September 2015). 
 
To give a general picture of KGA’s target microinsurance client, then, an LSM-5 
household is understood to have an average monthly income of R4,550, reside in a small 
“matchbox” house, have access to electricity, water on the premises, and a flush toilet 
outside, and own a TV set, radio, stove and a fridge. Similarly, the microinsurance 
division at Metropolitan Life, which is one of South Africa’s largest insurance companies, 
targets a slightly higher LSM segment (LSM 5-8). According to sales agent Lyndwill 
Kuhn, their approach is more explicit on the types of microinsurance clients they are 
looking for: 
The main focus for my team is to get as many of our advisors into work sites. Now, the moment 
you restrict yourself to work sites, obviously it then means you exclude a big portion of your 
target market because a large portion of the South African population is either informally 
employed or unemployed and many of them rely on state allowances… [But] work sites are 
ideal because you’ve got people with regular income every month which makes it more likely they 
can afford insurance and that they will pay diligently…If you want people to pay, find people 
who are salaried (Kuhn, L., Metropolitan Life; Fieldwork Interview; 29 September 2015). 
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 Market technologies like the LSM segmentation tool, function primarily to guide 
investment decisions, but they also “produce the poor as knowable market subjects” 
(Dolan and Roll, 2013: p.129). In this case, the LSM helps constitute the ideal 
microinsurance client as an urban/peri-urban based wage earner with a regular income 
drawn from the formal sector. In contrast, LSM 1-3 clients are identified as poor, rural 
residents who rely on irregular sources of income and are likely to adversely impact 
churn rates for the insurer. Thus, while microinsurance systems are celebrated as a 
possible means through which the poor can be financially included, they serve instead to 
reify the line between the insurable and uninsurable poor (see Dolan and Rajak, 2016).  
 What this also reveals is the extent to which risk—more precisely, the type of risk 
that microinsurance products are well suited to address—is constructed by formal 
insurers who invariably invest in products—and market segments—that are profitable in 
the long term. As Siegel et al. (2001: p.9) conclude, “the viability of insurance depends 
critically on the characteristics of the risk.” Non-ideal risks such as epidemics and other 
catastrophic forms of risk are outside the purview of these characteristics. Similarly, 
those clients who are identified to be on the lower end of the LSM scale face a greater 
level of risk due to the conditions of their extreme poverty, which makes it more unlikely 
for insurance companies to extend products that meaningfully address the risks they 
might face. I argue, then, that insurers offer a circumscribed risk management solution 
that addresses carefully constructed forms of risk. And even then, these products are 
primarily targeted toward ideal clients who must continue to perform as ideal clients if 
they wish to reap the benefits of formal insurance. 
Producing Ideal Clients: Disciplining Techniques 
 
 Insurance companies not only employ market technologies to target the “right” 
type of clients, they utilize them as disciplining techniques in order to shape ideal 
insurance subjectivities. The extent to which clients are already integrated into the formal 
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sector matters in terms of the technologies and techniques employed. For clients who 
own a bank account and/or are employed in the formal sector, insurers typically collect 
premiums through a standing debit order at the client’s bank, or in more aggressive 
cases, through a payroll deduction in which the employer deducts policy premiums 
automatically for payment to the insurer.27 On the other hand, clients who are 
disconnected from the formal sector pose a particular sort of challenge for insurance 
companies, who must deploy different techniques: 
The ability to collect [premiums] is one of our biggest challenges. Now, when you put someone 
into a work site, it becomes much easier to collect. But when somebody is not in a work site, it 
becomes exponentially more difficult to reliably collect…We use mobile technology to sell, but 
maybe even more so, to communicate and collect, because it’s going to be cheaper, you’re going to 
be able to interact with them [clients] more regularly and more effectively (Kuhn, L., 
Metropolitan Life; Fieldwork Interview; 29 September 2015). 
 
Since the microinsurance market is typically a low-tech environment, insurance 
companies use low-tech methods (e.g. monthly SMS reminders), which are nevertheless 
effective in encouraging/reinforcing certain client behaviors that are amenable to 
conventional insurance practice, namely, the regular payment of premiums (Téllez, 2012; 
Prashad et al., 2013).  
 At a market-wide scale, however, consumer education is used as the primary 
means by which the client base is disciplined. Here, it is useful to understand consumer 
education through a Foucauldian lens, that is, as a governmental technique that aims to 
affect/guide the conduct of people, i.e. the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 1982: p. 
341). Understood in this way, the efforts of formal stakeholders like insurance companies 
to “educate” consumers are, in effect, techniques to shape clients who will adopt and 
self-regulate “good” financial behavior. Individual companies like KGA Life thus have 
an incentive to invest in consumer education as good business practice: 
                                               
27 These are known in South Africa as “emoluments attachment” or “garnishee” orders. To help curb abuse and 
crippling levels of indebtedness in low-income credit markets, the Constitutional Court ruled in September 2016 that 
stronger judicial oversight is now required to carry on with garnishee order. It remains to be seen how this ruling will 
affect the microinsurance industry (See Neves and James’s 2017 article: South Africa’s social grants: Busting the myth about 
financial inclusion). 
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Our marketing approach on the radio is to talk less about the product… and talk more about 
funeral insurance and what you should be looking at if you’re a policyholder…What we’re 
trying to do is empower them with knowledge about the insurance and then tell them that they 
shouldn’t be afraid to go to wherever they are and ask these questions and get answers and if 
they’re not getting satisfactory answers, then well, here’s a trusted viable solution in KGA 
(Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 21 September 2015). 
 
Moreover, section 8.4 of the Financial Sector Charter commits all South African 
financial institutions to annually invest a minimum of 0.2% post tax operating profits to 
consumer education. This fund, which is managed by the FSB, supports nation-wide 
financial education programs and publications. One key publication, for example, is the 
“Make the Most of Your Money” booklet, which is published in all the major South 
African languages. Designed as a remedial, easy-to-read comic book, it provides the basic 
foundations of personal finance such as creating and maintaining a budget, opening a 
bank account, saving for retirement, and buying insurance (See Appendix J). As 
rudimentary as such a publication might seem, the head of the FSB’s consumer 
education department, Alastair Petersen suggests that, rather than remediation, such an 
approach seeks to facilitate a paradigm shift in thinking: 
I know people tend to think of financial literacy or wellness purely in terms of formal financial 
products. We’ve got a lot of informal financial products in South Africa. So the way people 
think about money here is maybe different than the European way of thinking and that needs to 
be brought into the debate around financial education…My goal now is to get to that point 
where I’m not changing human behavior, but the way that they’re thinking (Petersen, A., FSB; 
Fieldwork Interview; 10 November 2015). 
 
Consumer education is thus a coordinated effort between state and industry to produce 
“empowered” clients whose thinking is made compatible with the logical frameworks of 
the formal financial system.  
 By the same token, efforts to educate consumers about the benefits of formal 
financial products like microinsurance entail strategies to simultaneously delegitimize 
informal modes of financial practice. The insurance section of the comic booklet, for 
instance, includes a not-so-subtle warning for clients to avoid unregistered funeral 
insurers/parlors who can’t produce a license issued by the FSB (See Appendix J). Formal 
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insurers like KGA Life have a direct financial stake in such efforts as they face 
competition from informal insurers who misrepresent themselves in the market (as 
formally registered entities) and are able to undercut them in prices. Their radio 
marketing campaign can then be understood, not only as an effort to discipline the 
consumer through education, but also as a delegitimization strategy aimed at their 
competitors: 
Everything KGA Life does has to do with consumer education. We are looking for those clients 
that have been burned in the past by these informal operators. We want them to know that 
there is a difference between us and them, but it is difficult because sometimes they [the informal 
insurers] will say they are underwritten by KGA, you see? They will claim they are formally 
registered. So our radio campaign will educate the client to ask for a registration number. But 
unless they know to ask, they won’t (Nxasana, M., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 15 
October 2015).  
 
Beyond consumer education, the very nature of commodifying risk through the 
sale of insurance products requires that a set of techniques and technologies be instituted 
to discipline clients into ideal insurance subjectivities. Following Callon and Muniesa’s 
(2005: p.1245) rendering of markets as “calculative collective device[s] for the evaluation 
of goods,” I argue that both actuarial logics/practices and tangible objects such as 
insurance contracts, brick-and-mortar insurance buildings, and sales agents, operate as 
“material devices [that] frame the world of possible choices” (ibid.: p.1235) and play key 
roles in establishing a calculable value, i.e. price, to the insurance exchange.  
In particular, the contract quite literally defines/identifies the risk, establishes the 
terms and conditions that bind the exchange between the insurer and the client, and lays 
out, in detail, the expected behavior of the client in order to maintain coverage (i.e. 
making regular premium payments at a defined rate and interval): 
It is all right there in the contract. Clients will complain, ‘Why is this cancelled, where is my 
money?’ But we will just show them that they signed this contract, which includes all the rules. 
We keep track of the payments on our computer so it’s very clear (Zenzile, KGA Life; 
Fieldwork Interview; 22 October 2015). 
 
 144 
The sanction, of course, for violating the terms of this contract, is the cancellation of 
coverage and a re-exposure to the defined risk. The legibility of these insurance contracts 
to their mostly financially illiterate clients is such that sales agents like Zenzile have to 
“translate” between formal and informal financial spheres/rationalities; they thus have 
key roles to play in disciplining clients to uphold their end of the contract. I will discuss 
the sales agents’ disciplining techniques in further detail in Chapter 7, where I take a 
closer look at the work of intermediaries/mediators along the microinsurance value 
chain. 
Conclusion 
 
 The aim of this chapter was to shed light on how formal institutions influence 
and/or shape the predominantly informal microinsurance market in South Africa. The 
drive to formalize—the “big squeeze” as it was often referred—and the resulting 
microinsurance framework policy document, provided a unique empirical setting to study 
the processes involved, despite the fact that official enactment of the proposed reforms 
had come to a standstill at the time of my fieldwork. Through thematic analysis of 
documents and interview data as well as an analysis of the prevailing discourse, I engaged 
with two broad questions that framed my inquiry: 1) What are the underlying motives 
that drive and shape the process of formalization? 2) How is formalization enacted in 
practice? 
 While informal actors like burial societies and funeral parlors were nominally 
included in the consultations over the microinsurance framework, state and industry 
actors dominated the process. The analysis revealed that three broad motivations framed 
their engagement. First, insurance companies approached formalization as an 
opportunity to “level the playing field” with informal providers who are seen as 
opportunistically exploiting the lack of regulatory enforcement to undercut compliant 
businesses. There is some dissonance to the idea that an insurance company with clear 
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competitive advantages in terms of resources and expertise could perceive themselves at 
a disadvantage to their informal counterparts. And while it must be acknowledged that 
informal operators do engage in these practices (mostly as a survival strategy), industry’s 
interest in formalization can reasonably be read as a calculated strategy to gain a further 
edge on their competition in the low-income market.  
Second, the state equates formalization with consumer protection. Formalization 
is a way for the state to “see” unregulated providers who abuse clients in order to then 
enforce protective regulation. I found that while the core elements of the microinsurance 
framework have yet to be implemented, the state channels its formalization efforts 
through insurers and administrators, who have managed to enter into partnerships with 
informal entities. It is worth noting that what is missing from this framing are the ways in 
which formal providers can also engage in practices that undermine consumer 
protection. This issue will be explored further in subsequent chapters, particularly 
Chapter 8. 
Finally, the microinsurance framework aims to lower barriers to entry for both 
formal and informal microinsurance providers to enter into an evenly regulated formal 
market, thereby boosting access to high-quality financial services, i.e. financial inclusion. 
Recognizing that informal providers currently service much of the financially excluded 
population, the state has made the incorporation of these providers into the formal 
regulatory system a core part of its financial inclusion agenda. In the microinsurance 
sphere, concessions like lowered capital reserve requirements, relaxed “fit-and-proper” 
criteria, and a lighter tax dispensation are strategies to on-ramp informal providers into 
the regulatory fold. 
 By clarifying these underlying objectives, it becomes possible to see not only who 
is driving the formalization process, but also whose interests are being served. These 
competing interests, as I have demonstrated, do produce trade-offs, which have to be 
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negotiated (almost exclusively by state and industry actors). This calls for an analysis that 
accounts for the power relationships that structure these negotiations and the broader 
interactions between formal and informal actors/institutions, a theme that I take up in 
more depth in the following chapter(s). But in understanding the ways formal 
institutions, namely insurance companies, exert their power, this chapter examined how 
discourse and management technologies were deployed to constitute a market space that 
was more amenable to their interventions. 
 I highlighted, for example, how the discursive framework worked to assign moral 
qualities to different actors (i.e. unregulated providers as “illegal” and/or “abusive,” vs. 
formal insurers as “safe” and “reliable) and aligned microinsurance formalization with 
South Africa’s broader market-led development agenda. Thus, the operant discourses 
serve to simultaneously enact and legitimize microinsurance formalization, while 
delegitimizing informal institutions. This discursive framework works hand-in-hand with 
managerial techniques and technologies that insurance companies have used to shape 
this space. Innovative institutional partnerships, particularly group-based underwriting 
and m-insurance ventures, have enabled insurance companies to penetrate and 
restructure this space, even as the state’s regulatory reforms have stalled.  
Moreover, following Dolan and Roll (2013: p.129) who argued that 
“management techniques, practices, tools, and infrastructures…bring into being the 
markets of inclusive business,” I demonstrated how insurance companies use tools like 
market segmentation (i.e. Living Standards Measure) to identify and differentiate between 
“ideal” and uninsurable clients, thereby producing more selective boundaries of inclusion 
rather than expanding access across the board. Actuarial logics and tangible objects like 
insurance contracts—what Callon and Muniesa (2005) refer to as “material devices”—are 
used to structure the terms of exchange between insurer and informal provider/client 
and are key reference points that guide the disciplining of insurance subjectivities. 
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Through consumer education campaigns, state and industry actors also exert a 
governmental force on clients in the hopes that they will adopt behaviors that essentially 
self-enforce “good” financial practice, which includes fully buying-in to insurance 
practices and rationalities.  
While I have demonstrated in this chapter that “formal” actors employ these 
discourses and techniques to shape the microinsurance space in their favor, I have 
mostly shied away from drawing any concrete conclusions regarding outcomes. In the 
next chapter, I explore how these various techniques, rules, discourses, and practices—
collectively constituted as formal institutions—interact with the informal institutions 
examined in Chapter 4. As much as formal institutions work to shape this market, they 
do not proceed deterministically. Rather, they interact with informal infrastructures in 
complex ways to produce a formal-informal institutional arrangement that ultimately 
shapes the course of welfare/risk outcomes.  
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6—Hybrid risk management institutions: Formal and informal 
institutional dynamics and change 
 
For the sake of analysis, I have examined informal and formal risk management 
institutions separately in order to trace their respective origins and development over 
time. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated how informal funeral insurance institutions, which 
were embodied in organizational forms like burial societies and funeral parlors, grew out 
of cultural practices grounded in indigenous beliefs about death, ancestors, and kinship. 
Chapter 5 documented the efforts of both state and industry to formalize the funeral 
insurance market. Even though efforts to formalize the market through state regulations 
have stalled, insurance companies have nevertheless employed a range of discursive and 
managerial techniques to penetrate and shape the informal space—a sort of 
formalization through the back door. 
Building on these insights, this chapter examines the ways in which formal (state 
and industry) and informal institutions interact to regulate microinsurance providers and 
clients. Reflecting on the formalization process, Martin Scheepers, a spokesperson for 
the Association for Savings and Investment South Africa (ASISA)—the long term 
insurance industry’s representative lobby—acknowledges that there are limits to the 
state’s ability to fully formalize this space: 
The intentional goal is not to completely stop or cease or takeover the informal market. Contrary 
to that, it’s actually looking at how can the formal market better work with the informal 
market. Because the hope and prayer of ‘Oh, let’s completely clean up this informal market and 
make it formal…’ It’s not going to work, like I said, because you’ve got this cultural, religious 
history specific to South Africa. So it’s really about understanding: A) That the informal 
market is not going anywhere and B) How the formal market can work better with them 
(Scheepers, M., ASISA; Fieldwork Interview; 12 October 2015). 
 
What his comment signals is the need to dispense with any expectations out of 
modernization theory that formal institutions/practices will eventually replace informal 
ones. Instead, the new development reality is one in which the tensions, ambiguities, and 
complementarities produced by formal-informal interactions are in constant states of 
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negotiation and adjustment. What is the nature of this interaction? What are “the actual 
rules being followed” (O’Donnell, 1996: p.10) versus those that exist merely on paper? 
And what are the mechanisms and pathways through which institutional change is 
induced? 
 As institutional scholars have long noted, explaining how or why institutions 
emerge, interact, and change is fraught with empirical difficulties (Zenger et al., 2000; 
Helmke and Levitsky, 2003; Rodrik, 2004; Williamson, 2009). Much of the work done in 
this area has either been theoretical or has taken an in-depth/comparative case study 
approach that has examined institutions contextually (see Carey, 2000; Lauth, 2000; 
Helmky and Levitsky, 2006). Building on existing institutional theory, this chapter aims 
to contribute to this case study literature by providing a more ethnographic examination 
of the institutional arrangements that underpin South Africa’s microinsurance market. I 
focus the analysis on two main areas: 1) The ways in which formal and informal 
economic institutions interact in the South African microinsurance space; and 2) How 
formal and informal institutions change as a result of this interaction. 
 The analysis concludes that because the state’s regulatory authority and 
effectiveness is limited in the microinsurance sector, insurance companies’ engagements 
with organizations like burial societies and funeral parlors have resulted in uneven 
institutional outcomes. In situations in which insurance companies are able to effectively 
map their operations onto informal infrastructures, formal and informal institutions can 
complement one another, which enhances the effectiveness of microinsurance 
operations. On the other hand, when insurance companies are unable to exert leverage 
within a partnership, informal institutions can undermine the effectiveness of formal 
institutions insofar as they present a competing regulatory regime. Thus, in the absence 
of evenly enforced state-based regulations, I find that the effectiveness of hybrid (formal-
informal) institutions depends on the relational dynamics embedded within particular 
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institutional arrangements. Following Helmke and Levitsky (2006), I argue that the 
effectiveness of formal institutions, as well as the compatibility of underlying institutional 
goals, helps to determine the ways in which formal and informal institutions interact. 
 This chapter will also explore the vectors of institutional change. Many burial 
societies and funeral parlors undergo fundamental changes when they partner with 
insurance companies. As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, it is in the interest of 
insurance companies (and the state) to partner with stable, predictable entities; a variety 
of disciplining techniques (e.g. contracts, trainings, etc.) are employed to 
“professionalize” and/or “formalize” informal partners. As a result, end-clients 
increasingly experience a shift in institutional logic, from one based upon the principles 
of solidarity/reciprocity to one steeped in the language of actuarial logics and business 
efficiency.  
But the analysis also concludes that the direction of institutional change flows 
both ways. Recognizing that traditional insurance legislation is ineffective and/or 
unfeasible in microinsurance markets, insurance companies have had to innovate and 
adapt their techniques in order to better align with informal institutional structures. In 
many cases, this has entailed mirroring their operations to reflect the ways burial 
societies/funeral parlors typically engage their members. Understanding that institutional 
change flows in both directions helps to re-frame institutional interaction as a dynamic 
negotiation shaped by power relations, rather than one that is engineered seamlessly 
from the top-down. 
Institutional Interaction and Change: Reviewing and Applying Theoretical 
Models 
 
Theorizing Formal and Informal Institutional Interaction 
 
 As institutional scholars have argued, in order to fully understand the relationship 
between institutions and economic/development outcomes, empirical frameworks must 
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account for the role of informal institutions in shaping formal ones (Helmkey and 
Levitsky, 2006; Boettke et al., 2008; Williamson, 2009; and Casson et al., 2010). 
Comparative institutional analyses have demonstrated that informal institutions play key 
complementary roles in allowing formal institutions to function more efficiently or 
effectively (Platteau, 2000; Aoki, 2001; and North, 2005). Casson et al. (2010: p.137) 
argue that the moral and behavioral norms that are embedded in informal institutions 
(e.g. religion and caste) “determine the quality and sustainability of formal 
institutions…and the rules and regulations governing economic activity.” Moreover, 
Boettke et al. (2008) advance the idea of “institutional stickiness” to describe how for 
formal institutions to be effective, they must map onto existing informal institutions. 
 In Helmke and Levitksy’s (2006) work, which focuses on informal political 
institutions, they make an important distinction between informal institutions that have 
either convergent or divergent goals/outcomes with the formal institutions they interact 
with. In their typological framework, informal institutions complement effective formal 
institutions when their underlying goals are compatible (see Figure 5).  
  
 
“Complementary informal institutions ‘fill the gaps’ left by formal institutions—
addressing problems or contingencies that are not explicitly dealt with in the formal 
rules—without violating the overarching formal rules” (Helmke and Levitsky, 2003 p.11). 
Under these conditions, informal institutions enhance the effective operation of formal 
Figure 5- Helmke and Levitsky (2006)- Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America 
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institutions. If, on the other hand, informal institutions have conflicting goals with 
effective formal institutions, they are said to be accommodating. Accommodating 
interactions arise when formal institutions that lead to undesired outcomes cannot be 
changed or broken. In these situations, informal institutions may violate the spirit, rather 
than letter, of the law in order to mitigate the effects of or circumvent formal rules. 
While they don’t enhance the effectiveness of formal institutions like complementary 
institutions do, they help maintain their stability by reducing the desire/need for change 
(ibid.). 
 Unsurprisingly, in contexts in which formal institutions are weak/ineffective, 
informal institutions take a more central and prominent role. If the underlying goals are 
compatible, informal institutions can substitute for formal ones; they can facilitate the 
realization of intended outcomes even if they undermine/contradict formal institutions. 
If, on the other hand, the goals of informal institutions conflict with ineffective formal 
institutions, it is anticipated that they will compete with one another: “Competing 
informal institutions structure actors’ incentives in ways that are incompatible with the 
formal rules. To follow one rule, actors must violate another” (ibid.: p.13). For example, 
scholars of legal pluralism—the term used to describe the existence of multiple operant 
legal systems within a given social field—has shown how in colonial settings, the 
imposition of European common law upon indigenous governance systems created a 
complex plurality of legal orders (Hooker, 1975; Merry, 1998; Von Benda-Beckmann, 
2002). In such settings, local people’s fidelity to indigenous law often meant that they 
were violating “official” colonial law, thereby entrenching competing institutional 
systems. 
Theorizing Institutional Change 
 
 While useful in clarifying the different modes of interaction between formal and 
informal institutions, as well as some of the underlying conditions that help determine 
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these modes, Helmke and Levitsky’s framework lends itself toward a more static 
institutional perspective. And though they acknowledge that institutions are dynamic, not 
static, their framework sheds little light on the processes/mechanisms of institutional 
change. Tracking the source and pathways of institutional change is complicated by the 
fact that formal and informal institutions are comprised of different characteristics. 
While formal institutions are relatively easy to identify by virtue of the fact that the 
“official” rules (and rule-makers) are typically a matter of public record, informal 
institutions are much harder to track because they emerge out of a context-specific 
cultural history.  
 North (1990) points to the underlying incentives between economic/political 
actors—a change in “relative prices”—as key to understanding the process of 
institutional change. Actors/parties are in some cases incentivized to restructure the 
“hierarchy of rules” to improve their bargaining positions. As a result, over time, formal 
rules, and even certain customs and traditions, may slowly be eroded and/or replaced. 
Thus, in this formulation, individuals are primarily responsible for inducing change.  
In addition to actors and their underlying incentives, other sources of 
institutional change warrant attention. If, for example, informal institutions are created 
by and embedded within formal structures, changes to the design of formal institutions 
may change underlying incentives enough to induce change in informal institutions. Not 
only can changes to the design of formal institutions induce change, a strengthening of 
the effectiveness of formal institutions can also alter informal institutions, e.g. if the state 
decides to enforce certain regulations more strictly than they had before (see Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2003). Other sources of change are exogenous to formal-informal institutional 
arrangements such as changes in societal/cultural attitudes or values (North, 1990) and 
changes to the status quo, which might lead to a re-distribution of power and resources 
(Knight, 1992). Since these sources tend to be rooted in socio-cultural norms and 
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traditions, change comes slowly for the most part, though as Mackie (1996) found in the 
case of foot-binding traditions in China, widely shared cultural norms can change or 
“tip” relatively rapidly. 
 These perspectives are primarily concerned with how alterations to formal 
institutions lead to changes in informal institutions. But as Casson et al. (2010) point out, 
it is also important to account for the ways in which informal, social institutions like 
tribal/kinship structures, gender, caste, and religion shape formal ones; far less attention 
has focused on this reverse relationship by comparison (see OECD, 2007; Asadullah and 
Chaudhury, 2010; Crost and Kambhampati, 2010; Granville and Leonard, 2010; Harriss-
White, 2010; and Johnson, 2013 for a few notable exceptions). In light of this, the 
remainder of the chapter will apply these theoretical insights to understand how 
institutions interact and will analyze institutional change from both vantage points—as 
formal institutions affecting informal ones, and vice versa.   
Institutional Interaction and Change in South African Microinsurance Markets 
 
 By most measures, South Africa is reputed to have strong governance and 
economic institutions relative to other developing and Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries. According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators28 (based on 
the work of Kaufmann et al. [2009]), South Africa’s political institutions score in the 50-
75th percentile compared to all other countries and rank among the highest in SSA 
(alongside Botswana). In particular, measures of government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and rule of law placed South Africa in the 60-65th percentile relative to worldwide 
averages, while the bulk of SSA resides in the 25-30th percentile. South Africa’s economy 
is also highly formalized. Particularly in an SSA context in which informal employment 
accounts for a significant percentage of total employment (informal employment is 
estimated to comprise 66% of all non-agricultural employment in SSA [Vanek et al., 
                                               
28 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
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2014]), South Africa’s informal employment rate is much lower (22% of non-agricultural 
employment).29 These statistical figures support the view that the South African context 
is one in which formal institutions are generally strong and effective. 
 This holds true for the country’s insurance sector, which is highly capitalized and 
well regulated (see PWC’s 2016 South African insurance industry analysis).30 Adapting 
Helmke and Levitsky’s framework, then, my analysis might anticipate that formal and 
informal institutions would complement one another when their goals are compatible, 
while informal institutions would accommodate formal institutions when their goals 
diverge. However, in the context of South Africa’s microinsurance market, the picture 
that emerges is far less straightforward. As discussed at length in Chapter 5, efforts to 
formalize the funeral insurance market in South Africa through regulatory reform have 
been largely ineffective to date. In the absence of tailored microinsurance legislation, the 
state regulator is confronted by a challenging task. As insurance companies enter 
unregulated territory, the state is mandated to enforce insurance law currently on the 
books, regardless of its suitability to the low-income market. But as presently constituted, 
the Financial Services Board (FSB), which is the state body charged with enforcing these 
regulations, lacks the capacity to do so:  
 
The informal market sector is huge, massive. It’s a case of how many staff members does the 
FSB have? Can we in the industry really expect the regulator to be on it all the time? The FSB 
has so much other stuff to deal with as well. That’s no excuse for them not to do their work, 
absolutely. But it’s also understanding that the regulatory mandate is so big, and it’s going to get 
bigger with Twin Peaks…it may come across as they’re not doing their job, but it’s just a 
matter of capacity and workforce (Scheepers, M., ASISA; Fieldwork Notes; 12 October 
2015). 
 
In terms of the FAIS [Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services] Act, the informal 
funeral parlors [that offer insurance] were supposed to be underwritten by an insurer. They [the 
FSB] are failing to enforce that because there are still thousands of funeral parlors who are not 
underwritten by any insurer. The law enforcement by the FSB, I’ll say that’s where they are 
failing. They will only come in when there is a complaint (Nxasana, M., KGA Life; 
Fieldwork Interview; 11 December 2015). 
                                               
29 http://www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/lang--en/index.htm 
30 http://www.pwc.co.za/insurance 
 156 
 
Due to this lack of enforcement capacity, the state must rely on informal 
providers and intermediaries to register and comply with regulations of their own accord. 
As Anna van der Westhuizen, an insurance executive with Old Mutual, argued, the state 
provides no real incentives for informal providers to agree to comply with formal law:  
Everybody understands what the stick is but nobody sees the carrot. Because now you’re asking 
an entity that has been there pretty much before any of us existed, it’s been passed down from 
generation to generation, now you’re asking them to go ahead and register, pay a fee, get an 
actuarial line of products, do accounting practices, do reports once a month…you’re asking them 
to pay money and do stuff, but what’s the carrot? What is in it for them? If you currently 
cannot find them, why would they just pop up on your radar? (Van der Westhuizien, A., Old 
Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 28 September 2015) 
 
As I pointed out in Chapter 5, the state struggles to “see” informal providers the way 
they do insurance companies. In many cases, the state essentially tries to outsource its 
enforcement responsibilities to insurance companies who are in closer contact with these 
informal entities. What has resulted, according to John Van Rooyen, a funeral insurance 
administrator, is an uneven regulatory environment in which some actors are regulated 
more stringently than others:   
The regulatory authority is becoming more arbitrary…Depending on who you’re dealing with 
will tell you what kind of deal you’re going to get…To have an arbitrary and subjective 
decision-making process is very concerning to me. It leads to a sense of unease (Van Rooyen, J., 
The Best Funeral Society; Fieldwork Interview; 13 November 2015). 
 
To the extent that the state has failed to draw informal providers into the ambit 
of the its regulatory system, state institutions have limited impact on the low-income 
funeral insurance market. Despite the state’s limited engagement, insurance companies 
are still penetrating and operating within this unregulated market albeit in a weakened 
formal institutional environment. This has led to mixed results. In some cases, insurance 
companies have been able to dictate the terms of engagement and impose its will. In 
these cases, informal institutions and structures have been re-shaped to align with and 
complement formal microinsurance operations. In other cases, the lack of the state’s 
regulatory enforcement has indeed inhibited insurance companies’ ability to engage with 
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informal intermediaries. Here, it would be reasonable to analyze institutional dynamics 
through a lens that assumes a weakened formal institutional capacity. Suffice it to say that 
in South Africa’s microinsurance/funeral services market, there are some institutional 
arrangements in which goals are compatible and some in which the goals are in conflict. 
The ensuing analysis will consider both types of cases. Thus, the focus of the subsequent 
analysis will center on the ways in which formal and informal institutions both 
complement and compete with one another.  
Complementary Informal Institutions: Enabling Formal Microinsurance 
Operations 
 
 I have argued that among other things, informal institutions have developed over 
time to reinforce norms of solidarity and reciprocity, which are critical to the long-term 
sustainability of mutualist-based organizations like burial societies. But even in the most 
cohesive of burial societies, if they continually fail to deliver on their financial 
obligations—whether due to fraud, mismanagement, or bad luck—there is a more than 
likely chance that they would dissolve. Underwriting partnerships with formal insurance 
companies offer burial society administrators an institutional remedy to better manage 
this challenge. In this most basic of ways, then, formal institutions of risk management, 
i.e. microinsurance, can enhance, or complement a key function of burial societies, which 
allows them to continue serving their other socio-cultural roles. 
 In much the same way, the informal institutions inscribed within burial societies 
and other community-based organizations can serve to complement formal 
microinsurance institutions. In the following sections, I focus the analysis on two areas in 
which these complementary roles align with and support the goals of formal 
microinsurance institutions: 1) Facilitating premium and claims administration and 2) 
Providing governance structures that help ensure consumer trust. In both these areas, 
informal structures and institutions step in to enable the smooth functioning of formal 
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operations. 
Enabling Regularity: Informal Institutions and the Circulation of Premiums 
 
 For insurance companies, establishing and maintaining a regular schedule of 
premium payments is paramount. In traditional markets, insurance companies have 
instituted a number of mechanisms to collect premiums while minimizing transaction 
costs. These include setting up salary deductions from employers and standing/debit 
orders that link directly to a client’s bank account. The sanction for non-payment is the 
loss of coverage (though different providers may have varying policies with regard to 
grace periods). But in low-income microinsurance markets, these institutions are often ill 
equipped to reliably collect premiums. Most individuals and households are self-
employed and earn their incomes in the informal economy. If they do have a bank 
account (by no means the norm) balances are typically low, which puts clients at risk of 
incurring overdraft penalties if they set up standing/debit orders. Moreover, given that 
incomes are irregular and unpredictable in this market, strict enforcement of rules that 
govern continuation/cancellation of policies when a client fails to make premium 
payments may be draconian or otherwise unviable.  
Thus, McCord et al. (2006: p.197) argue that for microinsurance to succeed “the 
premium payment mechanism needs to find a balance between being efficient and being 
sensitive to the needs and capacities of clients.” The institutions embodied by burial 
societies help insurance companies strike this important balance. Absent the ability of 
insurance companies to automate the collection of premium payments (i.e. through 
employer deduction, direct debit, etc.), their only recourse is to engage in physical 
collection. Here, the options are largely limited and self-defeating: door-to-door 
collection is inefficient and exacts prohibitively high transaction costs, and having 
policyholders come into a central location (i.e. physical office) puts too high a burden on 
low-income individuals who may be limited in their means of transportation. 
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Group-based mechanisms like burial societies (referred to in the industry 
literature as “client aggregators”) help plug this gap; they are typically area-based and a 
natural forming risk-pool that allows for a more efficient means of collecting premiums. 
Although the rules and norms that regulate burial societies have evolved separately from 
their engagement with insurance companies, they nevertheless reinforce individual habits, 
which are conducive to the regularized collection of premiums. For instance, most burial 
societies require their members to meet regularly (typically once a month) to discuss 
administrative matters and to collect premiums. Failure to attend these meetings can 
result in a fine. But to the extent that burial societies are comprised of community 
members, neighbors, and/or kin who have personal reputations to guard, it is not so 
much the fine that keeps members accountable, but the mechanism of social pressure, as 
the following respondent discovered when her husband missed a regular payment: 
Nobody wants to show up with empty hands because people will start gossiping about you, but 
sometimes it can’t be helped. Money is short, né? He [her husband] also got a call from the 
administrator to ask about it. I told him he should just leave, but he wanted to stay and get it 
sorted in case something happened (Respondent #59; Fieldwork Interview; 3 March 2016). 
 
Burial societies also provide an important intermediating function that helps to smooth 
out the irregularities in individual income streams.  
Sometimes our members do not pay every month but on a good month we receive about 
R40,000 but on bad month we receive R30,000 to R35,000. But it depends. During [peak] 
times, for instance January, children are going to school so people [postpone] payment of their 
premiums (Secretary for Baba Burial Society; UniQ Insights Interview Transcripts; 8 February 
2016).      
 
While an insurance company may have a difficult time dealing with these fluctuating 
flows, the institutions that structure burial societies have historically been responsive to 
the variable and irregular nature of members’ financial lives; their intermediation is 
instrumental in bridging this divide.  
 Moreover, in partnering with insurance companies, burial societies sign on as the 
master policyholder. Depending on how many members the burial society covers, it pays 
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a certain fixed amount to the underwriting insurance company per month. In the event 
that a particular individual fails to make a monthly payment, administrators retain the 
flexibility to cover that individuals’ 
shortfall, at least temporarily. According 
to Daniel Masego, a retired executive of 
one of the longest running burial societies 
in South Africa (The Great North Burial 
Society and Funeral Services based in 
Soweto [Figure 6]), this flexibility 
continues to differentiate burial societies from insurance companies: 
Insurance is cold. An insurance person is a business person. But burial societies are full of 
warm relationships. Even if you miss payments, people will be there for you at the end of the 
day. They will cover for you until you can catch up. The members know each other very well, 
they are like families (Masego, D., The Great North Burial Society and Funeral Services; 
Fieldwork Interview; 13 November 2015). 
 
This institutionalized flexibility embodied by the burial society enables the smooth 
collection of premiums. While a burial society might lose some of this flexibility when 
they enter into a partnership with an insurance company (a dynamic I explore in more 
detail below), its core institutional ethos and regulatory structure continues to maintain 
reciprocal/solidaristic norms. 
Enabling Accountability, Transparency, and Recourse: Informal Institutions as Governance Structures 
 
In Chapter 5, I briefly touched upon elements of the FAIS Act, which came into 
effect in 2004. The FAIS Act requires all financial advisors and intermediaries—including 
burial societies and funeral parlors—to meet certain “fit-and-proper” thresholds to 
ensure that they were minimally qualified to provide financial services to their 
clients/members. Regulators and industry actors quickly realized that the compliance 
requirements were far too high and that widespread non-compliance emerged as a result. 
They responded by initiating a lengthy consultation process (October 2006-September 
Figure 6- The Great North Burial Society and Funeral 
Services in Soweto, South Africa. Photo credit: 
Christopher Paek 
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2008), which considered what requirements would be appropriate for the informal 
market.  
In 2012, the Financial Services Board (FSB) issued exemptions to select financial 
service providers, key individuals, and representatives who were employed or mandated 
by an authorized financial service provider. These applied to burial societies and funeral 
parlors and exempted them from certain requirements (e.g. passing a regulatory 
examination, meeting qualifying criteria regarding experience, knowledge/skill set, and 
obtaining minimum educational certifications) that were deemed to be creating barriers 
for entry into the “formal” market. Even with these reforms, however, the state 
struggled to draw informal operators into the regulatory fold: 
As we’re speaking today, in order for them to be licensed for FAIS, the requirements have been 
relaxed so much that it’s not very difficult for a funeral parlor [or burial society] to be licensed 
under FAIS. But they still do not meet the requirements. This is a historical issue. You have to 
look at the historical background. The educational levels are not up to the required level. 
However, some of them are entrepreneurs; they are able to run those informal businesses. But 
when it comes to formalizing their businesses and to act within a regulatory environment, it’s 
still a challenge (Modiba, J., FSB; Fieldwork Interview; 10 November 2015). 
 
In short, formal regulations proved to be limited in their ability to simultaneously protect 
consumers from “unqualified” financial intermediaries/providers while facilitating 
market entry for informal operators who collectively have decades of experience 
servicing this market.  
While the state’s steady withdrawal from this regulatory space is tied to its lack of 
capacity to enforce FAIS and other formal legislation, it can also be read as an implicit 
acknowledgement by the state that informal governance structures can be leveraged to 
perform key regulatory functions that formal institutions struggle to provide: 
The FAIS exemption means that burial societies do not have to fork out huge costs to become 
FAIS compliant. The focus now needs to be on improved governance of burial societies and 
professionalization of the industry (Sandra Dunn, CEO of the Insurance Sector Education 
and Training Authority [INSETA]; FA News Interview; 8 May 2013).31 
 
                                               
31 https://www.fanews.co.za/article/people-and-companies/12/news/1163/inseta-welcomes-fais-exemption-for-
burial-societies/13555 
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In the place of formal prudential and market conduct regulations, long-standing informal 
governance structures have continued to provide the rules in force, which regulate the 
interactions between financial service providers/intermediaries (i.e. burial societies and 
funeral parlors) and the end-clients. Most burial societies, for example, are governed by 
an elected or self-appointed committee typically comprised of at least a chairperson, 
treasurer, and secretary. Committee members are usually trusted members of the 
community, most often elders. Thus, in cases in which these administrators are 
unlicensed (i.e. not FAIS-accredited), social status/reputation stands in as the mechanism 
through which trust and accountability are garnered: 
If leadership misappropriates funds, people lose confidence. To build trust, you have to do the 
job. For the burial society to work, there has to be trust between the committee and the members. 
Misappropriation of funds used to be a big problem, but people have grown wiser. They realized 
that this is a short-term thinking. For the long-term, it is better for everyone involved to make 
sure the money is taken care of (Masego, D., The Great North Burial Society and Funeral 
Services; Fieldwork Interview; 13 November 2015). 
 
Additionally, as detailed in Chapter 4, the majority of burial societies are 
structured around a founding constitution in which the committee promises to regularly 
share bank statements (typically at monthly 
burial society gatherings) to help keep 
finances transparent. Members’ payment 
histories are logged by hand in 
individualized record books (see Figure 7). 
As I would come to discover over the 
course of my fieldwork, burial society and 
funeral parlor members preferred this mode 
of record keeping over more modern, technological methods like computer-based 
accounting because record books were a long-standing practice with which they were 
more familiar. These measures were designed over time to institutionalize transparency, 
Figure 7- Burial Society member's record book. 
Photo credit: Christopher Paek 
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which provided members with some basic safeguards for their money. Even as burial 
societies and funeral parlors have partnered with insurance companies, these informal 
conventions of accountability and transparency have largely remained in place; insurance 
companies have essentially out-sourced the generation of trust to their informal partners. 
In the domain of dispute resolution, South Africa’s formal institutions (i.e. legal 
system) offer a number of options that theoretically should provide consumers with 
effective backstopping in terms of recourse. But even here, the evidence suggests that 
formal mechanisms of recourse have their limits. Many respondents were simply 
unaware that such options even existed: 
Interviewer: In the case you have a complaint or a problem with your policy, what do you do? 
 
Respondent: No. Nothing. There is nothing you can do but pray to God. These guys just want 
the money, so they won’t help you even if they are wrong. 
 
Interviewer: What do you think the government should do to help? 
 
Respondent: They should set up a hotline so people can call and make their complaints. 
 
Interviewer: Yes, are you aware of the Ombudsman? 
 
Respondent: No. 
 
Interviewer: If your funeral parlor is registered and working with an insurance company and you 
have a problem with them, you should call the Ombudsman. Here, I will give you their phone 
number (Male Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #1; 11 January 2016). 
 
The ombudsman referred to in the interview above was established in 1985 to help 
mediate disputes between policyholders and insurance providers.32 Though this service 
has always been available to microinsurance clients free of charge, not a single 
respondent I interviewed was aware of this as an available option. Even if clients were 
aware of formal options for recourse, such as registering their disputes with a small 
claims court, they expressed little hope that these mechanisms would actually work for 
them: 
                                               
32 http://www.ombud.co.za/ 
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I don’t really know how to make a complaint with the court. I have heard they just write down 
your issue and they pass it on to someone and then you have to explain your problem again. At 
the end of the day, they can’t do anything to solve it, so it is a waste of time in my opinion 
(Female respondent; Durban Focus Group #2; 15 January 2016). 
 
Whether due to a lack of awareness or faith in formal institutions of recourse, burial 
society and funeral parlor members turn to informal means in order to settle disputes: 
Councilors are members of the community that we can turn to to help arbitrate the process of 
distributing money or settling disputes as a result of a funeral. If the councilors can’t solve it, 
then we can bring the matter to a chief (Male Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #1; 11 
January 2016). 
 
What these respondents’ comments reveal are the limits of formal state 
institutions, i.e. laws and courts, in their ability to secure the rights of clients who either 
don’t trust in these institutions and/or lack the capacity/power to press their claims 
through their channels. In his study of the contestations and politics surrounding South 
Africa’s land reform process, Ben Cousins asks a key question in the context of property 
rights: how can the rights inscribed in formal law become de facto rights in reality? 
Formally defined rights intersect and interact with other institutional frameworks, both formal 
and informal, in the real world contexts of the prospective rights-holders. Both centrally involve 
issues of power, authority, and contestation, and require us to consider law as only one source of 
rule-making in society (Cousins, 1997: p.4). 
 
Similarly, in the microinsurance space, issues of recourse, dispute resolution, and 
consumer rights are resolved within a “messy matrix;” multiple institutional orders are 
embedded within “unequal and dynamic social relations,” (ibid.: p.12) and are thus in 
varying states of tension and cooperation. Though formal insurance laws may be a 
necessary component of securing the rights of microinsurance clients in the long term, 
they are, as yet, insufficient in a low-income market context in which levels of trust, 
capacity, and individual agency are low with regard to formal institutions. And though by 
no means do informal mechanisms guarantee fair outcomes, their presence can fill in for 
formal institutions that are, by and large, unavailable, illegible, or not trusted by most 
low-income clients. In other words, informal institutions enable microinsurance 
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operations by offering clients an option for recourse that is at least familiar, accessible, 
and somewhat effective. But as I will argue below, they can also present competing 
institutional systems that undermine the goals of formal institutions.   
Competing Informal Institutions: Incompatible Regulatory Regimes 
 
Addressing the Need for a Monetary Option Through Formal Regulation 
 
 In Chapter 5, I made brief mention of the state’s attempt to better enforce a 
long-standing provision: the right to a monetary option. To briefly recap, this provision 
allows funeral parlor clients the right to claim a cash payout rather than the in-kind 
services offered by their funeral parlor. Coming out of parliamentary hearings in 2003 
and 2005 on the state of the informal funeral services market, subsequent studies have 
underscored the importance of enforcing this regulation by highlighting at least three 
ways in which low-income funeral insurance clients were inadequately protected or 
otherwise being abused (Van den Berg et al., 2016). First, without having to provide a 
monetary payout, funeral parlors have more flexibility to adjust the quality of the services 
paid out as claim, particularly if they are dealing with financial problems. Clients 
experience this adjustment in service quality as a broken promise: 
The undertaker didn’t do what the family wanted him to do. They didn’t offer a cash payout 
either. Our package was supposed to give us two buses [for the transport from the service to the 
gravesite] but we only got one. We went after to ask for a refund, but they didn’t give it to us. 
So they were being dishonest. Maybe it happens to a lot of people, I guess it happens to 
everybody (Female Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #3; 12 January 2015). 
 
Second, it is quite common for clients to cover the same family member under 
multiple funeral insurance policies. The way many of these policies are designed, clients 
are given the option to include multiple people under a single policy. As an example, if 
four siblings of a single family fail to coordinate with one another, and they each pay 
premiums to separate funeral parlors to cover their parents, the situation that eventually 
arises is that the siblings will have to choose the best funeral parlor among the four 
policies to provide the service. If funeral parlors withhold the monetary option, the three 
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siblings whose funeral parlor was not selected simply lose out on all their premium 
payments. This scenario is indeed what was revealed over the course of several focus 
group interviews: 
Interviewer: What happens if there are multiple policies covering one person? Would you get the 
money back? [group laughter] 
 
Respondent: No, these funeral parlors will never give you the money back. Once they have it, the 
money is gone. 
 
Interviewer: So how did your family handle this situation? 
 
Respondent: We decided to choose my sister’s funeral parlor. They offered the best package. 
That is how we decided. 
 
Interviewer: What about your policy? 
 
Respondent: I just cancelled it. 
 
Interviewer: How long have you been paying for the policy? 
 
Respondent: Not long, maybe six months ago (Female Respondent; Durban Focus Group 
Interview #3; 15 January 2016). 
 
It was not entirely clear from the interviews why most respondents did not coordinate 
with their family members to avoid multiple coverage scenarios. One plausible 
explanation is that clients are hedging their bets in case a funeral parlor policy fails to pay 
out. Regardless, from the view of consumer protection advocates, the lack of a monetary 
option puts clients at a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis their funeral parlors, even if clients 
may not be fully aware of this issue. 
 Finally, situations often arise in which covered beneficiaries happen to die in 
areas not serviced by their funeral parlor (i.e. if the beneficiary dies in a different 
province). In some cases, if the funeral parlor has the capacity, it will simply charge more 
in transportation costs to retrieve the body. But in other cases in which this option is not 
available, family members have no choice but to switch to a funeral parlor closer to the 
body. Again, if no monetary option is available, they simply lose out on all their premium 
payments. 
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 The intention of the monetary option policy was to help address these gaps in 
consumer protection. Its preliminary inclusion into Section 53 of the Long-term 
Insurance Act of 1998 held that the value of the monetary option be equal to “the cost 
that would have been incurred by the long-term insurer” had the in-kind benefit been 
provided. Due to the uncertainty that this caused in the market, the Insurance Laws 
Amendment Act of 2008 amended the provision such that the policy must “1) Provide 
that the policyholder is entitled to demand that the policy benefit be provided as a sum 
of money in lieu of the benefit on the occurrence of the event insurance against; and 2) 
State the amount of the policy benefit that is to be provided as a sum of money” 
(Insurance Laws Amendment Act No. 27, 2008; Government Gazette, Republic of 
South Africa). Notably, the 2008 amendment dropped the requirement that the monetary 
benefit must be equal to the cost of the in-kind benefit. For those funeral parlors that did 
comply with this regulation, this omission gave rise to market practices in which large 
discrepancies between the value of the in-kind benefits and the monetary option were 
observed.33 
While state and industry actors are quick to label these practices as market 
abuses, funeral parlor respondents make clear that the monetary option is withheld as a 
key strategy for them to limit their risk exposure: 
Interviewer: Do you offer your clients an option between your services and payouts in cash? 
 
Respondent: Yes, I can give them the cash if they ask, but they always take the service. 
 
Interviewer: I have heard that a lot of funeral parlors won’t provide the cash option. Why do you 
offer this option when others don’t offer it? 
 
Respondent: I want to serve my clients at the end of the day. If they want something, I will 
deliver it. It’s not just about money for me. I want to provide my clients with a good service. 
These other guys, some of them are thieves, you have to be careful. But a lot of funeral parlors 
have problems with their businesses. It would be hard for them to give money back. I think a lot 
                                               
33 The proposed Microinsurance Policy Framework sought to revert to the former position with the additional 
requirement that the insurer disclose the value of the monetary benefit upfront and that the face value of the in-kind 
benefit and the monetary option provided be the same. As previously noted, the Microinsurance Framework policy 
document’s recommendations have not yet been implemented into law. 
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of them would go out of business (Dumile, Hlubi Funeral Services; Fieldwork Interview; 16 
March 2016). 
 
Though it was difficult, methodologically speaking, to find funeral parlor staff who 
openly admitted to any kind of financial difficulty, it seemed to be a widely held view 
within the industry that for funeral parlors to both maintain their low price points and 
remain solvent (or profitable), they had to retain the flexibility to adjust down on the 
value of their services when needed, i.e. withhold the monetary benefit option.  
Misaligned Goals, Competing Institutions 
 
Institutionally speaking, the goals of a funeral parlor are not centered on risk 
mitigation. Rather, as informal businesses, funeral parlors are designed to deliver services 
and to generate profit. The monetary option policy is thus a point of contestation that 
reveals how the underlying goals of formal and informal institutions can be misaligned. 
Despite the fact that the monetary option provision is included in formal legislation, 
many focus group respondents reported that they signed contracts with funeral parlors 
that included explicit provisions denying a monetary benefit. For example, a respondent 
in Johannesburg shared the contract he signed with his funeral parlor, SFS Funerals, in 
which the terms and conditions clearly spell out the monetary option policy: “There’s no 
cash payout or whatsoever when SFS Funerals is not providing a funeral service” (see 
Figure 8).  
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Regardless of if these funeral parlor contracts have any formal legal standing, 
they are the institutional mechanisms in force that structure the de facto relationship 
between funeral parlor providers and clients. Most if not all clients I interviewed were 
unaware that they were, in fact, entitled by formal insurance law to claim a monetary 
benefit. Even if they had been aware, it is unlikely that they would have the institutional 
means to compel funeral parlors into complying with this regulation. In fact, according 
to Iske Murdoch, a financial policy researcher based in the Centre for Financial 
Regulation and Inclusion (Cenfri), the monetary option issue presents a strong 
disincentive for funeral parlors to formally register their businesses: 
It’s very common, and indeed necessary for informal funeral parlours not to provide this 
[monetary option]. Of course, informal guys don’t comply with any regulation, so for them it’s 
not even a question whether to provide a cash payout. The point is that this will be a sticky 
point that makes them not want to formalise, should the MI framework be 
implemented…Consumers also don’t know that this is a right that they have or even why they 
would want such a right, so are not placing any pressure on providers (Murdoch, I., Cenfri; 
Email Correspondence; 16 February 2016). 
 
 By remaining outside the reach of the state regulatory system, funeral parlors are 
able to maintain an informal institutional regime that both reflects their set of incentives 
and competes with unfavorable formal regulations that would hinder their goals. 
Unsurprisingly, the resulting outcome is one in which funeral parlor operations are 
Figure 8- Contract agreement with SFS Funerals. Terms and conditions item #7 stipulates the monetary 
option policy. Photo credit: Christopher Paek 
 170 
solidified while their clients are exposed to an often undetected form of risk. Given state 
and industry’s inability to enforce the monetary option provision, the informal rules, 
which are in direct contravention of formal law, trump formal ones to regulate provider-
client relations. 
 In this context, competing informal institutions should not be understood as 
suboptimal or necessarily abusive. Although abusive practices certainly persist in the 
informal insurance market (e.g. price gouging via uncapped commission rates), informal 
institutional regimes also enable organizations like funeral parlors to function sustainably 
in a low-income, volatile environment. The strict imposition of formal regulations like 
minimum capital requirements, monetary option benefits, and capped commissions 
would be severely constraining to the development of informal businesses, and would 
undermine efforts to include low-income households within the formal financial system. 
Following Rodrik (2008), I argue that a “second-best” institutional mindset is required to 
understand that informal governance and economic institutions can be more 
efficient/effective than formal institutions, particularly in contexts in which enforcing 
formal regulations are too costly or otherwise unfeasible (see Dixit, 2003).  
Formal to Informal, Informal to Formal: The Two-Way Flows of Institutional 
Change 
 
Top-Down Change: The Professionalization of Burial Societies  
 
 Informal institutions that complement and enable formal microinsurance 
operations are put under pressure to change in ways that more efficiently aligns with the 
needs of a profit-driven bureaucracy. For burial societies, in particular, which are 
primarily designed according to the principles of solidarity and reciprocity, engagements 
with insurance companies can induce fundamental shifts in core institutional logics. In 
terms of operational practices, for instance, I have shown in Chapter 5 how insurance 
companies utilize a range of discourses and managerial technologies to shape their 
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informal partners. Pieter Murray, a sales executive at Assupol who manages a portfolio 
full of underwriting partnerships with burial societies, quite literally gives informal 
operators the hard tools to become more efficient and “business like”: 
These businesses were started by entrepreneurs and handed down. They don’t have a lot of 
corporate governance; most are community-based. Simple things like record keeping are not very 
sophisticated as they do it by hand. So it’s hard to draw them into a formal regulated market. 
But to bridge that gap, we provide them with systems, computers, data software, training, what 
have you, so they can use it. We see it as a partnership in taking that business to the next level. 
And it’s a part of our corporate social responsibility (Murray, P., Assupol; Fieldwork 
Interview; 18 November 2015). 
 
Self-interest, not just altruism, motivates insurance companies to retrofit burial 
societies/funeral parlors with these technologies and managerial techniques. The 
collection of quality data, in particular, is a strong incentive for insurers who want to 
price premiums more accurately or who may want to use the data in order to access 
individual clients directly, effectively circumventing intermediaries altogether. 
  The pricing of premiums is also a key point of convergence and contestation 
between formal and informal institutions. What was remarkable to observe in the field 
was the extent to which monthly dues for burial societies were largely uniform regardless 
of size, membership characteristics (e.g. age, health, gender, etc.), or even region. This is 
reflected in the analysis of my survey data (N=55), which yielded a mean of R146 in 
monthly burial society dues expenditures, a mode of R150, and relatively low levels of 
dispersion from the mean (standard deviation=56), with the exception of a few outliers 
(See Figure 9). 
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Figure 9- Frequency Distribution of Monthly Burial Society dues (in Rands) 
 
 The reason for this conformity is because informal providers typically do not 
employ risk-based pricing. Instead, it is the market that sets the price: 
I can promise you there’s no actuarial science behind it. What you get…there are two 
phenomena. You get the guys who just want to be in the same playing fields, so they will never be 
over or above. You also definitely get the guys who come in and want to have the quick bite and 
undercut all these other parlors. I’ve seen that more than once (Katzke, L., KGA Life; 
Fieldwork Interview; 26 February 2016). 
 
For burial societies that can’t adjust down on services like funeral parlors can, market-
based pricing opens them up to the risk of insolvency and/or covariate shock (e.g. many 
members dying at the same time), particularly if they make their monthly dues too low or 
if they remove too many safeguard restrictions. But, of course, what compels burial 
societies to maintain lower monthly dues and relax certain rules in the first place is to 
better align with members’ livelihood strategies and volatilities. For their parts, members 
exhibited a basic understanding and acceptance of the limits of burial societies as 
financial institutions: 
There’s a replacement of money if many people die at one time. They will raise the money for a 
few months from R100 to R130 or something like that. In my opinion, the money will never be 
finished. Yes, it does get chowed [depleted], but the society will not run out. In our burial society, 
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we have a treasurer who brings last month’s statement and current statement. We all have the 
right to check how much money is going in and out. Some months are less and other times they 
are more, because things happen in life né? In the Christmas time, people are traveling home; 
usually there are road accidents. So sometimes we have to pay more to the burial society to cover 
(Female Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #4; 12 January 2016). 
 
In other words, in exchange for a more flexible, collectivist form of risk mitigation, 
members seem to implicitly shoulder at least some risk. 
But as burial societies more closely integrate with insurance companies, they 
increasingly adopt rules and practices that align with corporate interests. Informal 
operators like burial society administrators and committees are essentially co-opted by 
insurance companies to restructure premium regimes and schedules to approximate 
actuarial frameworks. As a result, the client experiences a shift in institutional logic and 
form. The switch to premium-based models has led to fewer regular meetings and 
opportunities to build social bonds with fellow burial society members. And crucially, the 
new model relies more on individual members’ ability to maintain regular payments; the 
risk is thus shifted from the collective to the individual. 
Moreover, the flexibility, which is characteristic of most burial societies, gives 
way to a much stricter, actuarially inspired regime enforced by 
administrators/committees. Whereas previously, burial societies could be counted on to 
find ways to make things work if there were problems with a payment, the new rules 
imposed by underwriting arrangements are far less forgiving when it comes to income 
volatility. Mpumelelo Nxasana, a former burial society administrator himself, explains 
how when a burial society enters into a partnership with an underwriting insurer, the first 
thing that needs to be re-negotiated is the premiums/claims ratio: 
When they [burial societies] come to KGA…[I] will look and see there is something like 30 
lives assured. That’s [a liability of] R177,000 and they’re only paying premiums of R120. 
You realize that these premiums are too low. Then [I] tell them, I can do this for R200 
(Nxasana, M., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 11 December 2015). 
 
If burial society administrators are unwilling or unable to raise premium rates, they 
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typically negotiate by lowering the sums assured instead. Nxasana also pointed out that 
administrators who opt to underwrite their burial societies were now technically required 
to comply with regulations that governed financial intermediaries (i.e. fit and proper 
requirements under the FAIS Act), although enforcement was rarely carried out.34 The 
general point to be highlighted here is that the formal system exerts various pressures on 
burial societies to adjust their practices to align closer with risk-based, bureaucratic 
norms and logics. In the following chapter, I will further explore the role of burial society 
administrators in negotiating the tensions between maintaining social and cultural norms 
while acceding to financial practices that are increasingly shaped by their insurance 
company partners. 
Sparking Innovation: How Informal Institutions Affect Formal Institutions 
 
 As noted earlier, institutional scholars have found that the success of formal 
institutions depends in part on their ability to “map” onto existing informal institutions 
and structures (Boettke et al., 2008; Williamson, 2009). These findings are not lost on 
industry actors who have had extensive experience working in the informal funeral 
market: 
 
Our informal market is so culturally embedded…How they purchase insurance products, 
specifically funeral products, is very different to you and I. It’s so culturally embedded in the 
sense that they look at their church pastors who hold such a powerful influence in those 
communities, and they shape how the informal market purchases insurance. It’s so important to 
understand the context of these communities (Scheepers, M., ASISA; Fieldwork Notes; 12 
October 2015). 
 
As Van der Westhuizen explained, insurance companies must be mindful of and navigate 
the various and intersecting social institutions that govern their target market, particularly 
as it pertains to group-based policies: 
You have to, first and foremost, when you’re dealing with any of these traditional structures, you 
have to have a very clear understanding that the elders still make the final call on these things, 
                                               
34 The Microinsurance Bill would have lowered FAIS requirements for informal operators like burial society 
administrators. With lack of enforcement on the current law, many informal operators are de facto unregulated. 
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and you have to be very respectful. When you look at your demographic, you have to be very 
certain, because some of the demographic also don’t even allow a female to talk to men at 
all…and so for argument’s sake if you do find a man from the right clan and all of that, you 
also have to make sure he’s the right age because if he’s too young, they also won’t take your 
advice. There’s just so many difficulties about access, it’s not just normal retail business (Van 
der Westhuizien, A., Old Mutual; Fieldwork Notes; 28 September 2015). 
 
For larger insurance companies like Old Mutual, recognition of the social complexities of 
the low-income space is instituted to some extent into their hiring practices. As I will 
demonstrate in the following chapter, insurance companies employ sales agents who are 
from the communities that microinsurers are targeting in order to leverage their intuitive 
understanding of social relations and their affective forms of labor. Through this labor, 
insurance companies are enabled to better navigate an unfamiliar institutional terrain. 
Moreover, the effort to work with and, at times, circumvent these social 
institutions has sparked a number of innovations in the way traditional insurance 
companies operate. These innovations have ranged from small token gestures (e.g. 
record books, see Figure 7) to fundamental changes in the way insurance business is 
conducted. For example, as a smaller retail funeral insurance company, KGA Life is 
highly attuned to the way their clients’ expectations have been shaped by informal 
institutions, and adjust their services to mirror them. Burial societies, for instance, are 
essentially structured as an informal savings mechanism; members pay in regularly, but 
they expect some kind of pay out at a future date. Burial society members who are new 
to insurance seem to have some difficulty reconciling their previous experiences with the 
concept of sum-assured cover as interview respondents make clear: 
Insurance companies in South Africa still struggle to structure their policies in a manner that 
fits the way these burial societies are structured. These new insurance clients, they will come in 
and pay their premiums every month, but if they cancel their policies, they will now expect to get 
their money back, you see? We have explained it to them, we have even signed the contract, but 
some will still ask for their money (Nxasana, M., Old Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 11 
December 2015). 
 
I will stay with the stokvel and the burial societies. These insurance companies are a scam. You 
pay them and if you cancel, they just keep all your money. It is for white businesses; they will 
scam you to keep your money. What if they lose your paper on purpose? With the stokvel you 
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can keep track of your money (Respondent #16; Group Interview #1; 21 November 2015). 
 
Recognizing this pervading sentiment in their target 
market, KGA Life opted to innovate by offering an 
“Xmas Box Funeral Plan” (see Figure 10). This 
product essentially added a savings component to 
the baseline insurance product; for a slight increase 
in premiums per month, clients were paid back a 
dividend or “bonus,” of R1000 in cash at the end of 
every year. This was a popular product not only 
because it gave clients a sense that they were getting 
something back for their premiums, but it also 
provided them with a useful lump sum of cash during a Christmas season in which they 
needed to buy presents for family and friends. It also aligned with a mental framework 
that had been shaped for years by the rhythms of burial society membership. Innovations 
like these have helped insurance companies map their operations onto the existing 
informal institutional landscape. 
 Finally, in terms of the formal regulatory space, the resilience and sheer scope of 
informal infrastructures have made it impossible for the state to turn a blind eye. Thus, 
the challenge that continues to confront the state is to craft a framework that balances 
the needs of both informal and formal insurance providers:   
What is the regulatory framework that’s going to allow the formal and informal players to work 
better together? It’s really going to take the formal players [having a] better understanding of the 
informal market because I think, to be quite honest, a lot of the formal players…they think 
they know exactly about what’s happening in the informal market. I think that there’s a lot 
more education that needs to take place. And I think a lot more willingness needs to happen 
among the informal market to meet formal players halfway. How we go doing that, I think is 
the responsibility of the policymaker and the regulator (Scheepers, M., ASISA; Fieldwork 
Notes; 12 October 2015). 
 
To date, the state’s approach has been to codify informal institutional arrangements into 
Figure 10- KGA Life's Xmax Box 
Funeral Plan Promotional Brochure 
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its existing regulatory frameworks, i.e. classifying funeral parlors as “assistance 
businesses” and burial societies as “friendly societies,” and crafting legislation to 
recognize them under formal law. But as I have demonstrated here and in previous 
chapters, this codification has largely been confined to de jure rather than de facto 
regulation. But given how essential and embedded these informal structures have 
become within South African microinsurance value chains, the state continues to work 
toward modifying formal institutional frameworks that would provide stronger incentives 
for informal providers to register themselves into the state’s regulatory system. 
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has examined the ways in which formal and informal institutions 
interact in order to regulate the South African microinsurance market. While Helmke and 
Levitsky’s (2006) work focuses on informal political institutions, the typological 
framework they developed to study this interaction has nevertheless been useful in my 
analysis of economic institutions. Given the limited capacity of the state to enforce 
microinsurance regulations, I find that formal institutions (both of state and industry) 
have mixed degrees of effectiveness in this space. Moreover, the ways in which these 
institutions interact depend on whether their underlying goals are compatible or at odds 
with one another.  
In the case of burial societies that have been underwritten by insurance 
companies, for example, I find that informal economic and governance institutions 
complement formal regulatory structures that have largely struggled to align with the 
livelihood patterns of the poor. By intermediating the circulation of premiums/claims, 
burial societies essentially help to smooth and regularize volatile income flows that 
insurance companies have difficulty accommodating on their own. Burial societies’ 
mechanisms to safeguard accountability and transparency are also valuable institutions 
that help maintain a minimum threshold of trust; onerous consumer protection/market 
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conduct regulations alone cannot secure this without forcing informal providers out of 
the market. Thus, informal institutions serve to enable formal microinsurance operations 
to deliver risk mitigating financial services to low-income households. 
On the other hand, informal institutions can also undermine the effectiveness of 
formal institutions if underlying goals are misaligned. In such cases, informal regulatory 
regimes can compete or contradict formal ones. In the example I presented, funeral 
parlors are in the regular practice of withholding a monetary benefit option to their 
clients, often including these provisions explicitly into contracts (which may or may not 
be sanctioned by the state). Despite the fact that these policies directly contravene formal 
regulations that mandate assistance businesses (funeral parlors) to provide a monetary 
option, I found that it was the funeral parlor contracts that held sway in this space. While 
regulators and industry actors were quick to label such practices abusive, such practices 
are often necessary for informal operators to continue providing services.  
The different ways in which formal and informal institutions interact raise 
interesting questions about the underlying factors/conditions that determine whether an 
informal institution complements or competes with formal ones (or some other form of 
interaction). While this chapter has identified a number of these factors, namely the 
effectiveness/ineffectiveness of formal institutions and the compatibility of institutional 
goals, it has not taken into account the role of individual actors in determining the nature 
of these interactions. Nor has it given a full treatment of issues related to power. As 
Cousins (1997: p.4) has argued, formal and informal institutions interact within a “terrain 
of struggle,” in which individual actors have to make sense of and negotiate between the 
various regulatory systems inscribed in both law and practice. These negotiations are 
ultimately shaped by power relations. Thus, the focus of my next chapter will be on the 
role of individual agency within processes of institutional interaction and change, and on 
the power dynamics that mediate between actors and institutional structures.  
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Finally, while the analysis in this chapter gives equal weight to the regulatory 
effects of both formal and informal institutions, it highlights the critical role that 
informal institutions play in enabling or inhibiting the development of microinsurance 
markets. These insights offer a critique to design inspired perspectives embedded within 
new institutional economics (NIE) frameworks, which assume that institutions can be 
“crafted” to induce desired outcomes (Ostrom, 1990; De Soto, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 
2001; Rodrik, 2004). For as much as formal institutions have exerted pressure on 
informal structures to become more aligned with a business, rather than 
reciprocal/solidaristic ethos, informal, social institutions have sparked innovative 
changes to standard insurance practice, and have carved out a niche within the formal 
regulatory structures of the state.  In other words, the currents of institutional change 
flow both ways. Thus, in the context of South African microinsurance market, 
institutional (and welfare) outcomes are not engineered, but rather result from a dynamic, 
negotiated process between institutions that interact in a myriad of complementary and 
competing ways.  
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7—The gatekeepers: The role of mediators and intermediaries in 
sustaining microinsurance markets 
 
The previous chapters have examined formal and informal institutions (and their 
interactions) in the abstract, as sets of norms, rules, organizations, logics, customs, and 
traditions that blend together in dynamic ways. What has been missing thus far is an 
accounting of individual actors and the ways in which they navigate, respond to, and 
shape the institutional terrain. How do they figure into institutional dynamics? In what 
ways are different actors constrained and/or empowered by institutions? And what role, 
if any, do individuals play in inducing institutional change? These questions of individual 
agency form the basis of inquiry for the following two chapters. While Chapter 8 will 
focus on the experiences of microinsurance clients and burial society/funeral parlor 
members, this chapter will consider the role of providers, more specifically, 
microinsurance brokers.  
In this discussion, I return to Frances Cleaver’s notion of “institutional 
bricolage,” which captures the ways in which new/old, formal and informal institutional 
forms are grafted onto one another: 
Bricolage consists of the adaptive processes by which people imbue configurations of rules, 
traditions, norms, and relationships with meaning and authority. In so doing, they modify old 
arrangements and invent new ones but innovations are always linked authoritatively to 
acceptable ways of doing things. These refurbished arrangements are everyday responses to 
changing circumstances. Institutional bricolage implies more than simply making up and 
making do…institutions must be legitimized and imbued with authority to have any purchase 
on the job to be done and to ensure over time and space (Cleaver, 2012: p.34).  
 
In keeping with this metaphor, this chapter conceptualizes brokers as bricoleurs who 
“piece together” risk management institutions into new forms, which are re-purposed 
toward new ends. These bricoleurs reside at the intersections between formal and 
informal spheres and are thus ideal subjects of the empirical gaze. 
This chapter will also build on some of the insights produced by a vast 
anthropological and sociological literature on brokers and intermediaries/mediators, 
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which has shed light on the ways in which they enable and produce coherence between 
institutional spheres. Deborah James has argued, for instance, that transitional settings 
such as post-apartheid South Africa provide fertile conceptual and empirical grounds for 
“the return of the broker” (James, 2011). By “return,” James is alluding here to the 
disappearance of the broker as a relevant point of analysis in the structural and post-
structural traditions, particularly Marxist-inspired scholarship, which locates power 
primarily in the post-colonial state (James, 2011; Lindquist, 2015). These accounts stress 
how structural and governmental power shapes/constrains individual subjectivities, all 
but sidelining questions of agency (Lindquist, 2015).  
However, with the rise of neoliberalism, which has challenged state-focused, 
structuralist analyses of power, James has noted a revival of interest in the figure of the 
broker—and processes of mediation more broadly—as critical nodes along the shifting 
fault lines that delineate institutional spheres (i.e. state/market, formal and informal 
economic/governance systems, etc.). Following the work of Bruno Latour, Mosse and 
Lewis argue that these brokers are critical insofar as they “translate” between otherwise 
disparate registers, work that “permits the negotiation of common meanings and 
definitions and the mutual enrollment and co-optation into individual and collective 
objectives and activities” (Mosse and Lewis, 2006: p14). 
 This chapter builds upon these perspectives to explore how brokers sustain 
microinsurance operations through this work of translation. The analysis shifts away 
from a focus on the structural and institutional underpinnings of microinsurance markets 
to highlight how mediators function within the interstices of disparate 
institutional/regulatory systems. More specifically, the chapter will bring to light the 
various practices and strategies these actors deploy to essentially bring heterogeneous 
frameworks, ways of thinking, and systems together to produce a coherent 
microinsurance value chain. 
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 Building loosely upon Latour’s (2005) distinction between mediators and 
intermediaries (i.e. mediators as “translators” versus intermediaries as “dumb pipes”), I 
identify four human and non-human mediators/intermediaries that operate along this 
formal-informal value chain: 1) Insurance agents; 2) Mobile network operators; 3) 
Funeral parlor operators; and 4) Burial society administrators. The chapter is designed as 
a comparative case study; the different cases help to clarify not only how different actors 
are constrained and/or enabled by emergent institutional forms, but also how they effect 
change upon the institutions they mediate. By contrasting insurance agents with mobile 
network operators, for example, I highlight how the mediator’s work of translation is 
critical in cohering disparate actors and frameworks, producing the trust upon which 
consumer decision-making is based. Moreover, comparing the cases of the funeral parlor 
operator and the burial society administrator highlights how social identities and 
institutional logics are remade in relation to their respective positions along the value 
chain and their control over the “critical junctures,” (Wolf, 1956: 1075) which hold this 
chain together. 
 While I construct and analyze these case studies separately, there is, in practice, 
much overlap in the way these different actors and institutional forms interact. In the 
final section of the chapter, I aim to bring these threads back together to examine the 
linkages between these disparate (inter)mediations and how they animate processes of 
inclusion into formal microinsurance markets. The analysis reveals that while mediation 
works to produce and maintain “coherent representations of social realities” (Mosse and 
Lewis, 2006: p.16) that make it possible for heterogeneous systems to come together, it 
also produces/entrenches power inequalities at different scales, complicating the notion 
that favorable risk outcomes are distributed equitably. I argue that this divergence of 
outcomes can be understood as a function of divergent forms of mediation that are 
shaped by these power relations; different types mediators and intermediaries inhabit 
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differential positions of power, which matters in terms of how evenly or unevenly the 
benefits of financial inclusion are distributed. Risk and welfare outcomes must be 
understood within the context of these power dynamics. 
Insurance (Double) Agents and the Hard Work of Translation 
 
Lindelwa, Old Mutual Agent: Affective Techniques and Emotional Labor 
 
 In market contexts in which insurance is not well known or understood, sales 
agents play a critical role in making insurance products legible to local ways of 
understanding. For instance, in China where there is a strong cultural taboo against 
thinking and talking about premature death, Chan (2012) found that sales agents had to 
frame life insurance as a novel money management instrument that appealed to the 
prevailing cultural ethos of saving for “yanglao” (retirement). Only then, she discovered, 
were life insurance products able to be sold. In this context, a seemingly insurmountable 
cultural barrier for the sale of life insurance was circumvented through the work of a 
mediator. Thus, Chan describes the process of building insurance markets as a “cultural 
project” in which “practice and meaning are constructed and reconstructed through 
interactions, negotiations, collaborations, and contestations” (Chan, 2012: p.174). The 
insurance agent is central to this project. 
 In South Africa, the subject of death does not seem to constitute the same kind 
of taboo as it does in China. In fact, it often took me aback just how candid respondents 
were when it came to very personal and painful accounts of death. Rather, the challenge 
for insurance companies in the South African context has more to do with building trust, 
as many insurers discovered when they first opened retail operations in townships. For 
example, an executive with KGA Life recounted that when they opened their branch in 
Khayelitsha, it took over six months before anyone bought a policy: 
What we found through really living the hard way was that people have been burned in this 
industry before…What they [the clients] want to see is whether you’re still there six months 
down the line and the claims are paid out. And then that word of mouth element follows 
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through to the market…We’re now seeing the dividends of having that sort of longer-term 
approach, purely built on trust (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 21 September 
2015). 
 
What this executive is speaking to is the wider context of mistrust in which clients live 
their daily lives. This environment is typically characterized by high crime rates, lack of 
formal legal recourse, a lack of consumer advocacy and education, and high levels of 
unemployment. Generally speaking, clients themselves have been defrauded, or have 
known neighbors and family members who have been defrauded, by fly-by-night funeral 
service providers, corrupt burial societies, and/or other scammers who have eroded trust 
throughout the market environment. It is through this lens of mistrust that low-income 
clients perceive and interpret formal insurance products.  
 Insurance agents, who are typically recruited from the communities they service, 
are key figures in the production of trust. Building this trust goes beyond simply speaking 
the same language as or sharing the same ethnic identity with their clients. Rather, it is 
better captured in Chan’s notion of a cultural project, an intimate process in which 
affective techniques are mobilized to forge a social relationship that is simultaneously and 
inextricably tied to a formal economic one. This dovetails with a broader anthropological 
literature that has recognized how affect and social ties are constitutive of financial 
practice and consumption in what Illouz (2007: p.23) refers to as “emotional capitalism” 
(see also Kar, 2013). In Golomski’s (2015: p.80) view, commercial insurance can thus be 
understood as a “compassion technology.”  
 Lindelwa, a Khayelitsha resident, is an insurance agent with Old Mutual, one of 
South Africa’s largest insurance companies. She has been selling policies for nearly 15 
years, and the biggest change she’s witnessed in that time is that new clients are coming 
to the office to buy policies, rather than her having to go into the community to pitch 
new clients. Lindelwa explained that this is the result of a growing recognition of the 
value of insurance among low-income households and a budding trust in formal 
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insurance companies like Old Mutual. She also expressed a love for her job and engaged 
a discourse of altruism to explain why: 
I explain to them [clients] that all of this is not for me but it is for them…People have put their 
trust in me. And you see, many of them are from Eastern Cape, I tell them, even if you go to 
Umtata [Mthatha], if you see an Old Mutual, they will take care of you like I did because they 
will have your portfolio. It’s all about trust. At the end of the day, I just want them to get the 
good results (Lindelwa, Old Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 13 October 2015). 
 
Despite some of the presuppositions held by many client respondents—that insurance 
companies were cold, calculating entities who cancelled policies for any slight 
infraction—Lindelwa presented a more empathetic face for an otherwise faceless 
insurance company. The individual trust she was able to earn from clients was then 
generalized to the Old Mutual brand writ large.  
Although technically trained as a certified insurance agent and compliant with all 
the formal regulations governing financial intermediaries, Lindelwa opted instead to 
employ a more relational, informal approach to her many clients:  
If a client has a problem with a policy, I tell them just come it’s ok, we can sort it. Each and 
every client I give a business card…and then now with WhatsApp [a personal messaging 
service], Sho! [laughs]…it’s always, ‘Please check this, please fix that.’ Even if I’m off, 
weekends, time with friends. Then some of them, they think I’ll do everything for them. They 
will phone me ‘Sisi please, deduct [the premium] now! There is money in the bank, please 
deduct now!’ [laughs] (Lindelwa, Old Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 13 October 2015). 
 
Lindelwa inhabits the social identity of a member of her local community who has all the 
right connections to help her neighbors. And while she clearly derives much value and a 
sense of purpose in this care component of her work, the burden is placed squarely on 
her to be personally available to more than 700 policyholders under her portfolio.  
Zenzile, KGA Life Agent: Disciplining the Clients 
 
 These affective, personal techniques not only secure trust for microinsurance 
products and specific brands, they enlist clients into the normative scripts put forward by 
the formal insurance system. Mosse and Lewis (2006: p.13) have referred to this process 
as “the mutual enrollment and the interlocking” of disparate interests/frameworks to 
 186 
make real, or produce “project realities,” in this case, formal microinsurance markets. In 
other words, not only do agents have to be fluent with the cultural norms and languages 
of their clients, they have to discipline clients into complying with the unfamiliar logics 
and practices of insurance. In so doing, these heterogeneous spheres are made to cohere, 
thereby enabling microinsurance transactions.  
Zenzile, a sales agent with KGA Life, expressed how the disciplinary aspect of 
his job requires as much of his attention as does building trust with his clients: 
We have to educate the clients about the products that we have, and how it works...We give 
them the number where they can call us, or they must come to the branches, because there are 
terms and conditions they must understand, you see? We have a Facebook page too so they can 
ask their questions…but still, clients, they always come back with complaints, every time. And 
we will have to explain it again (Zenzile, KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 22 October 2015). 
 
According to Zenzile, grievances are often related to unresolved disparities that persist in 
clients’ minds between formal microinsurance and the informal risk management systems 
to which they are more accustomed. One of the most common and recurring complaints, 
for example, suggests that many of Zenzile’s clients do not fully grasp the concept of 
insurance itself. In burial societies, members contribute money into a collective pool that 
is essentially held as a trust. The mental model that would be the most proximate is that 
of a savings account. Insurance, on the other hand, operates according to actuarial 
principles; if the defined event does not come to pass, there is no payout and the client 
loses out on the premium payments. Zenzile explained that many clients who opt to 
cancel their contracts expect to have their premium payments returned. Part of Zenzile’s 
job was to explain why this was not the case and to deal with the complaints and 
accusations of theft that would inevitably arise.  
 Another common misunderstanding arises when a policy lapses due to non-
payment; clients often had the expectation that they simply had to pay their next 
installment for the policy to come back into effect. While KGA Life and other insurance 
companies have built in non-payment grace periods into their microinsurance products, 
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they typically expire after only 1-2 months, at which point, the policy is voided entirely. 
To regain coverage, a client would have to sign a new contract, go through another 
waiting period, and most likely pay another joining fee. In contrast, while burial societies 
do suspend coverage for non-payment, most restore it immediately after payment 
resumes. Most of Zenzile’s clients assumed insurance worked the same way: 
The ones who come in to complain are the ones who are not paying their policies. They will ask, 
‘Why has my policy been cancelled?’ Some of them come and lie and say, you never said 
anything like that. But there is a binding contract that [they] signed. I even explained it to 
[them], the terms and conditions, but you must show them the paper so they can’t say you are 
lying (Zenzile, KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 22 October 2015). 
 
Here, Zenzile points to the important distinction between transparency and legibility. 
While contracts are the most efficient way to establish the ground rules between two 
parties, they do not ensure that actors are operating on a level playing field in terms of 
understanding those rules. Mediators like Zenzile are critical in bridging this gap between 
transparency and legibility: 
I have to explain it again and again to them [the clients]. In person. They are not used to it. 
Many of them, they don’t understand what they sign, they just want the funeral service, né? But 
even if they sign the paper, I have to explain it to them, the terms and conditions, because that is 
the legislation. The FAIS Act (Zenzile, KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 22 October 2015). 
 
Insurance agents like Lindelwa and Zenzile are thus counted on to deploy their 
emotional, affective labor while simultaneously upholding the rigorous standards set 
forth by formal insurance practice and regulation. This puts these mediators under a 
tremendous burden. In his own study of South African insurance brokers, Erik Bähre 
referred to the agent’s position through the imagery of a Janus-faced character in that 
brokers were caught between the expectations of social relations and the disciplinary 
power of the state: “The costs that insurance companies tried to limit were translated 
into financial risk for the brokers, who ended up doing unpaid labour for the insurance 
company”(Bähre, 2012: p.155). This is certainly true in Lindelwa’s case as her inhabited 
social role as a “community-fixer” blurred the lines between her professional and 
 188 
personal life. Moreover, the task fell squarely on Zenzile to discipline his clients and to 
confront their grievances. These cases demonstrate how retail insurance operations rely 
heavily on these mediators’ ability to translate between, and cohere, incongruent systems 
of thought and practice. It is through these affective and disciplinary mechanisms that 
trust is produced and microinsurance operations are enabled. 
Dumb Pipes: Mobile-based Platforms as Non-Human Intermediaries 
 
Mobile Insurance in South Africa: A Brief Overview 
 
 As a direct contrast to the active work of insurance agents in the production of 
trust, mobile-insurance (m-insurance) products are distributed through what Latour 
might identify as a passive, non-human intermediary: the mobile platform. In South 
Africa, like in many other developing countries, mobile penetration is deep; mobile 
phone subscriptions per capita stand at an impressive 1.65 (or, 165 mobile cellular 
subscriptions per 100 people).35 As discussed briefly in Chapter 5, South African 
insurance companies have partnered with mobile network operators (MNOs) to leverage 
their distribution networks and to gain a foothold into the lower end of this market. By 
overlaying their operations upon a mobile infrastructure, insurance companies have been 
able to generate efficiency gains across the entire microinsurance value chain from 
product design, marketing and sales all the way to enrollment and claims administration 
(Téllez, 2012). These efficiency gains translate directly into lower premium rates that 
compare quite favorably against traditional microinsurance products (See Appendix K).  
 A variety of m-insurance products have made it to market in recent years; they 
can roughly be categorized into two broad types: low-touch and high-touch models. As 
an example, MicroEnsure, a technology service provider (TSP), champions the low-
touch approach.36 Their philosophy is to leverage mobile and electronic platforms 
                                               
35 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.CEL.SETS?year_high_desc=false) 
36 https://microensure.com/ 
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maximally in order to eliminate the need for a human sales agent altogether. The goal 
here is to provide end-to-end insurance services including marketing, enrollment, claims 
administration, and communication, all through a mobile device. BIMA’s philosophy, on 
the other hand, is that mobile technology should be used to supplement, not replace, 
human agents.37 Their products are thus high-touch in the sense that clients interface 
with both mobile-based and human intermediaries.  
Given South Africa’s established microinsurance market and its deep mobile 
penetration, the compelling business case for both insurance companies and MNOs 
propelled a flurry of early investment into m-insurance deployments. Surprisingly, despite 
what would seem to be a bevy of structural advantages and a convincing business 
rationale, several reports, as well as the findings of my own fieldwork, concluded that the 
majority of m-insurance products in South Africa failed to achieve scale (see Smith et al., 
2010; Téllez and Zetterli, 2014). While there are certainly regulatory and market factors 
that contributed to this failure, I focus here on the inability of the intermediating entity 
(the mobile platform) to produce trust as a key reason why m-insurance has failed to take 
root. 
Any entity in South Africa that provides financial services and/or advice in an 
official capacity must comply with fit-and-proper regulations as stipulated by the 2002 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act. This regulation imposes a 
prohibitive compliance cost on high-touch m-insurance models like BIMA’s. In order to 
circumvent FAIS in the low-income segments of the market, insurance companies have 
opted to sell m-insurance products “passively” rather than “actively,” meaning that sales 
agents are not trained nor permitted to advise the clients on the use of these products. In 
effect, this has led to a bifurcation of the market whereby the lower-income segment of 
the South African market is served by non-advice, low-touch m-insurance products while 
                                               
37 http://www.bimamobile.com/ 
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the middle-higher income segments are served by FAIS-accredited agents (Endres et al., 
2014).  
Client Perspectives: The Failure to Build Trust 
 
Like with traditional microinsurance products, it is important to understand 
clients’ perceptions and experiences of m-insurance within the wider context of mistrust 
and precarity in which they live. Kingsley Masemola, who heads up Old Mutual’s Mobile 
Customer Solutions division, admits that this context poses significant obstacles for the 
wide scale take up of m-insurance products, particularly when the security of sensitive 
personal information cannot be assured:   
What drives the mistrust is that there are tons of syndicates in South Africa. So every single day 
you get an SMS with ‘You’ve won this competition, you’ve won that competition.’ An ID 
number is sacred here. An ID number is your credit score. So for me to give you an ID number 
is a real decision. Everything is based on your ID number and your mobile phone in South 
Africa, so people are penetrating that information and using it for the wrong reason. There’s the 
major problem (Masemola, K.; Old Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 28 January 2016). 
 
Moreover, it became clear from the interviews that clients were interpreting m-insurance 
through a lens developed and used over time to guard against fraud. For example, many 
clients rejected m-insurance by citing their personal experiences with the phone scams 
Kingsley referred to in his comment: 
I trust the phone, but I don’t trust the people behind the phone. I have seen too many scams on 
the phone. If I can’t see people eye to eye, then I don’t know what kind of people they are. 
Corruption is at every level (Respondent #40; Fieldwork Interview; 4 February 2016). 
 
Fears of theft, stemming from the high crime environment, made clients reluctant to use 
a phone to conduct sensitive financial transactions like insurance: 
In Khayelitsha, phones are not safe, and they can be stolen or lost (Respondent #52; Fieldwork 
Interview; 1 March 2016). 
 
Clients’ experience with fly-by-nighters (informal operators who literally vanish in the 
night) led many clients to reject the concept of a “mobile” based insurance product, 
fearing that their premium payments would easily disappear without a paper trail or an 
office to anchor their claims: 
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How can everything be stored on a phone? I need papers to confirm that the contract is real 
(Respondent #52; Fieldwork Interview; 1 March 2016). 
 
Many respondents indicated that even if they had a friend or relative who had 
successfully made a claim via an m-insurance product, they would still reject the product, 
suggesting that mistrust is not only pervasive, but resilient as well: 
Even if my neighbor has it, I don’t care. They could be colluding with the scammers 
(Respondent #35; Group Interview #3; 20 January 2016). 
 
It should be noted that, to the extent that this perspective is widespread, any word-of-
mouth marketing opportunities, which is typically critical for the success of any 
microinsurance product, are limited.  
Based on clients’ responses, it seemed that the very concept of m-insurance 
produced a dissonance that could not be overcome: 
I have never done the m-insurance, but I would feel strange to do it. I don’t think I will try. 
How can you mix money with the phone? (Respondent #4; Fieldwork Interview; 6 November 
2015). 
 
Without an agent to educate clients on how these products worked, these dissonances 
and fundamental misunderstandings persisted. Moreover, respondents repeatedly 
invoked a language of materiality to explain why the idea of conducting insurance 
business through the mobile phone was seen to be an outlandish one. There were 
constant references to their need for tangibility in the form of “papers,” contracts, cash, 
and human beings they could see “eye to eye.” Most important within this material 
imaginary was the need for a concrete office that could not “run away in the night.” The 
vast majority of respondents indicated that without an office, they would never trust an 
insurance product. The office was perceived to be a safe space, an “island of trust” 
(Bähre, 2007a: p.139) for their money in a context in which their money is generally not 
secure.  
This conceptualization of the office as a safe space helps to put into some 
perspective why an m-insurance product, which is designed to deal with clients on an 
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individual basis, is struggling to take hold among a client base that is currently structured 
into groups, where agents, burial society/funeral parlor administrators, peers and family 
members play key roles in mediating information and building trust. Without these 
mediating entities, the understandings and perceptions of m-insurance are 
filtered/interpreted through a lens shaped by the precarious environment in which 
clients live.  
There are a number of insights that can be gleaned from these findings. First, of 
course, is to highlight the critical role mediation plays in translating unfamiliar financial 
products like m-insurance into local socio-cultural contexts. In contrast to insurance 
agents who deploy affective and disciplinary mechanisms to help bridge the gap between 
the formal insurance system and a market space plagued by fraud and mistrust, the 
passivity of mobile-based intermediation failed to build any sort of coherence between 
the two spheres. Second, to understand why m-insurance markets failed to fully 
materialize in South Africa, a broader frame is required to capture the multitude of 
factors that contributed to driving client mistrust—too often, industry assessments 
attribute failure to relatively narrow issues related to product design or marketing. While 
the broader issues of crime, fraud, and unemployment are obviously outside the purview 
of insurance companies to solve, understanding that a large portion of the potential 
client base copes within such environments might explain why they are seemingly willing 
to pay a higher premium to deal with insurance sales staff face to face.  
In the on-going debate between low-touch and high-touch approaches to m-
insurance, these findings seem to suggest that the latter is required in the South African 
context, at least for a time. The case of m-insurance is reminiscent of the financial 
industry’s experience with introducing ATMs in South African townships. Initial reports 
suggested that there was widespread mistrust among residents. It took concerted time 
and effort—bank tellers would walk through each step with individual customers again 
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and again—for clients to eventually trust ATMs enough to deposit their hard earned 
cash. Examples like this demonstrate that trust in m-insurance products can eventually 
be earned, but that an initial investment in time and financial resources may be required 
to do so. In other words, efficiency, convenience, and price are necessary but not 
sufficient factors in building a successful m-insurance market. Mediation is also required. 
The Opportunistic Entrepreneur: Funeral Parlor Operators as Critical Junctures 
 
In the event of a funeral, a value chain is activated. Service providers, from the 
most informal (e.g. family and friends volunteering to cook for the guests) to the formal 
insurers, emerge to meet the needs of the bereaved family. Within this value chain, only 
the funeral parlor can deliver the actual administration of the funeral and the handling of 
the body. They also provide a range of other services that are highly valued by the 
families including dealing with formal 
procedures of the state (i.e. death certificates), 
the police if murder is suspected, and the 
hospital (Roth, 2001). While other services and 
providers can be interchanged or omitted, the 
parlor is thus indispensible (see Appendix L). 
This puts funeral parlors in a very powerful 
position relative to their clients, as well as to the insurance companies that underwrite 
them. 
While there is quite a bit of range in terms of how “formal” funeral parlors can 
be, I found in my fieldwork that those that operate in the low-income space are mostly 
informal (see Figure 11 for an example). These funeral parlors typically split their 
business into two distinct operations: 1) Funeral services and administration and 2) 
Finance/accounting (i.e. informal insurance). In this latter function, funeral parlors offer 
Figure 11. An informal funeral parlor in 
Khayelitsha, South Africa.  
Photo credit: Christopher Paek 
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packages that resemble premium-based policies, with a crucial difference that they pay 
out in in-kind services rather than cash. For example, Gcilishe-Taliwe, an informal 
funeral parlor operating in Gugulethu, offers three plans: 
• Plan A- Joining Fee: R200; Monthly Premium: R190; Benefit: Flat lid, 
storage, grave tent and chairs, hearse, and a family car for transport (Covers 
the Principal plus 5 people). 
• Plan B- Joining Fee: R200; Monthly Premium: R250; Benefit: 3-tier coffin, 
storage, grave tent and chairs, hearse, and a family car for transport (Covers 
the Principal plus 5 people). 
• Plan C- Joining Fee: R250; Monthly Premium: R290; Benefit: Casket, 
storage, grave tent and chairs, hearse, a family car for transport, and a 5-liter 
juice (Covers the Principal plus 8 people). 
As discussed in Chapter 6, when insurance companies underwrite these books, the 
funeral parlor, not the end-client, is the master policyholder, placing funeral parlors at the 
center of a potentially lucrative circulation of cash. Controlling the flow of this 
circulation is critical to the financial stability of these operations. Funeral parlor operators 
who mediate this flow thus have strong incentives to maintain their positions as 
gatekeepers. 
Despite the obvious disparities in power and resources between insurance 
companies and funeral parlors, the latter effectively leverages their mediating position to 
regulate the terms of access:  
It is a very one-sided relationship. The funeral parlors, and even the burial societies, are very 
jealous of the relationships that they have with the individuals of the community because it’s a 
community structure in so many instances, so they guard that information jealously. They are 
not in favor of simply throwing the doors open and allowing the insurer and the sales individuals 
to just have free range and access to their end members (Van der Westhuizien, A., Old 
Mutual; Fieldwork Interview; 28 September 2015). 
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In addition to their insider position within social networks, a key mechanism of control is 
related to how information is guarded and dispensed. In the informal insurance space, 
formally trained actuaries struggle to price policies in such a data-poor environment. 
Insurers lack even the most basic information about the end-clients like names, ID 
numbers, phone numbers, and addresses, which tend to change constantly (Cenfri, 
2013). Unable to pool these groups themselves, insurers are thus reliant on their 
community-based partners like funeral parlors to provide and update key client data. For 
funeral parlors, exclusive control of this data is one of the key advantages of remaining 
informal: 
Agent: Their biggest concern [of formalization] is the fact that they would have to comply with 
providing now all contact info of those policyholders. 
 
Interviewer: And the fear is that there will be a run-around? 
 
Agent: Yes. And they feel that they won’t have leverage anymore, and their reason for existence 
and their business property is essentially down the drain (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork 
Interview; 26 February 2016). 
 
Through this control of information, then, funeral parlors exert an inertial force that 
preserves a status quo in which they secure the benefits of underwriting while making it 
more difficult for insurance companies to circumvent them, thereby cutting them out of 
the lucrative circulation of premiums and benefits.  
 Funeral parlors also deploy a range of strategies to maintain control over their 
end members thus entrenching their position of relative power. For instance, when a 
covered member of a group dies, insurers process the claim made by the funeral parlor 
(the policyholder) and pay out the benefit on the understanding that they will disburse 
the cash to the end member. In most cases, however, these claims are typically kept by 
the funeral parlor to boost the cash flow of its operation. As Mpumelelo Nxasana (an 
agent with KGA Life) explained, there are also more serious cases of fraud in which 
these monetary benefits are embezzled: 
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I know a guy in my same clan. Today, he runs a funeral parlor. He’s got a double story house, 
it’s an 18 bedroom house. And that guy used to work in construction as a laborer. Then you 
ask yourself, where did he get the money? There are thousands of those guys. Funeral parlors are 
the most unscrupulous in the industry. They run away with murder (Nxasana, M., KGA 
Life; Fieldwork Interview; 11 December 2015). 
 
The way funeral parlors are able to maintain this scheme is by paying out through in-kind 
services, rather than cash. Despite being promised a list of benefits and services, client 
respondents indicate that funeral parlors are known to fall short on their commitments 
when the day of the funeral actually arrives: 
The funeral parlor promises all these things, but when the death comes, it’s not the same thing. 
There were no stretchers, the convoy got stuck and the body was just sitting in the sun. This was 
a very painful experience. A neighbor of mine had to pull out R20,000 in cash because the box 
[casket] they wanted was more expensive than they promised (Female Respondent; Durban 
Focus Group Interview #1; 14 January 2016). 
 
Unsurprisingly, since none of the respondents I interviewed were even aware that 
insurance companies underwrote their funeral parlor policies, they were also unaware 
that they were entitled (by formal law) to a monetary option in lieu of the in-kind 
services they typically received. Without this key disclosure, funeral parlors are free to 
scale-down the value of their services depending on their cash-flow constraints at any 
given time. The most common adjustment I encountered in the interview data, for 
example, was related to the quality of the coffin. Even though clients may be promised a 
high-quality casket if they selected a more expensive package (e.g. ‘Plan C’ in the 
Gcilishe-Taliwe example), they may receive a much lower quality box (e.g. ‘Plan A’ flat 
lid). In these cases, funeral parlors will often claim that they are out-of-stock or that 
clients had misunderstood the benefits package. Since the funeral must be performed, 
and because clients are reticent to forgo years of premium payments by switching funeral 
parlors, clients express how very little in terms of recourse can be relied upon when these 
situations arise. 
Moreover, respondents explained away the failure of funeral parlors to live up to 
their promises as simply a matter of poor service delivery, rather than attributing it to the 
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information asymmetries that enable funeral parlors to capture the financial benefits of 
insurance payouts. In contrast to insurance companies, funeral parlors benefit from their 
long-standing roots in the community and enjoy what Frances Cleaver refers to as the 
“legitimacy bestowed by tradition, the moral command of what went before over the 
present” (Cleaver, 2001: p.30 citing Giddens, 1984). In other words, there is a level of 
impunity with which funeral parlors and other community-based institutions are allowed 
to operate; social sanction is rare and a “this is the way it’s always been done” mentality 
is pervasive: 
Why don’t we black people complain [when we are abused by funeral parlors]? We always keep 
quiet. Maybe we’re just scared. I think we should stand up as a community. We should speak 
the truth (Female Respondent; Durban Focus Group Interview #3; 15 January 2016). 
  
 Sydel Silverman elaborates on Eric Wolf’s notion of brokers as “critical 
junctures” who “connect the local system to the larger whole” (Wolf, 1956: p.1075). She 
argues that mediators guard these junctures with a “near-exclusivity,” which puts them in 
dominant positions to control the terms of exchange between the systems they mediate 
(Silverman, 1965). Funeral parlor operators control the junctures of information flow. 
They subvert efforts by insurance companies to circumvent them by withholding key 
data about their members and they operate with an obscurity that keeps their clients in 
the dark regarding their rights (i.e. to a monetary benefit option). Moreover, in engaging 
with insurance companies, the social identities of these funeral parlor administrators are 
remade from service providers into more opportunistic entrepreneurs. In adopting this 
role, the intent and design of formal insurance is distorted and a power inequality 
between funeral parlors and their clients further entrenched. 
Burial Societies Administrators: Relics in the Modern Financial Services Era? 
 
Hybrid Burial Societies: Negotiation and Re-education 
 
 In contrast to funeral parlor operators, burial society administrators do not have 
exclusive control over critical junctures along the microinsurance value chain. Although 
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they are underwritten much like funeral parlors are (i.e. on a group basis in which burial 
societies, not the individual end-members, are the master policyholders), burial societies 
are not able to substitute cash value for in-kind services and thus do not command the 
same kind of leverage. Nevertheless, the emergence of microinsurance as a viable 
institutional option has opened up a variety of new ways to manage burial societies. The 
managerial decisions made by administrators and/or executive committees, and the ways 
in which they negotiate with insurance companies, impact how burial societies ultimately 
function and evolve as institutions. 
 As outlined in Chapter 4, burial societies can be categorized into three broad 
typologies: traditional, hybrid, and commercial. In hybrid burial societies, mediation is 
required to bind together the social and cultural dimensions of a traditional society with 
the financial administrative techniques of underwriting insurance companies. Menzi 
Sonani, an administrator for a hybrid burial society of approximately 250 members, 
approached KGA Life to have his burial society underwritten. He explained that his 
primary motivation was driven by financial concerns: 
We are a small burial service. But companies like KGA, Old Mutual, Metropolitan are big 
né? So if you’re underwritten by them, it’s much better. We are safer than if we underwrite 
ourselves. This is a business, we must have money at the end of the day…Things are changing. 
We need to change as well (Sonani, M., Burial Society Administrator; Fieldwork Interview; 2 
November 2015). 
 
Burial societies’ steady transition into premium-based models enabled them to 
expand in scale. These expansions, along with an overall improved access to bank 
accounts, helped instill more of a business-like ethos into the operation of burial societies 
over time. This invited competitive impulses that drove administrators to offer 
increasingly generous and flexible terms, exposing burial societies to unmanageable levels 
of financial risk (Thomson and Posel, 2002; DGRV, 2003). Financial risk is tied to 
reputational risk; if burial societies fail to deliver on their commitments, word of mouth, 
which is so critical to their sustained success, would quickly sour and ultimately sink their 
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operations. Moreover, burial societies—and informal mechanisms in general (Dercon, 
2005)—are especially vulnerable to what economists refer to as covariate shocks, which 
can cause an unexpectedly high number of deaths in a short timespan (e.g. HIV/AIDS). 
With smaller burial societies, of course, this risk is much higher. Insurance provides a 
critical backstopping that mitigates the risk of covariate shock, and by extension, 
reputational risk. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, partnerships with insurance companies 
entail fundamental changes for burial societies. Though by no means inevitable, a 
pressure does mount on burial societies, and by extension, burial society administrators, 
to adopt practices that serve the interests of their underwriting partners. Nxasana, who 
has had experience on both sides of this relationship (as a formal burial society 
administrator and a current insurance sales executive), explains how burial society 
administrators are enlisted into this transition process: 
What we [insurance companies] are looking for are the small brokerages that are doing well, 
because then we know ‘Aha, these guys are reliable.’ We want to work with burial societies who 
will be compliant so we want to be with the burial society leaders who are responsible. Some run 
it like a business and are very disciplined. These are the guys we are looking for (Nxasana, M., 
KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 11 December 2015). 
 
By adopting practices preferred by insurance companies, burial societies lose out on 
some of the flexibility that makes them such valuable sources of financial support in the 
informal space. If, for instance, a standalone burial society were to be running short on 
funds, administrators can either scale-down payouts or ask members to temporarily 
contribute more per month until funds were replenished. The risk of insolvency is 
shouldered collectively in such cases. But a partnership with an underwriter typically 
entails a permanent increase in monthly premiums that must regularly (and contractually) 
be met to ensure coverage. This gives administrators less flexibility to adjust payment 
schedules if and when unplanned contingencies arise, and puts more pressure on 
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individual members of burial societies to make their monthly payments on time. The risk 
is shifted away from the collective and more toward the individual member. 
Adjustments to long-standing burial society practices correspond with the need 
to “re-educate” end-members on the new logics upon which their burial society would 
be run from that point forward:  
When they [burial societies] are forced to be underwritten…the committee must now go and 
address their general membership and explain to them why these changes are happening. You 
also educate them in terms of what is now required, what is possible, what is not possible 
(Nxasana, M., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview; 11 December 2015). 
 
Administrators are thus central to these twin processes of negotiation, whereby the terms 
of underwriting are established, and “re-education,” whereby clients are read into the 
negotiated script.  
For burial societies, the alternative to partnering with an insurance company, of 
course, is to carry on as imperfect, yet flexible, pooling mechanisms with limited scope. 
But given the new institutional landscape, which consists of microinsurers, underwritten 
burial societies, funeral parlor operators, and other forms of insurance brokerages, 
traditional burial societies are facing high levels of competition. Daniel Masego who 
retired after nearly 40 years of working for The Great North Burial Society and Funeral 
Services has observed a noticeable generational shift in attitudes toward burial societies:   
In the last 10 years, there has been an exodus of people leaving the burial societies because 
insurance companies are coming in and providing higher benefits…there are problems with the 
younger generation. They always see it [burial society] as a society for the elderly. They don’t 
want to come in here, they want to go elsewhere (Masego, D., The Great North Burial Society 
and Funeral Services; Fieldwork Interview; 13 November 2015). 
 
Masego’s sentiments notwithstanding, burial societies continue to be important social 
institutions that are deeply embedded within communal networks and relations. But as 
insurance companies assume more management of their financial functions, the pressure 
on burial societies to become more efficient and financially sound has produced a 
tension with their social functions. As mediators, administrators have to strike a balance 
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between maintaining the informal institutional mechanisms that cultivate norms of 
solidarity/reciprocity while working to remold burial societies into the more passive, 
frictionless distribution mechanisms favored by formal institutions and actors. 
Nominal Transparency: Obscurity as a Form of Control 
 
In contrast to romanticized accounts of solidarity/mutual-aid based institutions 
(i.e. burial societies), several ethnographic studies have revealed that they are often laden 
with uneven power hierarchies and ambivalent social relations (see Bähre, 2007b). In 
Erik Bähre’s ethnography of South African funeral insurance markets, for instance, he 
relays his observations of a model partnership between an insurance company, African 
Life, and the Zion Christian Church (ZCC), one of South Africa’s largest churches. 
Through this partnership, congregants joined church-based burial societies, which were 
administered by a company (the Kganya Group) with close ties to the ZCC. What is 
notable about Bähre’s account is his description of the type of control ZCC exercised 
over its members: “Members are not allowed to speak with outsiders about the church 
and are required to follow a strong disciplinary regime with regards to clothing, 
abstention from alcohol, and participation in meetings and other church events” (Bähre, 
2012: p.157). He concludes that while the various funeral schemes offered much value to 
ZCC’s congregation, they also “strengthen[ed] the hierarchies in this centrally led 
church” (ibid.: p.157). 
Although burial societies typically institute various accountability and 
transparency measures, key facets that have the most direct impact on burial society 
members are obscured from view: 
There are many problems with burial societies...Sometimes, even the premiums go up and there 
is no explanation. I don’t know why they go up, but if they do, you are not in a position to 
question it. You can’t question the committee because it is a done and dusted deal. There is 
nothing you can do (Respondent #56; Fieldwork Interview, 1 March 2016). 
 
Aside from arbitrary premium increases, the most commonly recurring complaint among 
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members was the murky issue of fines. As discussed in previous chapters, many burial 
societies have a variety of rules designed to discipline the group and build solidarity. 
Small fines are assessed for a variety of minor infractions—e.g. violation of dress code, 
tardiness/absence from meetings, etc.—though it is rarely, if ever, disclosed where these 
fees end up: 
Respondent: I am no longer in my burial society because I did not want to be fined. 
 
Interviewer: What were the fines for? 
 
Respondent: Every burial society is different. You are penalized if you do not wear the burial 
society uniform or if you arrive late for meetings. They will find a reason for a fine [laughs]. But 
the burial society committee will never disclose what happens to these penalty fee monies with the 
burial society. Maybe to buy coffee for the meetings? I don’t know (Respondent #66; Group 
Interview #5; 17 March 2016). 
 
Even in more serious issues of mismanagement, options for recourse are limited and/or 
constrained: 
Losing your money to a burial society is a very passionate issue and it can cause you a lot of 
stress. People do not speak against burial societies or the committee because the committee is 
normally people who are relatives of people you are familiar with because they come from the 
same rural home area in the Eastern Cape (Nxusani, G.; Group Interview #5; Fieldwork 
Interview, 17 March, 2016). 
 
The power imbalance not only exists between the executives and the members, but can 
also be present within governing structures. Jabu Mshweli resigned her post as treasurer 
of a large burial society in Nceduluntu (approximately 500 members), because of a 
dispute with other committee members who were, in Jabu’s opinion, misappropriating 
funds (e.g. using burial society funds for dinners at restaurants, expensive car services, 
etc.): 
The chairman of the burial society is the parlor owner. He unfortunately has the habit of 
making anonymous decisions…So when I queried our behavior, as management, that of lacking 
to lead by example, relating to the purpose and objective of the burial society, the chair and the 
one lady sidelined me. They no longer informed me when we had to go to town to make a 
withdrawal. Instead, they would get the uneducated lady to give the second signature. I was thus 
prevented from doing my duties, but it was only recently that I decided to officially pull out 
(Mshweli, J.; Treasurer; UniQ Insights Interview Transcripts; 7 February 2016). 
 
In this particular case, the chairman had a great deal of power within the committee 
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because he also operated a funeral parlor, which he attached to the society. But each 
burial society comes with its own set of power dynamics that shape the way terms are 
negotiated with insurance companies and the way information, discipline, and benefits 
are distributed.  
It would be an overstatement to conclude that burial society administrators are 
deliberate actors who disseminate and withhold information in calculated ways. Rather, it 
would be more accurate to characterize their tactics as maintaining a strategic opacity, 
which allows them to dictate the distribution of benefits and flow of information from 
the shadows. Thus, transparency and accountability structures do not guarantee 
transparency and accountability. The administrators and committees make decisions on 
issues that presumably matter most to members—cash payouts, premium levels, fiscal 
management, and fees— in obscurity. Operating in opaque ways allows them to maintain 
control of their members and entrench their position within the social field. 
Mediation as Bricolage: Individual Agency and Institutional Change/Stasis 
 
 In practice, the various brokers and institutions, analyzed separately above, are 
linked in layered ways across the microinsurance value chain. Against the grain of some 
of the expectations of mainstream financial inclusion thinking, my findings suggest that 
increased access to formal microinsurance did not result in the wide-scale abandonment 
of informal institutions. While I explore the reasons for this further in Chapter 8, my 
research corroborates Collins et al.’s (2009) findings that clients largely retain their 
membership with burial societies and/or funeral parlors even while holding a formal 
funeral insurance policy. The picture that emerges is one in which new and old, formal 
and informal institutional forms are grafted onto one another (i.e. Frances Cleaver’s 
notion of institutional bricolage) to fulfill financial objectives. Formal financial services 
like microinsurance do not displace informal ones, but are adapted into an expanded 
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institutional ecosystem; existing (informal) institutions are simultaneously re-purposed 
toward new ends. 
 The mediators and intermediaries discussed above are thus bricoleurs who are 
integral to this process of piecing together and re-purposing various institutions. For 
instance, insurance agents like Lindelwa and Zenzile are expected to tap into their own 
social networks to sell group policies to burial societies and funeral parlors. This is a 
process fraught with complications. Recalling the case of an insurance broker named 
Bantu, Bähre (2012) found that such expectations intensified the tensions in his social 
network: 
He, like other brokers I interviewed, complained vehemently about the unexpected social 
pressures that his job brought about. He was forced to mobilize his social network aggressively to 
make a living. He visited his neighbours in East London, sold policies to members of his 
church, and—to the same end—attended as many funerals as he could” (ibid.: p.155). 
 
The labor required to weave informal networks and institutions together with the formal 
microinsurance system exacts a heavy toll on sales agents. As microinsurance has steadily 
become more and more ubiquitous over time, however, the laborious process of 
initiating group-based underwriting has become more of a two-way street: 
[Regulators] think that what’s happening is an insurer goes out, finds an intermediary or a 
broker, contracts with them and then gives them a mandate…And that’s not what’s 
happening…it’s actually in reverse. They [clients] actually go with a mandate to the funeral 
parlor…and that funeral parlor then goes to the insurers and says ‘I’ve got a mandate to come 
and ask for underwriting.’ And then we give it. (Katzke, L., KGA Life; Fieldwork Interview, 
26 February 2016). 
 
In this telling, the “mandate” does not originate with insurance companies, but rather 
emerges from the needs of the policyholder. As I have demonstrated, these needs can be 
manifold. Funeral parlor operators like Gcilishe-Taliwe may seek out formal underwriters 
to pass themselves off as legitimate and reliable businesses. Other funeral parlors may be 
more interested in capturing the cash value of insurance policies and are thus motivated 
by financial self-interest. Burial society administrators like Menzi might initiate a 
partnership with insurance companies out of prudential concerns.  
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Whatever the case might be, bringing to light the underlying motivations of these 
individual actors—or bricoleurs—helps to clarify the linkage between agency and the 
ways in which institutions function. Whether formal-informal underwriting partnerships 
evolve into extractive, exploitative, and/or emancipatory institutional forms, depends in 
part on whose agenda is being empowered. If, for instance, the governance structures of 
a particular burial society are sufficiently robust and enforced, administrators may have 
less ability and/or inclination to misappropriate insurance claims. Funeral parlor 
operators, on the other hand, are in a stronger position to exploit the regulatory lacuna 
that exists in the cracks between formal and informal institutional regimes. They are thus 
empowered to capture the cash value of the insurance exchange, leading to an 
institutional form that is more likely to exploit than to distribute benefits equitably. 
Just as these actors can induce institutional change to serve their interests, they 
can also exert inertial forces to maintain an institutional arrangement that benefits them. 
Both burial societies and funeral parlors operate opaquely, keeping the nature of their 
relationship with insurers hidden from view of the end members. In effect, their 
operations are simultaneously shrouded and legitimated by the socio-cultural norms 
embedded into daily practice—the “right way of doing things”—that people rarely 
question. This is a form of social capital inhered to them through their position within 
the social hierarchy. Through mediation, they are able to mobilize and convert this social 
capital into financial capital, which they either pass through to their members or keep as 
profit for themselves. In any case, by remaining opaque, they are able to control the flow 
of information in order to maintain a status quo that entrenches their position as 
essential mediators between insurance companies and the end-clients. 
Moreover, a focus on these bricoleurs also highlights how processes of mediation 
are embedded within existing social/power hierarchies and dynamics. Mediators and 
intermediaries, as well as end-clients, inhabit social positions that powerfully determine 
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how they experience associational life. As the emergence of the formal microinsurance 
system recalibrates the institutional space, new incentives and opportunities are produced 
along the value chain, which strengthens social positions for some and erodes them for 
others. In this recalibration, social identities are remade. Wanted or not, individuals who 
are hired and trained as insurance agents gain a reputation in their communities as 
valuable resources who can help in dealing with all manner of financial problems. While 
this new role filled Lindelwa and Zenzile with a sense of pride and purpose, Bähre is 
quick to point out that the personal reputation of agents like Bantu are also put at risk: 
Half his day he spent driving people around and helping them with financial problems, such as 
difficulties with bank accounts or insurance companies. Most of the time these had nothing to do 
with his work. But if he refused to help, he felt that his neighbours and clients would start to 
gossip about him, making it very difficult to sell policies. He told me that he was growing tired 
of these requests (Bähre, 2012: p.155). 
 
Informal providers also undergo key transformations in their social identities. 
While funeral parlors were always community-based businesses, they were businesses 
more in the mold of service providers; their objective was not necessarily to maximize 
profit, but rather to fill an important unmet need. Partnering with insurance companies 
enabled them to adopt a more entrepreneurial identity that no longer centered on 
improving service provision (the implications of which will be made clear in Chapter 8), 
but on capturing maximum value from the insurance side of their businesses. Likewise, 
burial society administrators who were once beholden to their members to help 
coordinate financial, social as well as cultural functions on their behalf, are pressed in 
their partnerships with insurance companies to abandon these solidarity principles in 
favor of ones that would turn them more into passive, frictionless pipes of exchange that 
better serve the logics of insurance. In comparison to the funeral insurance operators 
who at least maintain control over critical junctures, burial society administrators’ agency 
seems much more constrained within this new institutional landscape. 
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Finally, I argue that risk and welfare outcomes must be assessed in light of these 
shifting social positions and identities. The expansion of formal microinsurance markets 
does not result in an equitable, broad-based distribution of benefits, but rather, 
produces/entrenches power hierarchies along which risks and benefits are then 
distributed. I have demonstrated, for example, how funeral parlors leverage information 
asymmetries to capture much of the cash value of insurance payouts without their 
clients’ knowledge. Burial society members assume more individual financial risk as their 
burial societies undergo a shift from solidarity-based institutions to market-based ones. 
Even clients who are able to mitigate the risk of funeral expenses through individual 
policies confront new risks; their general lack of familiarity, maneuverability and/or trust 
with formal insurance practice is its own form of risk that clients seek to hedge by 
retaining their membership in burial societies and funeral parlors. Microinsurance 
produces new pockets of opportunity for some, and creates new forms of risk for others. 
Thus, while mediators and intermediaries enable microinsurance, they also direct how its 
benefits, as well as new forms of risk, are distributed.  
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has pivoted attention away from the institutions that underpin 
South Africa’s microinsurance market to focus on how individual actors relate to 
institutional processes and change. In describing institutional dynamics through the fluid 
concept of bricolage—the process of piecing together “existing institutions, styles of 
thinking and sanctioned social relationships” in order to adapt them toward new ends—
Cleaver (2002: p.16) raises important questions regarding the nature of bricoleurs. To 
what extent are agents purposeful, empowered engineers who craft institutional 
arrangements? Or are agents entirely constrained by both formal and socially embedded 
institutions? 
 To explore these questions, the chapter focused its analysis on intermediaries and 
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mediators who operate at the interstices of the formal-informal microinsurance value 
chain. The chapter compared four cases in turn: the insurance sales agent, the mobile 
platform, the funeral parlor operator, and the burial society administrator. The analysis 
drew out the ways in which the formal and informal spheres are made to cohere through 
the embodied work of translation. The focus on individual agents clarifies the ways in 
which social hierarchies affect distributional outcomes and the terms by which 
individuals engage with institutions. Within this interaction, the analysis reveals that the 
social identities of the various mediators are reshaped according to their positions along 
the value chain. 
Insurance agents who are recruited from the communities they service, embody 
and speak to the cultural/traditional norms of their clients, and simultaneously enact the 
logics of insurance practice and regulation. In effect, their ability to speak both affectively 
(through discourses of care and altruism) and authoritatively (through the technical 
language of insurance) allow them to cohere formal and informal institutional spheres 
and to translate between otherwise incompatible registers. They adopt dual identities of 
“community-fixer” and “professional agent” to build trust with clients and to transmute 
an ethos of personalized care and empathy to otherwise faceless, calculating insurance 
companies. They are thus mediators who generate trust and enable the penetration of an 
illegible microinsurance system through an affective (often free) form of labor, which as 
I have demonstrated, places significant individual pressure on these agents. 
This case was contrasted with that of the MNO, a passive non-human 
intermediary. Unlike agents who actively translate between formal and informal systems, 
MNOs serve as “dumb pipes” that passively transport value between the insurance 
companies and the client. The failure of these m-insurance products can be explained, in 
some measure, by the inability of the mobile intermediary to build trust with targeted m-
insurance clients. Without this crucial work of mediation, clients interpreted m-insurance 
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through a lens developed to guard against fraud (i.e. phone scams). The findings 
indicated support for more expensive high-touch m-insurance models in that even low-
income clients seemed willing to pay higher premiums for face-to-face interactions. 
On the informal provider side, funeral parlor operators command exclusive 
control over “critical junctures” along the microinsurance value chain. By jealously 
controlling the flow of information, and thus a lucrative circulation of cash (i.e. 
premiums and claims payments), funeral parlor operators adopt dual identities, that of 
local service provider and of opportunistic entrepreneur. In their mediating role, they are 
able to capture much of the benefits of formal insurance provision that would have 
otherwise flowed to their clients. The act of translation, in this case, is one of distortion. 
The power inequality that existed between funeral parlor operators and their clients is 
thus entrenched and reproduced. 
Burial societies administrators, while not controlling critical junctures like funeral 
parlors do, play a central role in negotiating terms with insurance companies and re-
purposing burial societies to fit the logics of the insurance system. As a result, they can 
become more regimented and inflexible with their members; administrators and the 
executive committees are tasked with enforcing this transition. But as I have 
demonstrated, relations between the executives and members are fraught with ambiguity 
and ambivalence. Here as well, internal power dynamics shape distributional outcomes. 
The gradual shift undertaken by burial societies in South Africa, from small, solidarity-
based mutual aid schemes to large, premium-based risk pools underwritten by insurance 
companies facilitated a move towards “businessification,” which administrators were 
well-positioned within the social hierarchy to exploit. 
Seen through the prism of these brokers, and the processes of (inter)mediation 
they enable, the mainstream narratives of financial inclusion find some important 
nuance. While inclusion entails opportunities for some, other individuals and institutions 
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experience dislocation and change. As Deborah James noted, brokers re-emerge in 
transitional conditions “to create and perpetuate such conditions, and indeed embod[y] 
the contradictions which ensue” (James, 2011: p.19). Thus, the spirit of this analysis 
urges a movement beyond the normative objectives of formal financial services to a 
more empirical approach attuned to the ways in which these objectives and practices are 
translated through the figure of the broker.  
More specifically, mediation should not be understood as a neutral process that 
simply enables the formalization and/or financialization of informal spaces, but rather, as 
a political exercise that re-constitutes and/or entrenches existing power inequalities. As 
critical scholars have argued, “the empowering, beneficial, and harmonious sheen” of 
financial inclusion discourse often obscures the ways in which inclusion itself “can also 
be an exercise of control and power” (Schwittay, 2011: p.395 citing Kothari, 2001). By 
recognizing that mediators and intermediaries occupy different social positions and 
embody conflicting incentives and possible biases, it becomes possible to acknowledge 
the ways in which inclusion into formal financial systems produces disparate outcomes 
for various actors and stakeholders along the value chain.  
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8—Empowered or constrained? Client perspectives and experiences 
of microinsurance 
 
As several commentators have noted, the broad appeal of microcredit among 
development policymakers and practitioners has to do with the way it aligns neatly with 
neoliberal prescriptions for poverty alleviation (see Rankin, 2002; Roy, 2010; Schwittay, 
2011; Roodman, 2012). In these articulations, poverty is presented as a function of 
finance, and the burden falls upon individual subjects to climb out of poverty by better 
managing their personal finances. Mader (2014) argues that success stories are central to 
the power of microcredit’s normative agenda: 
While stories and mobilising narratives always matter in finance, in the case of microfinance 
their importance is even more pronounced, in part thanks to the many colourful and uplifting 
stories surrounding microfinance. Microfinance has been anchored in the public imagination 
through narratives of empowerment thanks to credit (ibid.: p.6). 
 
Similarly, microinsurance markets in South Africa have been built upon these “positive 
mobilising narratives,” (ibid.: p.1) which center the figure of an empowered risk subject. 
While insurance companies utilize a language of care and support in their marketing 
materials to cultivate a sense of empathy with their target clients, they also reinforce the 
idea that individuals are ultimately responsible for meeting the financial, as well as 
cultural burden of burying their kin. A funeral insurance brochure put out by Hollard, 
one of South Africa’s largest insurance companies, captures these sentiments succinctly: 
At Hollard we understand the importance of family and friends coming together for the burial of 
someone close. We appreciate that you want to provide generously [and say your farewells with 
dignity]. You need the freedom to mourn without worrying about money (Hollard Funeral Plan 
Brochure). 
 
What accounts like these emphasize, both explicitly and implicitly, are how 
formal financial services expand choice and opportunity to clients, in other words, 
strengthen individual agency. There is also an emancipatory quality to this narrative; the 
formal system “frees” poor people from the constraints and inadequacies of their 
informal solutions. But as I have demonstrated in previous chapters, microinsurance 
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systems have not displaced informal mechanisms. Rather, formal and informal 
institutions form hybrid arrangements that regulate behaviors in new ways. When 
confronted by a risk event—in this case, the death of a loved one—how do individual 
clients navigate this emergent institutional terrain? In what ways are they constrained 
and/or empowered? 
This chapter examines how microinsurance clients experience and navigate an 
institutional space produced through the interaction between the formal insurance 
system and the informal norms, customs, and mechanisms that are deeply embedded in 
the daily lives of the poor. While I draw heavily on data collected through several one-
on-one and focus group interviews I conducted with clients, I anchor the substantive 
analysis of this chapter on two illustrative cases that reveal, in their differences, key 
insights that challenge some of the sweeping assumptions at the heart of normative 
microinsurance frameworks.  
I open the chapter with a brief account of a traditional Xhosa funeral (the funeral 
of Feziwe Patricia Sibiya), which I attended during my fieldwork. An ethnographic 
perspective helps to situate the performance of funeral rituals within the proper 
contextual frame. It brings into sharper focus the underlying social institutions that 
regulate the ways in which individuals respond to the challenges brought on by the death 
of a family member.  
I then present the case of a Zulu woman named Jabulile Lwazi who provided a 
detailed account of her experiences as she planned a funeral for her late husband. In 
many ways, Jabulile’s story is emblematic of the ideal case scenario upon which the 
microinsurance value proposition rests. She utilized her funeral policy effectively to 
mitigate the financial risk of her husband’s death and successfully yielded value not only 
from formal institutions, but from informal ones as well. Her story, and many just like it, 
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add empirical grist to the founding mythologies of microfinance and further equate 
formalization with empowerment/poverty alleviation.  
Her case is contrasted with that of Goodwill Nxusani, who unfortunately 
experienced bereavement twice over the course of my fieldwork: first of his grandmother 
(Feziwe Sibiya), who died in November 2015, and then of his father-in-law who died a 
couple months later. Although Goodwill was also able to benefit from his formal funeral 
policy, the many difficulties he had to confront as he juggled various financial, social, and 
cultural obligations were strikingly different from Jabulile’s relatively straightforward 
experience. What were the factors that made these experiences so different? To answer 
this question, I attempt to retrace the ways in which clients like Jabulile and Goodwill 
navigated the microinsurance value chain, from the way they utilized burial societies and 
funeral parlors to their experiences with the insurance claims process. Taken together, I 
assess welfare/risk outcomes relative to the question of agency, that is, whether access to 
microinsurance empowers individual clients like Jabulile and Goodwill to effectively 
protect themselves against financial risk and to meet the various obligations that a funeral 
entails. 
My findings indicate that higher levels of income play a crucial role not only in 
yielding maximum monetary value from the value chain, but also in accessing higher 
quality sources of information that lead into a sort of virtuous cycle that pays out 
monetary and non-monetary dividends. For those of low income, on the other hand, 
their experience is more characteristic of a poverty trap, in which lower quality 
information leads to inefficient engagement with institutional arrangements. Since I have 
identified income as a determinant factor, I corroborate Jabulile and Goodwill’s accounts 
with data I obtained from client interviews, which have been delineated based on 
reported income. The analysis provokes critical questions about how an individual’s 
socio-economic position affects how clients engage with microinsurance markets. I argue 
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that the relationship between individual agency and the wider institutional ecosystem 
must be understood through a political economy lens, in that power relations shape the 
contours of the institutional landscape and play a determining role in the set of options 
and benefits available to clients.  
Burying Feziwe: A Xhosa Funeral in the Western Cape 
 
Burying the person ‘well’ or performing umkhapho and umbuyiso ‘properly’ can be very healing. 
It is healing because the focus is not just on the beast that is slaughtered, but the focus is that as 
a family or clan. You gather there for two days and in the course of the gathering there is talk, 
there is team building, and when the following day the neighbourhood arrives, elderly people and 
wise women stand up and address you, and they sort of praise you by being grateful to those who 
made you who you are. In that sense the spirit of the ancestor is honoured and you feel 
encouraged and strengthened. Even the poor will benefit out of the meal and the ancestor will 
smile, wherever they are, because they will see their son enjoys people. I think that is the 
philosophy behind it (Van Heerden, 2002: p.9 citing personal communications with A. Mbete, 
May 21, 2001). 
 
 The funeral for Feziwe Patricia Sibiya was held on 12 December 2015 and 
gathered nearly 400 people in a large community center in Delft, an impoverished 
township on the outskirts of Cape Town. In a clear departure from the norm among the 
Xhosa living in Cape Town, Feziwe had made it clear to her family before she died that 
she wanted to be buried in the Western Cape where she had lived almost all her life. 
Many of her relatives from the Eastern Cape made the journey to Delft to pay their final 
respects. The rest of the attendees were members of Feziwe’s church. 
 The funeral ceremony was an elaborate, highly synchronized affair. Overall, the 
mood in the hall was festive; whenever a moment of sadness settled into the crowd, 
celebratory music, singing, and clapping spontaneously emerged to drown it out. 
Attendees exhibited a collective familiarity with the subtle rhythms of the proceedings—
with very little prompting from the officiants, the congregation seemed to know 
intuitively when to stand, when to sing, when to dance, when to sit, and when to wail. In 
these ritualistic displays, clearly delineated and defined gender roles were evident; while 
well-dressed men adorned the head stage, delivered the eulogies/speeches, and 
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“officiated” the ceremony, the women were generally the ones to lead the performative 
displays of celebration and mourning. It felt scripted, as if everyone in the hall had been 
to his or her fair share of funerals in the past and were settling into familiar roles. 
 It was also clear that community members used these occasions to be seen. 
Displays of social status were inscribed in the bright array of suits and garments, hair 
weaves, hats, and freshly manicured nails, which were dotted throughout the hall. 
Disapproving glances were reserved for those who seemed to cross a subtle line between 
dressing well and dressing flashy. At the center of attention though was a heavy-set, 
powerful looking man who was shaking hands and conversing with several people who 
approached him throughout the ceremony. Later, I would find out from Goodwill that 
this was his uncle, Feziwe’s eldest son. According to Goodwill, the costs of the funeral 
were split between him and his younger brother who was also on the front stage. During 
his eulogy, the elder son made brief mention of a conflict he had with his brother, which, 
to his relief, had apparently been resolved in time for the funeral. I asked Goodwill if he 
knew what this conflict was about: 
It was over the money. They agreed 50-50, but then he [the older brother] wanted a bigger 
funeral. His brother doesn’t have the money, so there was a disagreement, but at the end of the 
day, they were able to sort it (Nxusani, G.; Informal Conversation; 12 December 2015).  
 
 In this setting, it was apparent that it was social pressure as much as it was 
cultural/traditional obligation, which compelled the two sons to pay for a funeral of this 
size. The habituated rhythms and patterns of social interactions on display were strong 
indications that certain expectations had to be met. It was as if the entire choreography 
of the ceremony—the structured and regulated ways in which attendees engaged in these 
rituals of bereavement—depended on the hosts’ ability to meet a certain material 
threshold. Failure to do so would reflect poorly on their social standing within the 
community. Moreover, as sons, the expectation was even higher that they would send 
their mother off in a dignified, socially accepted manner. 
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 After the ceremony in the community center, which lasted nearly three-and-a-half 
hours, the funeral party packed into buses and made its way to a large, yet non-descript 
mass cemetery on the edge of Khayelitsha. It was on 
this route that I observed the unabashedly commercial 
presence of insurance companies and funeral parlors: 
Outside the community center, the funeral parlor, called 
Geilishe-Taliwe has their banner erected. Old Mutual’s 
logo is also visible…At the burial site, there are about 7 
funerals happening simultaneously. Many are really 
loud, some even have what looks like marching bands 
with coordinated uniforms. They all have their own logos 
and color schemes, which are clearly displayed as 
advertisement/marketing. During the burial itself, 
people are handing out brochures. This happened as they 
were lowering the body into the ground. This didn’t seem 
to strike the attendants as strange or rude at all. It felt 
natural. It seems as if this type of behavior has been 
accepted as normal to people who must have grown up 
attending funerals just like this all their lives (Fieldwork 
Notes; Funeral of Feziwe Patricia Sibiya; 12 December 
2015). 
 
Since this form of marketing places a high premium on reputation, funeral 
parlors are compelled to put on lavish displays during funeral ceremonies to draw 
attention to their services (e.g. marching bands). Meanwhile, the brands of insurance 
companies like Old Mutual, Metropolitan, Hollard, Assupol, and African Life were 
plastered on banners, tents, and even vehicles—visual evidence that the work of market 
penetration had successfully grafted microinsurance onto informal infrastructures. Those 
who were attending Feziwe’s funeral would be the clients of tomorrow. 
After the burial, and the attendant ceremonies, the guests were ushered into a 
large gathering area underneath massive tents rented out by the funeral parlor. Women 
who had been cooking since the early morning hours were serving food to the guests—
these were the “helping hands” of Feziwe’s burial society. Here as well, familiar rhythms 
regulated social interactions, and it seemed that everyone played some prescribed role 
Figure 12- Burial Ceremony for Feziwe 
Sibiya. Tent Displaying Logo for 
Geilishe Taliwe Funeral Parlor and Old 
Mutual. Photo Credit: Christopher Paek 
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without the need for instruction. In those waning moments, it struck me that this was the 
culmination of a process that began years ago when Feziwe had joined a burial society. It 
is likely that she herself had been the helping hands at several funerals over the course of 
her life. The tents, the buses, the burial equipment, the chairs, the mahogany casket, and 
the community center in Delft were provided by a funeral parlor that was underwritten 
by one of the largest insurance companies in the country. 
Through the mediation of actors, and of formal and informal institutions, the 
intimate cultural practices of this funeral were effectively linked with the global financial 
system. But by no means is the path from insurance office to cemetery a straight one. 
Clients of different profiles and socio-economic backgrounds engage with the 
institutional space in a variety of ways and according to their means. Why are some 
empowered and others not? I turn now to the case of Jabulile Lwazi who took primary 
responsibility in planning a funeral for her husband. Her case highlights how institutions 
can work in concert to produce ideal risk outcomes, provided that clients know how to 
use leverage to maximize value.   
The Case of Jabulile Lwazi: An Ideal Microinsurance Client 
 
A Worthy Send-off: Jabulile Buries her Husband 
 
 Jabulile Lwazi—a mother of six and a grandmother of nine—strikes a formidable 
first impression. Her calm, self-assured manner of speech and her richly layered attire 
speak to her standing as the matriarch of a well-respected Zulu family. She is reputed to 
be a pillar of her community in Umlazi, a large township located just south of Durban, 
and it was clear through her demeanor and poise that she wanted for very little. She has 
steady work as a medical researcher and her reported monthly income is approximately 
R6,500. In my sample, only 4 respondents (5.3%) reported a monthly household income 
in the same vicinity as Jabulile’s (See Figure 13). 
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Figure 13- Reported Monthly Income (N=76) 
While this level of income positions her comfortably in the middle-to-upper class 
relative to other members of her community in Umlazi, Jabulile is still considered an 
archetypal microinsurance client. According to the South African Audience Research 
Foundation (SAARF),38 she falls in between 5-6 on the Life Standard Measure (LSM), 
which is the core microinsurance market demographic for individual policies (i.e. direct 
retail funeral insurance). SAARF also provides a colorful sketch of what an LSM 5-6 
household might look like: 1) An average household income of R4,550-R6,895 per 
month; 2) Small to medium sized townhouse in an urban/peri-urban setting; 3) Access to 
electricity, water, and flush toilets inside the home; and 4) Possession of assets such as 
TV sets, a refrigerator, and a stove. A key distinction between an LSM-5 and LSM-6 
household is that more than 30% of LSM-5 households reported that they made 
personal use of the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) card, which means 
they qualify for state-based financial aid. In contrast, nearly half of LSM-6 households 
reported having a savings account, suggesting that they are more self-sufficient 
financially. Jabulile likely belongs to this latter grouping. 
                                               
38 http://www.saarf.co.za/lsm/lsms.asp 
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Unlike most people in her community, she avoided joining burial societies and 
did not take out a policy with a funeral parlor:  
These burial society guys, there’s too many meetings [laughs]. And if you don’t go, they will give 
you the fine. I have this insurance, the money is not important so I didn’t join. But I still go to 
their funerals to help. They know me, so I knew that they would come for the helping hands 
(Lwazi, J.; Fieldwork Interview; 15 January 2016).  
 
This is something the other respondents in Jabulile’s income bracket had in common. All 
but one opted not to join a burial society/funeral parlor and there seemed to be a shared 
recognition that formal insurance providers were a safer option for their money: 
Interviewer: Why did you choose for funeral insurance cover over the burial societies? 
 
Respondent: I have heard several stories of burial societies folding up and their members losing 
their monies. I don’t want to waste my money on burial societies. I have had a positive 
experience with the bank insurance [FNB’s funeral insurance policy]. Their premium is 
reasonable and affordable and all my dependents qualify for cover (Respondent #74; Group 
Interview #5; 17 March 2016). 
 
Jabulile held a total of three policies with three different insurance providers—Old 
Mutual, Standard Bank, and the First National Bank (FNB)—and paid monthly 
premiums of R209, R90, and R280, respectively, for 6 straight years. This adds up to 
approximately 9% of her monthly income (R579) going toward premium payments, and 
roughly R42,000 in total over the course of 6 years. Together, these policies covered 
herself, her husband, her six children, and her mother-in-law.  
 In September 2014, her husband of 42 years died unexpectedly. Since he was the 
male head of household, Zulu funeral tradition dictated that elaborate preparations be 
made, including the slaughter of a cow, sheep and a goat. The livestock used for these 
ceremonial requirements cost R11,800. On the recommendation of a family friend, she 
found a funeral parlor and opted for their most expensive package—R29,000—which 
provided her with a high-quality mahogany casket, buses for transportation, and burial 
administration. To round off expenses, she also paid for a tent and cold room (R2,000), 
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food for the guests (R11,000) and the graveyard plot (R4,500). The total expenses for the 
funeral came out to R58,300 (See Table 1). 
Funeral Expense How it was paid Services Rendered Amount Paid 
Funeral Parlor 
Package 
Insurance Benefit 
(Old Mutual, 
Standard Bank, and 
First National 
Bank) 
Mahogany casket, 2 
buses for 
transportation, 
hearse, and funeral 
administration  
R29,000 
Livestock Insurance Benefit Cow, sheep and goat 
for funeral ritual 
purposes and food 
R11,800 
Food Insurance Benefit Food for guests R11,000 
Graveyard Plot Insurance Benefit Municipal fee for 
graveyard plot 
“rent” 
R4,500 
Miscellaneous Insurance Benefit Tent and cold room R2,000 
Total: R58,300 
Table 1- A financial profile of Jabulile's funeral expenses  
 The costs of the funeral were covered in full by her three insurance policies. 
After she submitted her claim, these policies paid out within 24 hours to an accumulated 
amount of just over R70,000. She was pleased with the fact that she received this money 
hassle free: 
I had no problem with insurance, they were very fast to pay me the money. I have told all my 
friends that you must have insurance because it will pay for everything (Lwazi, J.; Fieldwork 
Interview; 15 January 2016). 
 
On top of her insurance payout, she received monetary and in-kind contributions from 
friends and family, despite the fact that she wasn’t part of a burial society. In other 
words, her standing within the community was strong enough to leverage the benefits of 
reciprocity without being bound to the ambivalent, often times fraught social relations 
entailed in burial society membership. In the end, the combination of the insurance 
payouts and contributions from friends and family covered the costs of the funeral and 
left Jabulile with an excess amount of nearly R20,000. Suffice it to say, Jabulile was 
pleased with the outcome: 
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He [her husband] was the head of our house and we have been together for 42 years so it was 
very important that we did a funeral that respected him and our tradition…I was very, very 
happy (Lwazi, J.; Fieldwork Interview; 15 January 2016). 
 
Pulling all the Strings: The Empowered Microinsurance Client 
 
As Jabulile navigated her way from submitting claims to dealing with the funeral 
parlor, she had two key advantages working in her favor: her steady stream of income 
and her reputation in the local community. In particular, these afforded her a degree of 
agency to engage with funeral parlors on stronger terms. One complication she had to 
overcome, for example, was that her husband died unexpectedly while visiting relatives in 
Mpumalanga, which is about 65 km to the northwest of Umlazi. She immediately 
coordinated with the funeral parlor (in Umlazi) to retrieve the body from a hospital in 
Mpumalanga and then store the body in a cold room until funeral arrangements could be 
made. Even though she was not a premium-paying member of this funeral parlor, they 
were willing to perform this service on a deferred payment. They were well aware of 
Jabulile’s social standing and took her at her word that she would be able to pay once she 
received her insurance payout. 
If the majority of responses to my client interviews are any indication, this level 
of courtesy and trust extended by the funeral parlor to Jabulile is quite rare. As discussed 
in previous chapters, funeral parlors leverage their relative positions of power to dictate 
the terms by which they engage with clients. When funeral parlors demand payment of 
unexpected or unpaid charges, clients are typically in no position to contest: 
If you are short on the money, parlors will hold the body until they receive the full payment. I 
had to borrow the R1000 from my relatives for them to fetch the body. They don’t tell you these 
things. They promise all these nice things at first, but all the things they promise don’t happen 
the way they say (Female Respondent; Durban Focus Group #1; 14 January 2016). 
 
Using their leverage to demand payment should not necessarily be interpreted as abusive 
practice, however. From the funeral parlors’ perspective, operating in a low and volatile 
income space means that they have to deal with clients who are regularly short on cash. 
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Where to draw the line in terms of how much flexibility to extend is a balancing act that 
funeral parlors struggle to maintain: 
I started this business bankrupt and built it up little by little. In this business, something will 
always go wrong. You have to be flexible. I am ok with letting people pay later, but I have seen 
with other funeral parlors who have been taken advantage by clients who don’t pay. Flexibility 
is good because it makes it better for word of mouth. But at the end of the day, I run a business 
and I have to be paid (Dumile, Hlubi Funeral Parlor; Fieldwork Interview; 16 March 2016). 
 
Regardless of whether funeral parlors are motivated by self-preservation or are looking 
to exploit vulnerable clients, they usually demand payment upfront for any services they 
provide. This is a constant source of friction in already stressed situations in which death 
comes unexpectedly or in which kin are forced to turn to expensive moneylenders (i.e. 
“mashonisas”) to obtain the necessary lump sums of cash. Jabulile was never faced with 
this dilemma. 
  By virtue of the fact that she opted not to hold a funeral parlor policy, Jabulile 
was not bound to any particular funeral parlor. As a result, she had more leverage to 
dictate terms in her favor: 
I was very satisfied with the funeral…I gave them [the funeral parlor] very specific instructions 
and they did everything properly. I told the funeral parlor everything I wanted. They delivered 
everything on time and it was a beautiful ceremony (Lwazi, J.; Fieldwork Interview; 15 
January 2016). 
 
Unlike premium paying members, Jabulile could threaten to switch to a different 
provider if the funeral parlor gave her any problems. She was, in other words, an 
empowered consumer; the R70,000 she received in insurance benefits afforded her the 
leverage to negotiate with the funeral parlor on her own terms.  
Making the Leap: Disembedding from the Informal, Embedding into the Formal  
 
Underpinning Jabulile’s empowerment as a client is her fundamental trust that 
formal microinsurance would deliver the promised benefit. This trust is by no means a 
given, even among those who have taken out a policy. Forgoing burial society 
membership and informal insurance through funeral parlors is a clear indication that 
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clients trust insurance enough to rely on it exclusively to cover the costs of a funeral. For 
those like Jabulile who are financially more secure, this trust goes beyond product and 
provider and extends to the formal regulatory system writ large: 
Interviewer: What would you do if you didn’t get paid out by the insurance company? How 
would you pay for the funeral? 
 
Respondent: I don’t know. I never think about this. [laughs] 
 
Interviewer: You’re not worried about something going wrong? 
 
Respondent: To be honest, not really. We have the contract so everything is straight. I know that 
I never miss the payments so these insurance guys have to follow the contract.  
 
Interviewer: Ok. But if something did go wrong, what do you think you would do? 
 
Respondent: Then I just have to take it to the small claims court and show the contract. As 
long as there is this contract, I am not worried about the payment (Respondent #7; Fieldwork 
Interview; 6 November 2015). 
 
Here the female respondent (identified as having a monthly income of more than R5000) 
reveals a faith in formal institutions (i.e. contracts) and measures for recourse (i.e. the 
courts/legal system). The ideal microinsurance client is thus institutionalized; he or she 
has access to, familiarity with, and trust in the formal institutional sphere. All this 
combined translates into a form of agency that allows clients to extract better value from 
their institutional options. In other words, fluency with formal institutions begets trust, 
trust begets agency, and agency ultimately begets value for “ideal” microinsurance clients 
like Jabulile who are able to fulfill their socio-cultural obligations without falling into a 
spiral of debt. 
By relying solely on her formal insurance policies, Jabulile removed herself from 
the social institutions that regulate interpersonal relations within burial societies: 
I didn’t do everything by tradition. Some of them are not necessary in my view. I picked the 
traditions that were important to me. I don’t care what people say. It is true that if you don’t 
respect traditions, people will start rumors about you, but I don’t care. When my mother passed 
away, I wore a black scarf to honor my Zulu traditions, but I didn’t do other things because it 
was not so important to me (Lwazi, J.; Fieldwork Interview; 15 January 2016). 
 
As reflected in this comment, she felt she had the freedom to be selective about which 
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traditions she wanted to follow and which to disregard. Her attitude evinced very little 
concern for community gossip and reproach—the social sanctions that constrain most 
burial society members. In other words, Jabulile’s exclusive engagement with 
microinsurance corresponded with her being disembedded from informal institutional 
systems and the various constraints that they entail. 
 She would have been unable to make this leap without trust in the formal 
institutions and mechanisms of recourse. Over time, her embeddedness into the 
formal/financial institutional sphere crystallized into a habitus that enabled her to 
maneuver more fluidly within the system, while concurrently disembedding from the 
informal/social institutional sphere: 
I don’t know why we blacks stick with burial societies and funeral parlors to be perfectly honest. 
Maybe it’s because certain people see financial companies as ‘white businesses’ and funeral 
parlors as ‘black business,’ I don’t know. But I think people are changing slowly (Lwazi, J.; 
Funeral Interview; 15 January 2016). 
 
In many ways, then, Jabulile came to represent the idealized narrative of an empowered, 
“modern” microinsurance client who detaches from “suboptimal” informal mechanisms 
and embraces formal financial services. What this account misses, however, is how 
clients like Jabulile may be empowered to begin with. Her income was robust and stable 
enough to make monthly premium payments. Her high standing within the community 
was such that gossip and social expectation exerted relatively little pressure. Access to 
microinsurance simply enhanced a degree of agency that she possessed already. But how 
do formal financial services, i.e. microinsurance, affect those who do not have the same 
kinds of financial and social capital at Jabulile’s disposal? Is agency enhanced when there 
is a lack of agency to begin with? In the next section, I explore these questions by 
considering the case of Goodwill Nxusani. 
The Case of Goodwill Nxusani: Drowning in Debt and (Still) Vulnerable to Risk 
 
Three Days Without Food: Goodwill Buries his Father-in-Law 
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 In contrast to Jabulile’s account, Goodwill Nxusani’s story offers a glimpse into 
how socially and economically disempowered individuals navigate the institutional terrain 
to help cope with the expenses of a funeral. In his little corner of Khayelitsha, Goodwill 
is a well-recognized community leader. He lives in a small shack made of corrugated iron 
with his wife and three children. He supports his family, as well as his mother who lives 
in the Eastern Cape, by running a makeshift video arcade out of his home, which earns 
him R800 per month. He also receives a child income grant from the state (R990 per 
month), and performs odd jobs that earn him a variable income of about R200 per 
month. In total, he earns a monthly income of approximately R2,000, right around 
average for my sample and between LSM 1-2 on the SAARF scale.39  
  In late January 2016, just a month after his grandmother’s funeral, Goodwill 
received the unfortunate news that his father-in-law had also died. As the only income-
earning household in the immediate family, Goodwill bore most of the financial burden 
of paying for the funeral. Two factors drove up the costs: 1) His father-in-law was the 
head of his family, which meant that livestock would have to be slaughtered; and 2) 
While he died near Cape Town, he was originally from Queenstown in the Eastern Cape, 
which meant that transportation would have been arranged to repatriate the body. 
Combined with the expenses (see Table 2), Goodwill was faced with a total cost of 
R42,040.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
39 LSM 2 households are characterized by squatter hut shacks, communal access to water, and minimal ownership of durables. 42.5% 
have a SASSA Grant card indicating heavy reliance on the state. 
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Funeral Expense How it was paid Services Rendered Amount Paid 
Undertaker #1- 
Western Cape 
Assupol Benefit Transfer of the body 
to the mortuary, 
mortuary facility and 
services for 2 weeks, 
and coffin 
R6,280 
Transportation Negotiated a 
monthly installment 
plan with his cousin. 
This was provided 
on a discounted rate 
Goodwill’s cousin 
provided the 
transportation to the 
Eastern Cape 
including the hearse 
R10,500 
Undertaker #2- 
Eastern Cape 
Assupol Benefit Services related to 
the actual funeral in 
the Eastern Cape 
including the 
provision of tents, 
chairs, bakkies for 
people transport, 
toilets and funeral 
administration 
R4,500 
Pastor Fee Assupol Benefit/ 
Personal Savings 
Led the funeral 
ceremony and burial 
R1,500 
Food Assupol Benefit Food for guests R5,000 
Slaughtered Sheep Assupol 
Benefit/Personal 
Savings 
Food for guests R1,000 
Slaughtered Cow Negotiated a 
monthly installment 
plan 
Cow slaughtered for 
ceremonial/ritual 
purposes and for 
food 
R6,000 
Post Funeral 
Tradition 
Personal Income Drinking 
‘umqombothi’ as 
part of the “Moving 
Darkness in the 
family” ritual. This 
occurred on 27 
February 2016, 
nearly a month after 
the funeral itself 
R260 
Second Cow Personal Income The slaughtering of 
the second cow is so 
that the soul of the 
deceased male can 
be accompanied to 
their eternal home. 
R7,000 
Total: R42,040 
Table 2- A financial profile of Goodwill’s funeral expenses  
  Neither Goodwill nor his wife was part of any burial society or funeral parlor, 
which made them relatively rare exceptions. Goodwill explained that he had lost trust in 
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informal service providers after hearing about the case of Chitibhunga, a large burial 
society that took all its members premiums and disappeared over night. Although he did 
not entirely trust formal insurance providers either, he turned to Assupol, a medium-
sized South African insurance company, about 6 months before his father-in-law had 
died. Although premium payments (R170) were difficult to meet every month, his 
diligence ultimately did pay off in the form of a R14,000 payout. This lump sum of 
money was significant as it paid for certain large expenses that needed immediate 
payment, particularly mortuary services and funeral administration costs. For other large 
expenses (i.e. livestock and transportation), Goodwill was forced to exhaust his savings 
and to negotiate monthly installment plans. After two weeks of making the 
arrangements, Goodwill and his family made the long 950 km return journey to 
Queenstown, where 300-400 people attended the funeral. 
 Although Goodwill considers himself lucky to have had a formal policy with 
Assupol, the fact remained that he was still in debt by almost R30,000. In my final visit 
with him before the conclusion of my fieldwork, he confided in me that he and his wife 
had not eaten in three days in order to make the first payment installment on the cow. 
Despite this, he never once considered scaling down on any expense; his father-in-law’s 
body had to be returned home to be with the ancestors, he explained, and a cow had to 
be slaughtered so that his soul could be accompanied on his journey into the afterlife. 
Goodwill felt that if these basic obligations were not met, he would be the subject of 
much gossip within his community. He also feared that his father-in-law’s soul would not 
be at rest. Past incidents of fraud (i.e the case of Chitibhunga) contributed to his lack of 
trust in informal institutions like burial societies and funeral parlors, stripping him and 
his wife of a key source of financial support.  
Moreover, his low, irregular income prevented him from taking out multiple 
policies or a policy with a higher payout. It is likely that without the R990 he received 
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from the state through the child income grant, Goodwill would have had to cancel his 
insurance policy with Assupol. Unlike Jabulile, whose income enabled her to fully 
leverage formal insurance’s value proposition, Goodwill was unable to extract the same 
kind of value from his set of institutional options. Although it is clear from Goodwill’s 
case that having access to microinsurance helped mitigate his financial burden somewhat, 
the larger point remains that it was not enough to confront, in any meaningful way, his 
general state of economic vulnerability and insecurity.  
All You Can Do is Trust God: Institutional Constraints on Client Agency  
 
Clients like Jabulile have leverage over informal businesses like funeral parlors 
because they have been empowered to exercise choice, i.e. they can take their patronage 
elsewhere if they are unsatisfied with a service. But even they are bound in the sense that 
funeral parlors are the only service providers who are equipped to handle the bodies of 
the deceased. The body is thus a site of contestation; any party who controls it ultimately 
controls the terms of exchange. Low-income clients like Goodwill are bound not only 
materially, that is, through the funeral parlors’ control of the body, but structurally as 
well: 
I was paying my funeral parlor for 6 years, but when my sister died in her home, her nephews 
called the hospital and a different funeral parlor picked up the body. They charged me R2000 
to release the body to my parlor. They are criminals! (Female Respondent; Johannesburg Focus 
Group #2; 11 January 2016). 
 
Typically, when clients face these situations, their best form of recourse would be to 
simply switch providers. However, clients are constrained from even this basic course of 
action: 
Interviewer: When you heard about these abuses, why didn’t you just leave for another funeral 
parlor? 
 
Respondent: It is because we have been paying them for a very long time. If we leave, we would 
lose the money that we have paid and it would be for nothing. I don’t want to start all over 
again with a waiting period (Female Respondent; Durban Focus Group #2; 15 January 
2016).  
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The value proposition of premium-based insurance models rests on reliable service 
delivery at the time of claim. Absent this basic guarantee, the premium structure itself, as 
well as other rules such as waiting periods, become institutional constraints on agency.   
While there are a number of these factors in the informal space that constrain an 
individual’s ability to make optimal risk management decisions, the formal institutional 
sphere also presents a set of constraints that limits access to desirable options. Unlike 
burial societies and funeral parlors, formal entities are governed strictly by contractual 
law. And in contrast to informal operators, formal insurers are compelled by regulation 
to operate with as much transparency as will guarantee a baseline of consumer 
protection. All terms and conditions that outline an insurer’s (as well as client’s) 
obligations are provided in contracts signed by all parties; the Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services (FAIS) Act governs information disclosure by sales agents at the 
point of sale.  
 There is, however, an important distinction that should be made between 
transparency and legibility. While clients generally understand the broad strokes of an 
insurance transaction, such as monthly premium obligations and how much they can 
expect to receive in claims, it became clear from the interviews that transparency 
measures like contracts and verbal disclosures did not translate into detailed 
comprehension. Contracts are written in dense legal language (almost exclusively 
English) that is difficult to understand, and sales agents disclose the bare minimum 
information required by FAIS: 
Respondent: I had the Hollard-Kaiser Chiefs plan. I cancelled the policy after they did not pay 
out because my son was not covered.  
 
Interviewer: Why didn’t they pay out? 
 
Respondent: They told me that he was not covered because he was in prison and he died in a 
particular way. See, they bring out the contract and they show it to you. This is where the 
problem is. They will show you that you signed it and there is nothing you can say. If you don’t 
read the contract, you will run into problems (Female Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group 
 230 
#3; 12 January 2015). 
 
When insurance companies fail to pay out a claim for any number of reasons (i.e. lapsed 
policies, exclusions, etc.), many respondents, particularly those who are new to insurance, 
feel that they had been cheated despite what was written in the contract: 
We are tired of insurance. Stokvels are better because it is better to give your money to one 
person to keep. I have paid one insurance company [AVBOB] for 3 years and I missed one 
payment and they say I must start over again with a new waiting period and a new initiation 
fee. I said no and I lost my coverage and they kept all my payments. Where does my money go? 
Insurance companies are tsotsis [thieves] (Respondent #16; Group Interview #1; 21 
November 2015). 
 
This sentiment reveals an inherent tension between informal norms of coverage and 
formal contractual arrangements; it would seem that clients are bringing their 
expectations of the former to bear on latter.  
When there is a legitimate grievance, clients face another seemingly 
insurmountable hurdle: how to navigate the formal legal system. Here especially, it is 
instructive to consider microinsurance provision within the broader frame of social 
exclusion. Due to the historical marginalization of poor South Africans by the formal 
system writ large, there is little familiarity with and faith in formal channels of recourse: 
In general, people don’t know their rights…We have tried to go to the police but they will just 
refer us to the small claims court. It is difficult to deal with new faces who don’t understand your 
whole situation. We must tell the same story over and over and they will maybe inform the rep, 
but it ends there. Police are not trained for this or they are corrupt (Male Respondent; 
Johannesburg Focus Group #1; 11 January 2016). 
 
If something were to go wrong with their formal insurance claims, then, clients are 
simply resigned to the loss: 
You can have insurance, but ultimately all you can do is trust God (Respondent #46; Group 
Interview #4; 23 February 2016). 
 
Seeing is Believing: Fluency as a Limited Form of Agency 
 
 When death comes, the best a microinsurance client can hope for is that formal 
and informal institutions, which have been designed over time to address this particular 
vulnerability, will work in concert to mitigate the expenses of the funeral. As I’ve shown, 
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this outcome is far from certain; clients must navigate an unfamiliar institutional terrain 
shaped by more powerful economic actors who control the flow of information and, by 
extension, the distribution of benefits. Client agency is thus heavily constrained and 
access to the most ideal options is often curtailed by structural limitations. This does not 
mean, however, that low-income clients like Goodwill are completely devoid of agency 
and recourse. Like all social actors, they operate within a particular milieu and react to 
the circumstances placed immediately in front of them.  
Though never fully immune from potential abuse, clients do take measures to 
protect themselves and mitigate the risk of fraud. One of the main mechanisms 
employed is word-of-mouth information sharing. In my sample, nearly all respondents 
joined a burial society and/or funeral parlor through the recommendation of trusted 
family members and neighbors; trust is therefore paramount in these exchanges. Though 
word-of-mouth can function as a form of sanction on misbehaving funeral parlors, it 
only offers partial protection from abuse: 
I did not really do any research. When funeral parlors do funerals, sometimes everything looks 
perfect. So you go with that service. It is only when you yourself go through the process where you 
see everything that goes wrong (Male Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #2; 11 January 
2016). 
 
For many, then, seeing is the only way to 
believing. In this regard, tangibility holds much 
currency in terms of building trust as was 
demonstrated by the failure of mobile-insurance 
products to scale. Physical objects and 
structures like office spaces, display caskets, 
paper contracts, and cash payouts, hold symbolic value that signal legitimacy and 
trustworthiness, which clients rely on to anchor their decision-making: 
 
I don’t trust agents, but it helps that there is a physical office. I can be assured that these people 
Figure 14- Front Office Display at KGA Life. 
Photo Credit: Christopher Paek 
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are not crooks. I like to see that other people come in to do business with KGA [insurance 
company] (Respondent #6; Fieldwork Interview; 6 November 2015). 
 
When problems do inevitably arise, options for recourse are limited as discussed 
above. However, the contrast between the options in the informal as opposed to formal 
spheres reveals the varying degrees of fluency with which clients navigate these spaces to 
air their grievances. This fluency matters insofar as client agency is concerned; if clients 
are unable to speak the language, any form of negotiation or contestation is effectively 
foreclosed. This is particularly relevant when clients confront insurance companies to 
dispute a claim: 
As long as you pay, you’ll have no problem. But once you have a problem with a payment that’s 
when you have a problem. They’ll bring in a manager who only speaks English and you won’t 
feel confident with your English. Then they’ll point to the computer and your chance to explain 
your situation will be gone. (Male Respondent, Johannesburg Focus Group #2; 11 January 
2016) 
 
It is not just fluency with language that clients struggle with, but with the broader realm 
of formalism. Material symbols like the office, computers, and contracts confer 
legitimacy and signal the “professional” ways of doing business. They bestow an 
“epistemic privilege” (Blowfield and Dolan, 2014) upon microinsurance that leaves little 
room for negotiation or contestation from clients who may or may not have a legitimate 
grievance. 
In short, what this speaks to is a general unfamiliarity among poorer clients with 
formal norms, rules, and options for recourse. The formal institutional environment is 
illegible to many low-income clients, even if they manage to gain some nominal level of 
access. And while the informal space presents its own set of constraints, there is at least 
some fluency for clients in terms of how institutions work to regulate this domain:  
In the informal ones, location based, they can speak. They’ll all sit down and come up with a 
solution. The advantage of a burial society is that you can still speak with them if you have a 
problem (Female Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group #4; 12 January, 2016). 
 
If burial society and funeral parlor members cannot get their problems resolved through 
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direct negotiation, there are trusted figures within their communities like area councilors 
to whom they can appeal to arbitrate their case:  
Members of the burial society often have the burial society executive’s phone numbers. Burial 
societies are often formed by people from the same rural area and by virtue of this, there is 
accountability – and as a last resort, if there is a grievance then people can report the matter to 
the king (Respondent #35; Fieldwork Interview; 20 January 2016).  
 
Despite the hierarchal constraints that structure informal interactions, clients have some 
fluency and thus a small measure of agency in the way they can negotiate and contest the 
terms of their engagement. The lack of fluency in the formal institutional sphere, by 
contrast, is an impediment for low-income clients to fully trust microinsurance and 
formal mechanisms of recourse.  
Virtuous Cycles versus Poverty Traps: Comparing the Cases of Jabulile and 
Goodwill 
 
Positive Feedback Loop: Developing Fluency in the Formal Institutional Sphere 
 
 Juxtaposing Goodwill’s account to that of Jabulile’s reveals the ways in which 
class, social status, and income shape how individuals experience the institutional 
environment. The extent to which a client has agency to begin with matters in terms of 
how he or she might derive value from microinsurance. Jabulile’s status, for instance, 
made it easier for her to bear the costs of social reproach. Her decision-making was not 
based on the fear of social sanction but upon quality sources of information that helped 
her navigate the formal bureaucracies of microinsurance:  
Interviewer: How did you hear about these insurance policies? 
 
Jabulile: I think I first heard some radio adverts about the Old Mutual funeral plan. But my 
work colleague was the one to tell me about it. She had a good experience with it so that is what 
convinced me in the end (Lwazi, J.; Fieldwork Interview; 15 January 2016).  
 
After pulling out her first policy with Old Mutual, she learned that FNB—the 
bank she held a checking and savings account with—also offered an array of insurance 
products, including funeral insurance. By then, she was convinced enough about the 
value proposition of insurance to pull out a second policy to supplement the first. 
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Finally, she signed up for a third policy with Standard Bank, which was designed to cover 
older beneficiaries; she used this to cover herself, her husband and her mother-in-law. At 
this point, Jabulile was fully enmeshed within the wider formal financial system. She held 
a checking account, interest-bearing savings account and three insurance policies; 
premiums were paid through automatic debit withdrawals that helped integrate her 
banking and insurance practices into a more streamlined personal finance experience.   
As long as these formal financial services continued to meet her needs, her 
assimilation into formal institutional systems only deepened. Because her peers were 
mostly clients of formal financial services as well, Jabulile was often surrounded by 
people who shared reliable information and feedback that enhanced her own 
experiences. Once embedded into the formal system, a virtuous cycle was initiated (see 
Appendix B). Her income level was high and stable enough that she was confident in 
making regular premium payments to three different insurance providers. She not only 
had ready access to FAIS accredited insurance agents and bank tellers, but her 
confidence in the system was buttressed by peers who successfully navigated the formal 
bureaucracy to receive their claims. In turn, her own positive experience with funeral 
insurance led her to become a purveyor of information that perpetuated this virtuous 
cycle for others: 
Jabulile: I was very happy with the insurance. I convinced three of my friends to also take out 
policies with FNB. 
 
Interviewer: And how did they respond? 
 
Jabulile: At first they were not convinced. Black people fear forms and yet they are signing 
contracts with these funeral parlor guys. I told them it is the same thing…Previously, the agents 
were the ones who scared everyone. They were very aggressive. They are the ones to kill this 
business. But now, I think it’s different. So I told them this business is straight, not like the 
funeral parlors (Lwazi, J.; Fieldwork Interview; 15 January 2016). 
 
Ultimately, the risk and welfare outcomes in Jabulile’s case speak for themselves. 
Her insurance policies covered all her funeral expenses, and she had a sizable amount left 
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over to use as discretionary income. Especially compared to Goodwill’s R30,000 debt, 
this reads like a case of the rich getting richer. And not only was she fully insured against 
a significant risk event, she was insured efficiently. Her case highlights how income, 
while clearly significant in affecting the terms by which a client engages with 
microinsurance, is not the only factor in terms of securing benefits. Developing trust was 
essential for her to make the full leap from the informal to formal sphere. To this end, 
Jabulile was exposed to sources of information that guided her through a formal system 
governed by an unfamiliar set of norms, rules and expectations. Eventually, maneuvering 
within this environment became second nature—a cultivated habitus—allowing her to 
more efficiently deploy her resources. Beyond simply receiving an insurance payout, 
Jabulile was fully incorporated into a formal financial system that was working effectively 
for her. 
Poverty Penalty: Are the Poor Over-Insured? 
 
In contrast, Goodwill and other low-income clients operate in a low-trust 
environment. Seen through this lens, potential victims of fraud are understandably 
defensive and share information that often assumes the worst-case scenario. In previous 
chapters, I have described the ways in which informal operators work to maintain the 
institutional status quo by controlling the flow of information. In part, they are able to 
do so by appealing to practices that have been legitimated through time and tradition. 
Left in the dark, burial society and funeral parlor members adopt a habituated 
helplessness that accepts the status quo as “the way it’s always been done” and thus 
forecloses the possibility of recourse. In the place of reliable information, salacious 
rumors abound, making it exceedingly difficult to tell truth apart from speculative gossip: 
There are vultures out there in this economy…People kill each other to make their own 
business. There are stories of nurses at hospitals will inject something into your loved one. And 
when they die, they will write an obscure forensic term or something on the death chart. And 
they are in league with funeral parlors who will get the business (Male Respondent; 
Johannesburg Focus Group #2; 11 January 2016). 
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As far-fetched as this may sound, I quickly discovered that this rumor and many sordid 
ones like it were widely spread and assumed to be true. Whether these stories are true or 
not is not as important as recognizing how quickly (mis)information spreads throughout 
the community and becomes accepted as truth. Trust in institutions is eroded as a result 
and, as I have shown, rampant levels of mistrust in this space have led people to reject 
some formal insurance products (i.e. mobile insurance), as well as informal entities (i.e. 
Goodwill’s rejection of burial societies/funeral parlors), out of hand. 
 In this environment, it is difficult for clients to differentiate reliable information 
from unsubstantiated rumor. This makes them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, 
particularly when dealing with funeral parlors. Savvy operators can exploit this 
information asymmetry in a variety of ways, especially when clients are in an emotionally 
compromised state of mind:   
If there is a problem with the funeral, someone has just passed away, so it’s difficult to think 
straight. In my experience, funeral parlors don’t really keep their promises. Even if things are 
wrong, you just end up paying for it. They’ll say R600 for the machine [to lower the body into 
the ground]. All you’re thinking about is the standard of the funeral and your guests. This is 
all that is in your mind (Female Respondent; Durban Focus Group #2; 15 January 2016). 
 
Many poor clients respond by obtaining multiple policies from different sources, 
essentially utilizing diversification as a strategy to reduce their exposure to the risk of a 
policy failing to pay out:  
Interviewer: Why are you in a burial society if you already have two policies [with Old Mutual 
and Hollard]? 
 
Respondent: I am afraid that something will go wrong and they will not pay the money when 
something happens. What if the insurance will not pay? We must have the funeral. With a 
burial society at least I know there will be a funeral and helping hands (Respondent #19, 
Group Interview #1; 21 November 2015). 
 
The elderly, in particular, are often covered by multiple policies taken out by their 
family members. A common scenario that occurs is that when a covered member dies, 
their next-of-kin must decide which funeral package offers the best benefits. The others, 
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who may have been paying premiums to their funeral parlor for years, get nothing in 
return due to the lack of a monetary benefit option in many funeral parlor policies:  
You just lose out though if you go with a different funeral parlor. They tell you that it is not a 
cash policy, so you just lose out. Nothing happens. All of that money is theirs. It happens all the 
time (Female Respondent, Durban Focus Group #1; 14 January 2016). 
 
A strong argument could be made, then, that many funeral insurance clients are actually 
over-insured, or at least insured inefficiently. In a way, it is the aptly termed “poverty 
penalty” (Caplovitz, 1964) asserting itself in another form. Rather than higher premium 
rates, the penalty comes from poor clients over-insuring themselves as a result of their 
fundamental mistrust of institutions and exposure to unreliable information. Thus, I 
argue that this behavior should not be understood as irrational in the economic sense, 
but as a plausible, context-driven response. Clients who choose to diversify are guarding 
themselves against fraud and/or unforeseen bureaucratic complications that might lead 
to non-payment. 
Moreover, these insights help to explain why, as financial inclusion theory might 
expect, microinsurance clients do not simply abandon “less efficient” informal 
mechanisms like burial societies, but rather supplement these mechanisms with formal 
services. If unexposed to the type of information Jabulile enjoyed, a full leap to formal 
insurance—and all its relatively unfamiliar institutions of payments, claims, and 
recourse—constitutes a formidable risk in itself; abandoning burial societies and funeral 
parlors altogether means that microinsurance clients risk getting nothing at all if they fail 
to make a premium payment or if a claim does not pay out for any reason. Due to the 
social and cultural imperatives placed on funerals, this is an outcome that clients will try 
to avoid at even prohibitive cost to themselves. In this regard, Goodwill can be 
considered a bit of an outlier. While most of his peers understood the risks of being 
exploited by burial societies/funeral parlors, they chose not to rely solely on insurance 
companies. This decision could be based on a variety of reasons: lack of trust, lack of 
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literacy, or perhaps even lack of reliable income from which to make premium payments. 
Faced with similar constraints, Goodwill’s decision to rely only on his Assupol policy can 
be read as an act of faith. 
Whatever the case may be, a careful reading of comments made by interview 
respondents suggests that they do not necessarily understand their own behavior as risk 
diversification. Instead, many seem to have mentally assigned different functions to the 
various institutional forms: 
Interviewer:  Why so many policies? 
 
Respondent: One policy [with the funeral parlor] is for the coffin, but in that one, there’s no one 
that will help me. The other policy [formal insurance] provides the cash, which can be used for 
the expensive things. The “street” society is to get help from people who can work [cook] on the 
funeral day. What’s nice with the burial society is the helping hands. Money from insurance will 
be used so that everyone can eat. What else? I spend the money for clothes and hair [laughs] 
(Female Respondent; Johannesburg Focus Group 3; 12 January 2015). 
 
Constrained as they are, low-income microinsurance clients like Goodwill are a far cry 
from the empowered individuals who allocate resources rationally and efficiently with 
their newfound access to formal financial services. Instead, they are bricoleurs in their 
own right, operating within data-poor, low-trust environments. They do the best they 
can to adapt to and piece together institutional arrangements—including 
microinsurance—to meet their risk management needs.  
Conclusion 
 
 The danger for any normative framework is in the way it can privilege a single 
narrative at the expense of alternative outcomes. The mobilizing discourses of 
microfinance and microinsurance emphasize the empowered individual and his/her 
ability to master risk. This chapter has pushed back against this narrative by considering 
the underlying conditions that must first be present in order for this empowered risk 
subject to emerge. The analysis found that for the poorest clients in particular, access to 
formal financial services alone is insufficient to mitigate their vulnerability to risk. In fact, 
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I argue that it is their condition of vulnerability in the first place that prevents them from 
fully actualizing the benefits that microinsurance can bring. 
 Despite the fact that Jabulile and Goodwill are both microinsurance clients, they 
inhabit altogether different social and economic realities, which determine much in terms 
of how they benefit from their respective engagements with microinsurance. Such a 
disparity is reminiscent of Marguerite Robinson’s analysis of microcredit and the ways in 
which it reifies a line between the “economically active” and the unproductive poor 
(Robinson, 2001). In much the same way, while Jabulile represents an ideal insurance 
subject, Goodwill must be disciplined and transformed into one.  
 But what makes Jabulile “ideal”? She had a steady and high enough income 
stream that she could afford years of monthly premium payments. This enabled her to 
select insurance plans, which yielded higher payouts; I estimated that her premium-to-
claims ratio was superior to that of Goodwill’s by about 50%. She was formally banked, 
making it easier for insurance companies to set up automatic debit orders. She developed 
fluency with the formal institutional environment, such that she had confidence enough 
in contracts, claims administration bureaucracies, and courts to rely solely on 
microinsurance to cover the cost of her husband’s funeral. These attributes, i.e. reliable 
income, trust in and fluency with formal institutions, framed her engagement with 
microinsurance and embedded her within a virtuous cycle that eventually produced an 
ideal welfare outcome. She was empowered to negotiate with the institutional 
environment on her terms and avoided falling into debilitating debt. 
 In contrast, Goodwill and the majority of clients in my sample were mired in 
what might be described as a poverty trap. They operate and make decisions in an 
environment fraught with mistrust and poor quality information. They lack the fluency 
and/or confidence to rely on formal mechanisms of recourse. As a result, sufficient trust 
in formal institutions was not cultivated. Clients thus hedged their risk by retaining 
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membership in their burial societies and funeral parlors. It was a common occurrence 
that a single family member could be covered by multiple formal and informal policies, 
an inefficient use of limited financial resources. And unlike Jabulile who was largely 
disembedded from the social structures/institutions that regulate this space, poorer 
clients like Goodwill were still compelled to abide strictly by prescribed social norms in 
order to avoid relational forms of sanction. 
 While poor clients like Goodwill manage to exert a limited, largely reactionary 
form of agency, they must ultimately navigate an institutional terrain that is shaped by 
and designed for more powerful, better-positioned economic actors. Their scope for 
agency is thus heavily constrained, not only by other actors and institutional structures, 
but also by the very nature of their poverty. To see the world through Goodwill’s eyes is 
to take institutions, both formal and informal, with a heavy dose of skepticism. Though 
these institutions have evolved separately to help mitigate his exposure to risk, their 
interactions create conditions by which the costs and benefits of engagement with risk 
management institutions are distributed on unequal terms. The potential for these clients 
to protect themselves from risk is thus highly circumscribed.  
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9—Conclusion 
 
I heard many stories over the course of my fieldwork. But of all of them, the 
story of how Goodwill and his wife went without food for three days because of funeral 
related expenses remained with me long after I left South Africa. While Goodwill had 
mentioned this to me in passing—barely a side note as if it was an entirely normal state 
of affairs—I have found myself mulling over its significance from a multitude of angles. 
First and foremost, it reveals how seriously Xhosa households take their responsibilities 
to bury their kin in a dignified way. While the quantitative results do indeed suggest that 
the death of a family member looms as a front-of-mind risk event for survey 
respondents, it was Goodwill’s story that drove home just how intense and highly-
prioritized this concern was in their day-to-day worldview.  
Second, his story highlights both the potential and limits of microinsurance as a 
viable risk management instrument in the lives of the poor. On the surface, the funeral 
insurance policy he held with Assupol worked as it was designed; after only 6 months of 
paying premiums (R1,020), he received a monetary payout of R14,000, which helped 
defray the crippling costs of the funeral (R42,040). By all indications, Goodwill was 
pleased with this outcome. But on closer examination, many factors had to go exactly 
right for this ideal outcome to emerge. It was entirely possible that the risk event (the 
death of a covered beneficiary) might have occurred outside the coverage timeframe. 
Another possibility was that Goodwill could have missed a premium payment or two due 
to unexpected expenditures or disruptions to his income flow. Had any of these very 
plausible scenarios materialized, Goodwill would have been left worse off than if he had 
not obtained a policy at all.  
Of course, the risk of non-payment is one that all insurance clients must assume 
upon signing their contracts. But the lingering question I was left with was whether the 
heightened level of risk for Goodwill and the millions of other low-income 
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microinsurance policyholders was ultimately tenable. Was this simply introducing a new 
risk, while claiming to address another? This question encapsulates an important wedge 
in the debates over financial inclusion and inclusive markets for development. While 
improved access to markets is celebrated in the mainstream literature as an unqualified 
positive goal, the incursion of market institutions into low-income spaces has also 
restructured informal infrastructures. If we account for the power imbalances that exist 
between private corporations and these community-based structures, it becomes possible 
to pose more critical questions regarding the terms of this restructuring. Does inclusion 
produce unintended, yet adverse outcomes for the risk management institutions that 
have long served low-income communities? What does this mean for these 
communities? 
I have demonstrated how in the South African microinsurance market, insurance 
companies do indeed resort to a number of discursive and managerial techniques to 
restructure and repurpose informal institutions to facilitate their operations. But I also 
showed how such efforts do not proceed deterministically. Individual actors mediate the 
interactions between formal and informal institutions. And since these actors are 
embedded within situated social and power hierarchies, processes of formalization flow 
through these complex relational webs, which affects and alters institutional and 
regulatory outcomes. Formalization is by no means inevitable. 
The objective of this thesis has been to move beyond the valorizing narratives of 
the financial inclusion agenda and the structurally determinist critiques that characterize 
the two sides of the financial inclusion/microinsurance debate. It has focused instead on 
the underlying institutional dynamics that ultimately shape welfare outcomes. By giving 
equal attention to both formal and informal institutions, I moved the analysis away from 
top-down “institutional design” perspectives and re-centered it on more fluid, relational 
conceptions of institutional interactionism (i.e. bricolage) underpinned by a political 
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economy framework. Within this frame, the crucial role of actors, i.e. 
gatekeepers/mediators/intermediaries, and their power relations, come into a much 
clearer focus. Formal and informal actors simultaneously respond to and shape 
institutional arrangements. In other words, individual agency is mutually constitutive of, 
rather than external to, processes of institutional change and development. 
Both the theoretical and empirical frameworks that give structure to this thesis 
are centered on this complex interplay between institutions, actors, and the underlying 
power dynamics that give shape to the social field. Bringing together structure and 
agency under the same analytical frame required that I adopt an ethnographic sensibility 
attuned to the different social positions occupied by key actors along the microinsurance 
value chain. In a sense, then, the ethnographic approach I undertook was multi-polar in 
the way it gravitated toward different clusters of actors—formal actors like insurance 
sales agents and state regulators/policymakers; informal actors like funeral parlor 
operators and burial society administrators; and of course, microinsurance clients. From 
these various vantage points, I was able to express the different ways these actors 
experienced and responded to the emergent set of opportunities, constraints, and 
incentives produced by institutional arrangements. In the following sections, I provide an 
overview of my core arguments and insights, discuss their theoretical and empirical 
implications, and conclude with final remarks regarding key contributions made by this 
thesis to the existing literature and directions for future research. 
Institutions and Agency: A Brief Summation of Key Arguments and Insights 
 
The substantive portion of the thesis was divided into two broad segments. In 
the first (Chapters 4-6), I focused the analysis on the ways in which formal and informal 
institutions operate and interact in the microinsurance space. I began by looking at the 
development of informal institutions (as embodied by burial societies) within the context 
of South Africa’s unique socio-political history. I traced the evolution of burial societies 
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alongside the unfolding patterns of labor migration, which have historically been shaped 
by the forces of colonization and apartheid. By helping labor migrants coordinate in 
bringing bodies back to their ancestral homelands, burial societies bridged a gap between 
the broader developments of South Africa’s modernizing society with the 
traditional/cultural legacies that continue to hold sway over indigenous groups like the 
amaXhosa. The resilience of burial societies in the face of dramatic social and political 
upheaval is a testament to both their adaptability as an institutional form, and to their 
enduring importance within communities. Beyond fulfilling economic functions, i.e. 
pooling financial resources to help members meet the costs of a funeral ceremony, they 
play important social roles, such as constituting notions of “neighborhoods” (Bähre, 
2007a) and reinforcing norms of solidarity and reciprocity. Thus, a burial society is not 
just an informal pooling scheme, but the embodiment of economic, social, and cultural 
institutions that regulates collective behavior toward a more effective and cohesive 
mutualism. 
I analyzed formal institutions within a much more recent historical frame. The 
rapid expansion of the microinsurance market in South Africa quickly exposed traditional 
insurance regulations as inappropriate for the low-income space. The ensuing “drive to 
formalize” reveals how formal actors like insurance companies and regulators 
fundamentally view informal systems/practices as inefficient and/or abusive. Yet despite 
a consensus between industry and state that a standalone microinsurance regulatory 
framework was needed, reform legislation has stalled due to broader policy priorities that 
have taken precedence. In the absence of this regulatory framework, insurance 
companies have essentially had to improvise within this unregulated space; Frances 
Cleaver’s notion of bricolage captures nicely the ways in which insurance companies 
have drawn on and re-purposed existing institutions (i.e. through group-based 
underwriting partnerships with burial societies and funeral parlors) to achieve their access 
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objectives and to shape a space that is more amenable to their intervention. They have 
deployed management technologies like the Living Standards Measure (LSM) and 
insurance contracts to identify and discipline “ideal” microinsurance clients who comply 
with formally regulated (and approved) financial practices. Moreover, I argued that 
consumer education campaigns could be read as governmental techniques that essentially 
trained clients to self-enforce these practices. These management technologies and 
techniques work hand-in-hand with the discursive agendas inscribed in state policy 
documents like the microinsurance regulatory framework, which work to legitimize 
formalization processes, while simultaneously delegitimizing informal institutions. Thus, 
rather than advancing a financial inclusion agenda that heralds a broadly expanded access 
to the formal financial system, the drive to formalize has created new boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion, reifying, rather than erasing, the line between ideal and 
uninsurable clients. In the case of microinsurance, the benefits of financial inclusion are 
mainly reserved for those who can and do comply with formal institutional norms, rules, 
and practices. 
As I have demonstrated, the techniques deployed by state and industry actors 
have had discernable impacts on the institutional landscape. Where formal institutions 
have been effective in overlaying their operations onto local, community-based 
infrastructures, informal institutions have been shown to play key complementary roles 
in smoothing the circulation of premium and claims payments as well as providing 
pragmatic, context-appropriate mechanisms that safeguard at least some measure of 
accountability and transparency. But in many ways, the re-purposing of burial societies 
towards these new ends has shifted their core institutional logics away from mutualism 
toward logics that privilege the aims of profit. To the extent that this shift is fully 
realized, burial societies can become extractive institutional forms that dis-embed their 
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members from the traditional protections of reciprocity-based networks, and connect 
them to the new protections of the modern financial system.  
I have also shown that when the underlying institutional goals are misaligned, 
informal regulatory systems can compete with and/or undermine their formal 
counterparts. A good example of this is the case of funeral parlor contracts, which while 
having no legal standing, are nevertheless the de facto rules in force that often 
contravene formal insurance law. These incompatibilities may be inevitable since many 
informal institutions have evolved precisely to respond to the volatilities of these 
unregulated spaces; they are often necessary components that allow businesses like 
funeral parlors to survive. Whether these practices are “abusive” (as formal actors label 
them) or are “second-best” institutional approaches (Dixit, 2003; Grindle, 2004; Rodrik, 
200) that are more survivalist in nature, they have compelled state and industry players to 
adapt their own practices to work with or around them, and to make concessions that are 
reflected in formal regulatory reforms. Thus, while formal institutions induce change to 
informal infrastructures, informal institutions can also spark changes to formal insurance 
practice and regulation, though to a lesser extent due to the disparities in 
power/resources between formal and informal actors.  
In the second segment (Chapters 7-8), I shifted attention onto questions of 
individual agency by examining in closer detail both microinsurance providers and 
clients. As North (1990) argued, institutions impose “pervasive” constraints upon 
individual choice sets. What these constraints ultimately mean for agency continues to be 
an animating topic of inquiry for social science research. In my own study, I understood 
agency as the extent to which actors were empowered to shape the underlying 
institutions that regulate their actions. In applying this lens to microinsurance providers, 
particularly the intermediaries and mediators who facilitate the distribution of 
microinsurance products, it became clear that agency was largely a product of an actor’s 
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ability to maintain control over “critical junctures” (Wolf, 1956: p.1075) along a shifting 
institutional landscape. As insurance companies enter largely (formally) unregulated 
spaces and restructure the social infrastructures and relational networks, certain actors 
(e.g. funeral parlor operators) are better positioned than others to secure the benefits of 
the newly formed formal-informal partnerships. So long as these actors continue to 
accrue benefits from the prevailing institutional arrangements, they act to maintain the 
status quo. By contrast, actors who do not enjoy the same kind of control over critical 
junctures (e.g. burial society administrators) are largely reactive, rather than proactive in 
shaping institutional arrangements; their agency is thus much more constrained. 
Accounting for individual agency in this way is key to understanding how the benefits of 
microinsurance ultimately flow to the client. Since mediators play an important role in 
building coherence between formal and informal institutional systems, they also affect 
how benefits are distributed.  
Since microinsurance clients are limited in their ability to affect change to 
underlying institutional arrangements, their agency in this respect is heavily constrained. 
But in their case, the more relevant question regarding agency may refer back to the very 
founding mythologies of microfinance writ large. That is, has improved access to formal 
microinsurance empowered poor people to better protect themselves from risk? By 
comparing Jabulile and Goodwill’s experiences with microinsurance, I found that the 
answer is somewhat tautological: empowerment is a precondition of empowerment. 
Jabulile’s social and financial status gave her access to more quality sources of 
information that translated into an easy fluency with formal institutions. She was an ideal 
microinsurance client in the sense that her income was both sufficient and regular, which 
enabled her to obtain policies that had superior rand-for-rand value. And because her 
policy provided substantial cover, she was empowered in her negotiations with service 
providers like funeral parlors. In other words, microinsurance helped flip the power 
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dynamics in her favor. In Goodwill’s experience, by contrast, several factors had to break 
his way for him to receive a payout that, in the end, turned out to be insufficient to cover 
his liability. He was constrained not only by an institutional environment he did not trust, 
but by the very nature of his poverty. Goodwill was not empowered by microinsurance 
because he was not empowered to begin with. 
Empirical/Theoretical Reflections and Implications 
 
On Risk and Insurance 
  
Anthropologist Jane Guyer asks, “What is ‘risk’ as a transacted ‘thing’? From 
whom and to whom is it transferred? Since mitigation can only ever be partial, where is 
the excess located in relation to a theory of ownership?” (Guyer, 2009: p.215 citing 
Maurer, 1999). Implicit within Guyer’s line of questioning is the notion that risk, as a 
“transacted thing” is not eliminated or mitigated against entirely, but something that is 
transferred from one entity to another. This conceptualization of risk is a subtle yet 
significant departure from the fundamental economic case for microinsurance as a 
poverty reduction tool (Siegel et al., 2001; Churchill, 2006); insurance is understood here 
as a technology to “master” or eliminate risk altogether, and in so doing, remove a key 
driver of persistent poverty (Dercon et al., 2009). But in reflecting on Goodwill’s 
experience with microinsurance, I am struck most of all by the stark dissonance that 
exists between his enduring state of precarity and his expressed satisfaction with his 
Assupol funeral insurance policy. If successfully receiving an insurance claim of R14,000 
is the market instrument performing as it should, then his three days without food reveal 
the limits of the market in confronting the wider, more structural vulnerabilities that keep 
Goodwill in poverty.  
Perhaps, as I suggested to him, it was not worth the trouble. Perhaps it was more 
important to eat than to pay for a funeral. He responded by shaking his head and stating 
nonchalantly (again, in passing): “No, we must have the funeral. This is the way we bury 
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our dead.” What his comment reveals is that beneath all the rhetoric of financial 
inclusion and the ennobling objective of helping the poor manage their risk, 
microinsurance markets in South Africa are ultimately built upon the value insurance 
companies are able to see and to extract from the cultural/traditional values that people 
hold dear; insurance is the mechanism that transforms “values” into “value.” Thus, as 
François Ewald has argued: 
The insurer’s activity is not just a matter of passively registering the existence of risks, and then 
offering guarantees against them. He ‘produces risks’…It is characteristic of insurance that it 
constitutes a certain type of objectivity, giving certain familiar events a kind of reality, which 
alters their nature. By objectivizing certain events as risks, insurance can invert their meanings: 
it can make what was previously an obstacle into a possibility. Insurance assigns a new mode of 
existence to previously dreaded events; it creates value (Ewald, 1991: p.199-200). 
 
But what is lost in this transformation of values into value? In the spirit of Guyer’s 
inquiry, I attend to this question by posing another: From where and to where are 
microinsurance clients being transferred? Whether it be motivated by a desire to 
strengthen consumer protection or to eliminate informal competitors, it is the explicit 
and discursive aim of the microinsurance formalization agenda in South Africa to 
dislodge and replace “inefficient” and/or “abusive” informal mechanisms. Insurance 
creates new “abstract mutualities” in which human interests are grouped together not on 
the basis of interpersonal relationships, but rather on principles of “contractual justice” 
(ibid.: p.203-207). In other words, microinsurance clients are brought into a new sort of 
collective, from one based on local, intimate, and familiar relationships to one that is 
global, dispersed, and impersonal.   
In this movement, Ewald observes that insurance “combines a maximum of 
socialization with a maximum of individualization” (ibid: p.203), by which he means that 
individuals are “freed” or disembedded from what Douglas (1994) referred to as the “old 
protections,”—e.g. the social, cultural, and financial institutions embodied by burial 
societies—which constrain individuals in accordance with the communal rules, duties, 
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conventions, hierarchies, etc. in force. This corresponds with an individualization of risk 
as clients like Goodwill and Jabulile assume the responsibilities (and risks) delineated by 
an insurance contract. And although their risks are shared across what is now an 
anonymous and “abstract” collective, access to this form of risk mitigation hinges on 
their ability to perform as an ideal insurance subject should—a performance Jabulile was 
in a much stronger position than Goodwill to execute.  
On Financial Inclusion and Formal-Informal Institutional Dynamics 
 
To the extent that inclusion into formal insurance markets is successful and 
comprehensive, it removes individuals like Goodwill from an informal institutional 
environment with which he is familiar, and incorporates him into a formal sphere lacking 
in the “old protections.” But as this thesis has demonstrated, inclusion into formal 
insurance markets is neither comprehensive nor complete. The current state of the South 
African funeral and microinsurance market is far more complex and contested. Formal 
microinsurance institutions do not simply dislodge existing infrastructures, but rather 
interact with informal institutions and practices that have deep roots in cultural histories 
and even in the supernatural realm of the afterlife and ancestors. I argue that risk and 
welfare outcomes must be assessed through the prism of these interactions, which are 
mutually constitutive of social/power hierarchies.  
Empirically, by focusing attention on the underlying institutional dynamics that 
underpin South Africa’s microinsurance market, the thesis has signaled the importance of 
process rather than outcomes. While mainstream financial inclusion/inclusive market 
frameworks are mainly concerned with removing barriers to access (World Bank, 2014; 
Beck et al., 2009; Cull et al., 2014) and creating “enabling environments” for the 
development of more inclusive financial markets (Honohan and Beck, 2007; DFID-
SDC, 2008), achieving expanded inclusion is, in and of itself, the end goal/outcome. 
Critiques of these frameworks have rightly raised important questions about the possible 
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adverse effects, or the so-called “dark side” of inclusion (Meagher, 2015: p.839)—and 
the ways in which market-led development interventions like microfinance and Bottom-
of-the-Pyramid (BoP) ventures re-shape informal infrastructures according to their needs 
and objectives (Cross and Street, 2009; Dolan and Johnstone-Louis, 2011; Schwittay, 
2011; Dolan and Roll, 2013). But as I have argued, these critiques are somewhat 
deterministic and one-sided in the way they understand the formal-informal dynamic.  
In my own study, I attempted to move beyond structurally deterministic accounts 
of unimpeded formalization, and focused more on how processes of negotiation and 
contestation—in a word, politics—produced institutional/regulatory outcomes. And as I 
have shown, regulatory outcomes can span a number of possibilities. Informal burial 
societies can become more regimented, abandoning flexible mechanisms that have long 
accommodated members with volatile incomes. Funeral parlor operations can become 
more opaque as they seek to consolidate their control over the circulation of premium 
and claims payments. Yet another possibility is that burial societies and funeral parlors 
can elect to fully register their operations with the state and comply with formal 
regulations.  
In light of these various outcomes, one of the key insights of this study is that 
institutional (and welfare) outcomes are not engineered, but rather result from a dynamic, 
negotiated process between institutions and actors. Formal and informal institutions 
interact in a myriad of complementary and competing ways. Even if state policymakers 
and regulators managed to craft tailored legislation suited to the informal market, their 
ability to enforce it hinges on its perceived legitimacy and ability to garner trust, which 
require constant engagement and negotiation. And while microinsurance systems do 
restructure and re-purpose informal infrastructures according to their needs, they must 
also adapt to long established local practices and rules, which have served as the de facto 
institutional mechanisms regulating the informal space.  
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Implicit within financial inclusion/inclusive markets discourse is the assumption 
that newly included actors would passively accept the legitimacy of formal institutions. 
Instead, what I found was that informal providers and microinsurance clients behaved 
more like “bricoleurs” (Cleaver, 2012) by drawing upon and piecing together both formal 
and informal institutions to address their risk management needs. Financial inclusion did 
not result in the replacement of informal institutions, but rather produced new formal-
informal institutional arrangements, which actors actively pieced together and learned to 
navigate. 
On Mediators and Power 
 
An institutional approach also allowed me to account more fully for power, not 
just in the way formal entities wielded it to shape the funeral insurance market, but also 
in the way local power hierarchies structure the unregulated, informal space, and effected 
change in formal institutions, in turn. Recognizing that the informal institutional space 
was full of complex power hierarchies, I was prompted to treat this area of my research 
with a greater degree of specificity. In this regard, it was productive, both empirically and 
theoretically, to bring to bear the anthropological/sociological work done on 
mediators/brokers. As it relates to my analysis of formal-informal institutional dynamics, 
this scholarship directed my attention to the crucial role of mediators (i.e. insurance sales 
agents, funeral parlor operators, burial society administrators, and mobile network 
operators, etc.) in forging institutional cohesion through their work of “translation,” 
(Mosse and Lewis, 2006) that is, negotiating between and cohering disparate frameworks 
(i.e. knowledge systems, ways of thinking and behaving, formal-informal institutional 
spheres etc.). Since mediators are social actors embedded within existing networks and 
hierarchies, by extension, it became possible to examine institutional processes through 
the prism of these relational power structures.  
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James (2011: p.1) adds that brokers do not merely negotiate between the spheres 
they mediate, but also “embody and bring into being socio-economic positions and 
identities.” Examples from my study were insurance sales agents like Lindelwa and 
Zenzile who adopted and deployed their social as well as professional identities in order 
to simultaneously generate trust with their clients (through affective forms of labor) and 
to discipline them into being more reliable insurance subjectivities. Moreover, in their 
study of development brokers in post-colonial West Africa, Bierschenk et al. (2002: p.2) 
observed that in the context of marked power differentials and heterogeneous 
governance systems, mediators “were not confined to the role of transmission belts” and 
had agency to act according to their own self-interest: 
They had no qualms about deviating and amplifying the function prescribed by the colonial 
infrastructure, and influenced the orientation of colonial policy and practice in keeping with their 
own interests or based on their own systems of political conceptions (ibid.: p.2). 
 
I found that as the formal microinsurance system recalibrates the space, new incentives 
and opportunities are produced along the formal-informal value chain, which some 
actors are in better positions than others to leverage for their own self-interest. Funeral 
parlor operators like Dumile of Hlubi Funeral Services have started to shift their 
operations away from the more limited opportunities of an informal service provider to 
more profitable, entrepreneurial models that rely heavily on commissions paid out by 
insurance companies. Meanwhile, long-time burial society administrators like Daniel 
Masego speak with some resignation about the declining relevance of burial societies as 
they enter into partnerships with underwriters. The critical roles they once played in 
instituting and enforcing rules designed to foster solidarity, reciprocity, and cohesion, are 
increasingly confined to performing intermediary services for insurance companies.  
 I have argued that these differential outcomes can be explained by the power 
inequalities embedded within the social field; access to and control over the “critical 
junctures” along the microinsurance value chain are by no means equal and determine 
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much in the way actors can respond to new opportunities and constraints. Contrary, 
then, to the rosy view that expanded access to the formal financial market results in a 
broad-based, equitable distribution of benefits, financial inclusion can instead entrench 
existing power inequalities, which ultimately distorts how benefits (and risks) are 
ultimately distributed. Thus, an institutional analysis of microinsurance markets with an 
empirical focus on mediators/intermediaries, has helped to reveal the underlying political 
economy of risk and insurance. But what does this imply for microinsurance clients?  
For the poor in South Africa, burying a beloved family member requires them to 
navigate this hybridized (formal-informal) institutional space, which is shaped by 
relations of power. Positive welfare and risk management outcomes in this endeavor are 
not determined as a function of greater access to or inclusion within the formal insurance 
system necessarily, but more by the constant negotiation of institutional structures and 
individual agents. A key implication here is that access to formal financial services may be 
necessary, but in no way sufficient for the poor to secure the benefits of financial 
inclusion. While for “ideal” clients like Jabulile—who has the resources, experience, and 
familiarity with formal institutional environments—simple access may be sufficient, 
Goodwill’s relative lack of fluency with formal institutions puts him at greater risk of 
non-payment, or exploitation by more powerful market actors. In other words, he has 
become a risk-bearer (Maurer, 1999)—or perhaps more accurately, the bearer of risks 
produced by markets—minus the tools, resources, or knowledge he needs to effectively 
manage these “new” risks. From this I argue that it is not so much that microinsurance 
empowers poor individuals like Goodwill, but it is empowered individuals like Jabulile 
who are in any sort of position to reliably benefit from microinsurance. 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 The main contributions of this thesis have been produced by bringing together 
the theoretical literature on institutions and the empirical research on financial inclusion 
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and microinsurance. Through an institutional lens, financial inclusion narratives and 
frameworks that fixate on expanding access to excluded individuals have been shown to 
be overly narrow. A wider frame that encompasses, and even centers informal 
institutions, has helped move beyond financial inclusion as an end in and of itself, to 
more critical insights about what this inclusion means for microinsurance clients as well 
as their networks, norms, infrastructures, and traditions. Moreover, the thesis has pushed 
back against more deterministic critiques that have mainly been concerned with the 
power of formal market actors and institutions in calibrating the social field. As I have 
argued, informal institutions continue to affect regulatory outcomes despite a 
formalization agenda that has worked to delegitimize them. Institutional theory has 
provided a way to analyze these formal and informal risk management institutions within 
the same frame. 
 The empirical insights of this study on microinsurance have also contributed to 
institutional theory. My focus on mediators/intermediaries and the crucial roles they play 
in cohering formal microinsurance systems with local socio-cultural institutions 
demonstrates that individual actors are integral to processes of institutional development 
and change. New Institutional Economics (NIE) perspectives are primarily concerned 
with “getting institutions right” particularly as it relates to igniting economic growth 
(Casson et al., 2010 referring to Acemoglu et al., 2002; Glaeser et al., 2004; Acemoglu & 
Johnson, 2005; Aghion et al., 2005) and/or improving market inclusion (e.g. Marshall, 
2004; Fergusson, 2006; DFID-SDC, 2008; Mair et al., 2012). These technical, design-
based perspectives often ignore macro and micro-level politics and the ways in which 
even constrained actors can circumvent, contest, or even undermine institutional 
arrangements. And while critical institutional scholarship has expanded the frame to 
account for politics and individual agency (see De Soysa and Jütting, 2007; Casson et al., 
2010), Cleaver (2012: p. 22) argues that there is a tendency for these perspectives to 
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focus too much on “the exercise of power by the disadvantaged—a celebration of local 
instances of resistance or of collective action without tracking their real and lasting 
effects on outcomes.”  
I have attempted to avoid this ideological trap by bringing individual agency 
closer to the center of institutional theoretical frameworks. Welfare outcomes were not 
interpreted through a formalist, design-based lens nor a politics of resistance, but rather 
through an empirically grounded analysis of the interactions between institutional 
structures and individual agents. Still, further theoretical work needs to be done in order 
to more precisely conceptualize the role of individual actors in processes of institutional 
development. I contend that the vast literature on brokers and mediators hold promise in 
this regard. 
Finally, this thesis has signaled the need for further empirical research that 
focuses more on the role of informal, social institutions in shaping risk outcomes. In 
designing a study that sought to cast a wide frame that encompassed formal/informal 
institutions, individual agents, as well as the power relations that structure these 
interactions, a degree of depth was lost. Although a handful of scholars have made 
informal institutions (i.e. gender, caste, class, religion, etc.) the explicit focus of their 
studies (see Helmke and Levitsky, 2006; Williamson, 2009; Asadullah and Chaudhury, 
2010; Granville and Leonard, 2010; Harriss-White, 2004; Harriss-White, 2010), more 
work needs to be done to connect these scattered insights to a coherent theory on 
formal-informal institutional dynamics. This work would have strong potential to 
contribute further insight to the existing scholarship on financial inclusion, inclusive 
markets, and microfinance/microinsurance. As formal market institutions penetrate low-
income spaces, they do not encounter “institutional voids” (Webb et al., 2010: p.556), 
but rather, dynamic social fields full of (informal) institutions that have evolved through 
social, political, and cultural transition. While future studies can focus on the regulatory 
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impacts of these informal institutions in more depth, the current study has examined the 
breadth of institutions and actors that are activated by the need to “bury well” in South 
Africa.  
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Appendix A—Framework for Analyzing Institutions and Development 
 
 
 
 
Source: De Soysa, I., & Jütting, J. (2007). Informal institutions and development: How 
they matter and what makes them change. In Johannes Jütting, Denis Drechsler, 
Sebastian Bartsch, and Indra de Soysa (Ed.), Informal institutions: How social norms help or 
hinder development. OECD Publishing.  
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Appendix B—Adapted Framework for Analyzing Microinsurance Institutions 
 
 
Formal Institutional Environment 
 
  
 
 Virtuous Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
   Financial 
   inclusion                
Contestation,     
  negotiation, circumvention 
         
 
 
 
 
Income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Welfare/Risk Outcome 
 
  
 Poverty Penalty     
 
 
Informal Institutional Environment  
Institutional/Regulatory Outcome 
Formal Institutions 
Intermediaries/Mediators 
(Agency of Gatekeepers) 
Informal Institutions 
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Appendix C—Topic Guides 
 
Topic Guide 1: Insurance Companies 
 
1. Introduction 
a. Introduce the focus of the research project: The research project is 
interested in understanding how insurance companies work with 
community-based structures and institutions in the microinsurance space.  
b. Anonymity: Inform participant that their real name will not be used. They 
can stop the interview at any time or decline to answer any question. If 
there is anything the respondent wishes to omit from the transcript, they 
are free to indicate so. 
c. Ask permission to record the interview. 
2. Warm-up Questions  
a. Just to start, can you give me a general description of what your role is 
with the company? 
b. How long have you been with [insurance company]? 
3. Insurance company specific questions (Questions that are unique to each 
insurance company) 
a. How does [insurance company] approach the low-income market? 
4. Experience working with informal operators 
a. Can you describe the relationship with these informal operators like 
burial societies and funeral parlors? In what ways do you work with 
them? 
b. What are some of the biggest challenges in working with informal 
operators? 
c. Aside from selling to the low-income market, do you also provide 
employment opportunities by hiring sales agents from those 
communities? 
d. Since insurance is a complicated product, does your company have to 
engage in consumer education as part of your core strategy? How is this 
approached? 
e. How have you leveraged technology to reach low-income clients? 
5. Formalization/Regulation 
a. What are the main motivations or incentives insurance companies have in 
the formalization process? 
b. What are some changes you would like to see to make it easier for you as 
a microinsurer to operate in the low-income market? 
c. How do insurance companies work with informal regulatory systems? 
6. Conclusion 
a. What do you envision is the future of the microinsurance market in 
South Africa? 
b. Snowball method: Ask if there are any other contacts that I can be put in 
touch with 
c. Thank the respondent for their time in answering the questions 
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Topic Guide 2: State Regulator/Legislators 
 
1. Introduction 
a. Introduce the focus of the research project: The research project is 
interested in understanding how formal and informal institutions interact 
in the microinsurance regulatory space.  
b. Anonymity: Inform participant that their real name will not be used. They 
can stop the interview at any time or decline to answer any question. If 
there is anything the respondent wishes to omit from the transcript, they 
are free to indicate so. 
c. Ask permission to record the interview. 
2. Warm-up Questions  
a. What is the current status of microinsurance regulation in South Africa? 
3. Regulatory Environment 
a. What are the primary factors shaping microinsurance regulation? 
b. What are the state’s policy priorities with regard to regulating 
microinsurance markets? 
4. State perspectives and approaches to the informal sector 
a. What is the state’s enforcement strategy regarding microinsurance 
regulation? 
b. How does the state view informal institutions and operators like burial 
societies and funeral parlors? 
c. How would you describe the process of formalization? What are the main 
challenges? 
d. What are some support structures that the state has in place to ease the 
formalization process? 
e. How is the state adapting to the increasing use of technology in the 
microinsurance space? 
f. Did the state engage with informal operators on regulation? If so, what 
was the nature of this engagement? 
5. Conclusion 
a. What do you envision is the future of the microinsurance market in 
South Africa? 
b. Snowball method: Ask if there are any other contacts that I can be put in 
touch with 
c. Thank the respondent for their time in answering the questions 
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Topic Guide 3: Informal Providers (Funeral Parlors and Burial Societies) 
 
1. Introduction 
a. Introduce the focus of the research project: The research project is 
interested in understanding the relationship between insurance companies 
and funeral parlors/burial societies. I’m interested in getting your 
perspective on what you think of insurance companies.  
b. Anonymity: Inform participant that their real name will not be used. They 
can stop the interview at any time or decline to answer any question. If 
there is anything the respondent wishes to omit from the transcript, they 
are free to indicate so. 
c. Ask permission to record the interview. 
2. Warm-up Questions  
a. How did you get started in the funeral parlor business (or burial society)? 
b. How is business going for you? 
3. Funeral Parlor specific business (Questions that are unique to funeral parlors) 
a. How do you primarily finance your business? How does it work? 
b. How do you determine price? 
c. How does your business compete with other funeral parlors who may be 
doing things illegally? 
4. Perspectives formal insurance and regulations 
a. Describe your relationship with the insurance company. 
b. As a funeral parlor, what are some of the rules that you have to follow 
when you partner with an insurance company? 
c. What are the advantages or disadvantages of working with insurance 
companies?  
5. Experience with clients 
a. How do you deal with poor clients who have trouble paying? 
6. Regulatory Environment 
a. What is the process to become registered? 
b. What are the incentives to becoming a “formal” business? 
c. What are some of the challenges of dealing with formal regulations? 
d. What are the community rules that you must follow? 
e. What are the legal rules that you must follow? 
7. Conclusion 
a. What are the biggest challenges for you in doing this funeral parlor 
business? 
b. Snowball method: Ask if there are any other contacts that I can be put in 
touch with 
c. Thank the respondent for their time in answering the questions. 
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Topic Guide 4: Clients 
 
Thank you for taking the time to answer a few questions. My name is Christopher and I am a 
research student. I am working with Sandisiwe to understand your feelings about insurance 
companies and what you think about some of their products and services. 
 
Before we start, there are a couple things I would like you to know: 1) I am doing this research as 
a student in a university in the UK; I don’t work for an insurance company. 2) Anything you 
share with me will be kept completely confidential and will be kept secure. I will not share any of 
your personal details with anyone. So feel free to share any answers that you are comfortable to 
share. If you are uncomfortable in any way, you can withdraw at any time.  
 
There will be two sections. First, we will ask you some questions and you can answer any way 
you like. Second, we will each give you a paper and will ask you to fill in your answers with pen. 
Let’s start with the first section. 
 
Dialogue and Open-ended Questions 
1. How is life going for you? 
2. Where do you come from? 
3. What are some of the things you worry about day to day? 
4. How did you first hear about insurance? 
5. What kind of insurance do you have? 
6. How much do you pay in monthly premiums and what is the payout amount? 
7. How many people do you cover with your insurance? 
8. What was your main motivation to buy insurance? 
9. How do you make your insurance payments? 
10. What are your feelings about insurance agents?  
11. What is something about insurance that you want to see improved? 
12. Are you or your spouse part of a burial society or funeral parlour? 
a. If yes:  
i. How much is your monthly payment into the burial society? 
ii. Why are you part of a burial society and also have an insurance policy at 
the same time? 
iii. Who is also part of the burial society in which you are a member? 
iv. Do you see other burial society members regularly or do you just make 
payments every month? 
v. How many burial societies are you a part of? 
13. Do you own a mobile phone? 
a. If yes: What type of phone do you own? 
i. What do you use your phone to do? 
ii. Does your insurance company contact you regularly through your 
phone? 
iii. Do you use your phone to do insurance? 
iv. If yes:  
1. What are some of the things you like about using your phone 
to do insurance?  
2. What are some of the things you don’t like? 
3. Did you receive advice about insurance before you signed up 
for this product? If so, who gave you this advice? 
v. If no: 
1. If you could do all your insurance business on the phone, 
would you prefer to do that or would you prefer to come into 
the office? Why?  
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Appendix D—Formal Funeral Insurance Marketing Brochures 
 
 
 
Source: KGA Life 
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Source: KGA Life 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 297 
Appendix E—Informal Funeral Insurance Marketing Brochures  
 
 
 
Source: Gcilishe-Taliwe Funeral Parlor 
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Source:  Hlubi Funeral Parlor 
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Appendix F—Survey (English) 
 
1. What is your gender? (Circle one) 
a. Male 
b. Female 
 
2. What year were you born?     
 
3. Are you married? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
4. Who lives with you in your home?    
 
5. Who earns the main income of your household?     
 
6. What are the sources of your income for your household? (Circle all that apply) 
a. Regular salary from a job 
b. Self-Employed  
c. Domestic Worker 
d. Grants/Pensions 
i. Which grant(s) do you receive?   
e. Seasonal jobs/Odd jobs 
f. Money from relatives who don’t live with you 
g. Other source of income:     
 
7. Approximately, how much is your household income per month? (Circle one) 
a. Less than R800 per month 
b. R801-R1,400 per month 
c. R1,401-R2,500 per month 
d. R2,501-R5,000 per month 
e. More than R5,001 per month 
 
8. Do you have a bank account? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
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Thank you for all your responses. They were very helpful. Now I am going to pass out 
pen and paper for you to answer some questions. We are doing it on paper so you can 
keep this information secret. If you have any trouble with these questions, please ask us, 
and we will help you. 
 
Risk Experiences 
We all face many risks in our lives. Even though we worry about all these risks, I would 
like to know which risks you worry about the most in your daily life.  
 
Below, you will see three boxes. Within each box, please rank, from 1-4, which risk you 
worry about the most, and which risk you worry about the least.  
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
Please rank from 1-4. Place a ‘1’ for the risk you worry about the most, and place a ‘4’ 
for the risk you worry about the least. 
 
Damage to your home    
 
Sickness of a family member    
 
Providing for your family in case something happens to you    
 
Losing your job or your source of income    
 
Please rank from 1-4. Place a ‘1’ for the risk you worry about the most, and place a ‘4’ 
for the risk you worry about the least. 
 
Having to go to the hospital because of an illness   
 
Someone stealing your property   
 
Owing money to a bank or to a friend/relative and not being able to pay it back   
 
Death of a family member   
 
 
Please rank from 1-4. Place a ‘1’ for the risk you worry about the most, and place a ‘4’ 
for the risk you worry about the least. 
 
Someone stealing your money    
 
Paying for a funeral    
 
Getting hurt because of an accident    
 
Losing or damaging something valuable you own (e.g. mobile phone, jewelry, etc.)   
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Insurance Experiences  
 
Next, I would like to ask you about how you feel about insurance. Please respond to 
each item on a scale of 1-7, 1 being ‘Not at all’ and 7 being ‘Very much so’: 
 
 
 
1. How much do you trust insurance companies? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
2. How well does your current insurance policy address your needs? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
3. How helpful is the advice you receive from insurance agents? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
4. How comfortable do you feel dealing with the insurance company if you 
have any problems with your policy? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
5. How important is it for you to have face-to-face interaction with an 
insurance agent? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
6. How confident are you that the insurance company will pay out your 
claim? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
7. How convenient is the process of making your premium payments? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
8. Do you feel that the way your insurance company communicates with you 
is helpful? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not at all         Somewhat                  Very Much So 
1         2                3               4            5         6               7 
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Mobile Insurance Experiences 
 
Finally, I would like to ask you to rate your experience of the mobile insurance product. 
After reading each statement, please respond on a scale of 1-7, 1 being ‘I Disagree 
Strongly’ and 7 being ‘I Agree Strongly’: 
 
 
 
1. Doing insurance on my phone has made it easier for me to pay my 
premiums. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
2. Doing insurance on my phone is easy for me to understand. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
3. If a problem comes up, I am confident that someone from the insurance 
company will help me. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
4. I prefer to do all my insurance transactions on the phone rather than going 
into a store. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
5. I feel that my money is safe doing insurance transactions on my phone. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
6. The phone has made it easier for me to receive my claims. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
7. I am satisfied with the mobile insurance product. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
8. The mobile insurance product has improved my overall experience with 
insurance. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I Disagree         Somewhat Agree               I Agree  
Strongly           Strongly 
          1          2                 3               4             5             6                7 
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Appendix G—Survey (Translated to isiXhosa) 
 
1. Yintoni isini sakho ? (rhangqa ibenye) 
a. ubudoda 
b. ubufazi 
 
2. Wazalwa ngowuphi unyaka ?     
 
3. Utshatile ? 
a. Ewe 
b. Hayi 
4. Ingaba ngubani ohlala nawe ekhaya?    
 
5. Ngubani ongoyena orhola ingeniso ekhaya ?     
 
6. Ingaba ingeniso yasekhaya ifumaneka phi ? (rhangqa ibenye) 
a. Umrholo ofumaneka rhoqo emsebenzini  
b. Uziqashile okanye uyaziphangelela 
c. Umntu Oncedisayo  
d. Isibonelelo sika rhulumente okanye umhlala phantsi  
i. Zeziphi Izibonelelo ozifumanayo?    
e. Imisebenzi enezaquphe  
f. Imali evela kwizihlobo ongahlali nazo  
g. Ezinye indlela zofumana imali:     
 
7. Ingaba mngakanani umlinganiselo wengeniso yasekhayeni ngenyanga? (rhangqa 
ibenye ) 
a. Ngaphantsi ko  R800 nge nyanga 
b. R801-R1,400 nge nyanga 
c. R1,401-R2,500 nge nyanga 
d. R2,501-R5,000 nge nyanga 
e. More than R5,001 nge nyanga 
 
8. Ingaba unayo I account yase bhankini? 
a. Ewe 
b. Hayi 
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Amava nge Risk 
 
Sijongana nemingsipheko emininzi ebomini. Noxa nje siba nexhala malunga 
nalemingcipheko, ndingathanda ukubuza ukuba yeyiphi eyona mingcipheko othi 
uxhalabe ngayo kakhulu kwimpilo yakho yemihla ngeminhla. Ngezantsi apha uyawuthi 
ubone ii bhokisi ezintathu, kwi bhokisi nganya ndicela ulandelelanise uqala ku 1 
uyokutsho ku 4 ukuba ngowuphi owona mngcipheko othi uxhalabe ngawo ikakhulu 
kwaye ingowuphi umngcipheko othi uxhalabe ngawo kancinci. 
 
1. 
 
2. 
 
3. 
 
 
Ndicela ulandelelanise uqala ku 1 uyotsho ku 4. Beka u 1 endaweni yowona mncgipheko 
okuxhalabisa kakhulu ube sewubeka u 4 kowona mngcipheko okuxhalabisa kancinci. 
 
Ukumoshakala kwe khaya lakho     
 
Ukugula komntu ohlobene naye wasekhayeni     
 
Ukuncedisana nekhaya lakho ukuba kungakho into ekwehlelayo     
 
Ukulahlekelwa ngumsebenzi okanye indlela yemali ngeniso    
 
Ndicela ulandelelanise uqala ku 1 uyotsho ku 4. Beka u 1 endaweni yowona mncgipheko 
okuxhalabisa kakhulu ube sewubeka u 4 kowona mngcipheko okuxhalabisa kancinci. 
 
Ukuya esibhedlele ngenxa yesigulo    
 
Ukubelwa izinto ngumntu   
Ityala le bhanki okanye elesihlobo sakho ongakwazi ukulibatala   
Ukusweleka komntu ozalana naye   
 
 
Ndicela ulandelelanise uqala ku 1 uyotsho ku 4. Beka u 1 endaweni yowona mncgipheko 
okuxhalabisa kakhulu ube sewubeka u 4 kowona mngcipheko okuxhalabisa kancinci. 
 
Ukubelwa imali ngumntu     
 
Ukubhatalela umngcwabi     
 
Ukulimala ngenxa yengozi    
 
Ukulahlekelwa okanye ukumoshakalelwa yinto elulutho kuwe (umzekele, imfonomfono, 
ubucwebe nezinye ).    
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Amava nge Insurance  
 
Ndicela ukubuza ukuba uziva njani nge insurance. Ndicela iimpendulo zakho 
uzibonakalise ngokwemilinganiseloyamanani uqala engu  1-7, u-1 ebonakalisa ukuba 
awuziva kakuhle konke konke ’ u-7 ebonakalisa ukuba uziva kakuhle ngayo I insurance : 
 
 
 
1. Ingaba uzithembe kangakanani ii Nkampani ze insurance? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
2. Ingaba le polisi yakho ye insurance unayo ihlangabezana kakuhle 
kangakanani nezidingo zakho? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
3. Ingaba ingcebiso ozifumana kummeli we insurance yakho ziluncedo 
kangakanani? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
4. Uziva ukhululeke kangakanani ukujongana ne nkampani ekunika I 
insurance xa ngabe unengxaki ne polisi ? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
5. Ibaluleke kangakanani kuwe into yokujongana buqu nomntu 
osisithunywa se insurance ? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
6. Ingaba Uqiniseke kangakanani ukuba le nkampani yakho ye insurance 
izakuwabhatala amabango akho kuyo ? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
7. Ingaba umcimbi wobhatala izavenge zakho ze insurance ulula 
kangakanani? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
8. Ingaba iluncedo njani  indlela enxebelelana nawe ngayo inkampani yakho 
ye insurance ? 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
 
 
 
Awuziva kakuhle      Usesiphakathini                         Uziva kakuhle 
  
1     2              3            4              5          6       7 
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Amava nge Mobile Insurance Experiences 
 
Okokugqibela ndingathanda ukulubuza ngamava kwi nkonzo ye insurance ekwi 
mfonomfono , emva kokufunda umqolo ngamnye ndicela uphendule ngokomlinganiselo 
wamanani u 1-7. U-1 ebonakalisa ukuba awuvumi konke konke kwaye u 7 ebonakalisa 
ukuba uvuma kakhulu ngokuqinisekileyo. 
 
 
1. Ukwenza I insurance kwi mfonomfono yam kwenze lula ukuba ndibhatale 
I insurance yam. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
2. Ukwenza I insurance kwi mfonomfono yam kulula ukuqonda. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
3. Xa kukho ingxaku evelayo ndiqinisekile ukuba ukhona umntu we 
nkampani ye insurance ozokundinceda.  
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
4. Ndikhetha ukuzenza zonke izinto ezimalunga ne insurance yam kwi 
mfonomfono yam kubona ndiye kwi sitolo. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
5. Ndiva ngathi imali yam ikhuselekile  xa ndisenza ii transactions zam ze 
insurance kwi mfonomfono yam. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
6. Imfonomfono iyenze kwalula ukuba ndikwazi ukufuma ii claims zam ze 
insurance. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
7. Ndanelisekile yile yile nkonzo ye insurance ikwi mfonomfono. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
8. Le nkonzo ye insurance ekwi mfonomfono iyiphucule indlela endiziva 
ngayo namava kwi insurance. 
1         2                3               4            5        6              7 
 
  
Andivumelani           ndisesiphakathini     Ndivumelana kakhulu 
          
1         2                3                 4              5            6       7 
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Appendix H—Survey Results (N=76)  
 
Where does the Respondent Originally Come From? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Eastern Cape 71 93.4 93.4 93.4 
2 Western Cape 3 3.9 3.9 97.4 
3 Kwazulu-Natal 1 1.3 1.3 98.7 
4 Northern Cape 1 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 308 
Gender 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Male 19 25.0 25.0 25.0 
2 Female 57 75.0 75.0 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
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Respondent’s Age 
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Respondent's Marital Status 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Married 33 43.4 43.4 43.4 
2 Not Married 43 56.6 56.6 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
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How Many People Live in the Respondent's House? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 6 7.9 7.9 7.9 
2 12 15.8 15.8 23.7 
3 12 15.8 15.8 39.5 
4 17 22.4 22.4 61.8 
5 9 11.8 11.8 73.7 
6 13 17.1 17.1 90.8 
7 3 3.9 3.9 94.7 
8 2 2.6 2.6 97.4 
11 1 1.3 1.3 98.7 
12 1 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
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Respondent's Employment Type 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Regular Salary 25 32.9 32.9 32.9 
2 Self-Employed 22 28.9 28.9 61.8 
4 Seasonal/Odd Jobs 4 5.3 5.3 67.1 
5 Unemployed 25 32.9 32.9 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
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Monthly Household Income Bracket 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Less than R800 16 21.1 21.1 21.1 
2 R801-R1400 17 22.4 22.4 43.4 
3 R1401-R2500 22 28.9 28.9 72.4 
4 R2501-R5000 17 22.4 22.4 94.7 
5 More than R5001 4 5.3 5.3 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
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Does the Respondent have a Bank Account? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Yes 48 63.2 63.2 63.2 
2 No 28 36.8 36.8 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 315 
Respondent's Grant Type 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Child Grant 23 30.3 30.3 30.3 
2 Old Age Pension 10 13.2 13.2 43.4 
3 Disability Grant 10 13.2 13.2 56.6 
4 No Grant 33 43.4 43.4 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
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Do Respondent's have Formal/Informal Insurance, Neither, or Both? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 Formal Insurance Only 33 43.4 43.4 43.4 
2 Burial Society Cover Only 19 25.0 25.0 68.4 
3 Both Formal Insurance and 
Burial Society Cover 
16 21.1 21.1 89.5 
4 No Formal Insurance or Burial 
Society Cover 
8 10.5 10.5 100.0 
Total 76 100.0 100.0  
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Monthly Expenditure on Formal 
Insurance Premiums (Rands) 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
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Monthly Expenditure on Burial 
Society Membership Dues (Rands) 
N Valid 35 
Missing 41 
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Ranked Attitudes Toward Risks Related to Property (‘1’ indicates higher rank and 
thus higher level of concern) 
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Ranked Attitudes Toward Risks Related to Health (‘1’ indicates higher rank and 
thus higher level of concern) 
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Ranked Attitudes Toward Risks Related to Life (‘1’ indicates higher rank and 
thus higher level of concern) 
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Ranked Attitudes Toward Risks Related to Income Security (‘1’ indicates higher 
rank and thus higher level of concern) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 323 
How Much Do You Trust 
Insurance Companies? 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
 
How Much Do You Trust Insurance Companies? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 1 1.3 2.0 2.0 
2 2 2.6 4.1 6.1 
3 4 5.3 8.2 14.3 
4 4 5.3 8.2 22.4 
5 3 3.9 6.1 28.6 
6 2 2.6 4.1 32.7 
7 33 43.4 67.3 100.0 
Total 49 64.5 100.0  
Missing 9 Not Applicable 27 35.5   
Total 76 100.0   
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How Well Does Your Current Insurance 
Policy Address Your Needs? 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
 
How Well Does Your Current Insurance Policy Address Your Needs? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 1 1.3 2.0 2.0 
3 1 1.3 2.0 4.1 
4 9 11.8 18.4 22.4 
5 8 10.5 16.3 38.8 
6 4 5.3 8.2 46.9 
7 26 34.2 53.1 100.0 
Total 49 64.5 100.0  
Missing 9 Not Applicable 27 35.5   
Total 76 100.0   
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How Helpful is the Advice You 
Receive From Insurance Agents? 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
 
How Helpful is the Advice You Receive From Insurance Agents? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2 1 1.3 2.0 2.0 
4 5 6.6 10.2 12.2 
5 6 7.9 12.2 24.5 
6 6 7.9 12.2 36.7 
7 31 40.8 63.3 100.0 
Total 49 64.5 100.0  
Missing 9 Not Applicable 27 35.5   
Total 76 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 326 
How Comfortable Do You Feel Dealing 
with the Insurance Company if You Have 
Any Problems with Your Policy? 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
 
How Comfortable Do You Feel Dealing with the Insurance Company if You Have Any Problems 
with Your Policy? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 2 2.6 4.1 4.1 
2 1 1.3 2.0 6.1 
3 2 2.6 4.1 10.2 
4 5 6.6 10.2 20.4 
5 2 2.6 4.1 24.5 
6 3 3.9 6.1 30.6 
7 34 44.7 69.4 100.0 
Total 49 64.5 100.0  
Missing 9 Not Applicable 27 35.5   
Total 76 100.0   
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How Important is it for You to Have Face-to-
Face Interaction with an Insurance Agent? 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
 
How Important is it for You to Have Face-to-Face Interaction with an Insurance Agent? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 2 2.6 4.1 4.1 
2 1 1.3 2.0 6.1 
4 1 1.3 2.0 8.2 
5 2 2.6 4.1 12.2 
6 2 2.6 4.1 16.3 
7 41 53.9 83.7 100.0 
Total 49 64.5 100.0  
Missing 9 Not Applicable 27 35.5   
Total 76 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 328 
How Confident Are You that the Insurance 
Company will Pay Out Your Claim? 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
 
How Confident Are You that the Insurance Company will Pay Out Your Claim? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 1 1.3 2.0 2.0 
2 1 1.3 2.0 4.1 
3 3 3.9 6.1 10.2 
4 4 5.3 8.2 18.4 
5 7 9.2 14.3 32.7 
6 6 7.9 12.2 44.9 
7 27 35.5 55.1 100.0 
Total 49 64.5 100.0  
Missing 9 Not Applicable 27 35.5   
Total 76 100.0   
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How Convenient is the Process of Making 
Your Premium Payments? 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
 
How Convenient is the Process of Making Your Premium Payments? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 1 1.3 2.0 2.0 
3 1 1.3 2.0 4.1 
4 1 1.3 2.0 6.1 
5 1 1.3 2.0 8.2 
7 45 59.2 91.8 100.0 
Total 49 64.5 100.0  
Missing 9 Not Applicable 27 35.5   
Total 76 100.0   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 330 
Do You Feel that the Way Your Insurance 
Company Communicates With You is Helpful? 
N Valid 49 
Missing 27 
 
Do You Feel that the Way Your Insurance Company Communicates With You is Helpful? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 1 3 3.9 6.1 6.1 
2 2 2.6 4.1 10.2 
4 4 5.3 8.2 18.4 
5 1 1.3 2.0 20.4 
6 5 6.6 10.2 30.6 
7 34 44.7 69.4 100.0 
Total 49 64.5 100.0  
Missing 9 Not Applicable 27 35.5   
Total 76 100.0   
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Appendix I—In/Out Migration Figures: South Africa, 2011 and 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa, 2016 
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Appendix J—Consumer Education Booklet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 333 
 
 
Source: Financial Services Board: Consumer Education (Republic of South Africa) 
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Appendix K—Comparison of Average Premium/Benefit Ratios (N=76) 
  
Informal Insurance, Formal Insurance, and M-Insurance 
 
 
Retail Insurance (Formal) 
Premium (Month)  R196 ($14.39) 
Benefit R20,663 ($1,523.25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Burial Societies/Funeral Parlors (Informal) 
Premium (Month) R157 ($11.52) 
Benefit R13,842 ($1,020) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M-Insurance 
 Premium Benefit 
 
R60 ($4) R10,000 ($656) 
    
 
Free 
(R100 Airtime Spend) 
R10,000 ($656) 
           R100 R18,000 ($1,180) 
 
R10 ($.65)* R15,000 ($982) 
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Appendix L—Funeral Services and Service Providers 
 
 
 
 
Source: Van den Berg (2016)- Cutting corners at a most vulnerable time: The customer’s 
perspective on abuses in the informal funeral parlour market in South Africa. Cenfri 
 
